

‘Lain Beside Gold’

Narrative, Metaphor, and Energy
in Freud and Conan Doyle

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Chapter 1 Introduction and Methodology

1.1 Overview

The ‘fictive’ dimensions of Freud’s work have often been the cause of controversy, and the paradoxical relationship between art and science within his work has drawn both the admiration and the ire of his critics. The polarised extremes are to represent Freud as either a promethean visionary, transgressing boundaries in order to provide us with a deeper insight into the human psyche than the positivistic approaches of many of his contemporaries could provide; or, as a charlatan, a deceiver whose narratives stretch the reader’s credulity. Even if more nuanced opinions fall somewhere in-between the extremes of this axis, it is difficult to develop an informed overview opinion of Freud without encountering that implicit value judgement. It would seem that Freud is a polarising figure first, a physician second, and an author third.

Yet the shifts between concentration upon ‘scientific’ and ‘narrativistic’ elements of Freud’s work, are arguably what has maintained his influence and applicability across many genres of intellectual enquiry. In Freud’s use of concepts such as ‘drive’ and ‘energy’, we encounter the potential paradoxes which grant the texts a metaphorical motor force, as terms from physics are drawn to represent the intangible. We access Freud’s ability to construct himself in two polarised roles, creative author and physician. Analysing Freud’s texts as works of literature, rather than as manuals detailing the development and use of psychoanalysis is not a new discipline. That is the point of Freud’s psychoanalytical endeavour to begin with: it is a system of analysis whereby nothing is exempt from the analytical process. However, there are under-represented alternative methods for analysing his texts, which may shed light on the operations of the text beyond both scientific and narrative concerns. For example, a cognitivist critique of Freud would come from a competing discipline based – largely – on observational data rather than in-depth analysis focussing on a model of developmental phases in the psyche.

In the main, the cognitivist approach used in parts of this thesis explores the relationship between the abstract and the physical in Freud's work. Using the relationships between metaphor, narrative, and Freud's ability to 'perform' within his work the various relationships which are endemic to psychoanalysis, we shall examine how language may evoke constructions beyond the printed page.

Freud had us explore the mind in depth, drawing complex and overlapping models to explain its inner workings, so we may now use theoretical models largely located closer to the 'surface' of psychology in order to analyse the depths of Freud's work. In doing so, the hope is that this thesis will shed light on how the practical, performative, scientific and narrative techniques which characterise Freud's work overlap and interact to create texts which demonstrate that abstracted physicality. Thus, we shall unpack the idea of Freud's textual dynamism, and the seemingly paradoxical notion of a 'motor' component to the metaphorical composition of both Freud's writing and theories.

Psychoanalysis is, disputably, a school of dialogue.¹ The analysand must uncritically relay information to the analyst, who is tasked with constructing an interpretation of that information and relaying it back to the analysand, so that the analysand may come to understand their symptom. Freud's development of psychoanalysis stems largely from his contributions to

¹ Disputably, in that criticism of the method is largely divided between those who praise Freud's ability to understand his subject, versus those who describe his psychoanalyses as theoretical impositions upon patients, e.g., the polarising effect of Freud's 'Dora' case (*Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* (1905 [1901], *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. Strachey et. al, (1966-1974), vol. VII, pp. 1–122, henceforth abbreviated to *S.E.* with requisite volume number.) See Patrick Mahoney, *Freud's Dora: A Psychoanalytic, Historical, and Textual Study*, (New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1996).

the field of psychodynamics, a study of the mind which centres, broadly speaking, on the circulation of psychical energies between conscious, unconscious, and preconscious areas of thought, that is, those which make up our sense of reality ('ego'), morality ('superego') and drive ('id'). Each of these elements, whether in theory or practice, is largely dependent on its moving parts. Therefore, if the theoretical basis and practical discipline both maintain a dynamic approach, this notion may be extended as a way of conceptualising Freud's writing itself.

Usually, we either consider the printed page to be a static artefact, or, if we are to bring in a basic concept of metaphorical motion, represent the relationship between author, text and reader as flowing in a single direction. Yet, that need not be the case. As Freud emphasised aspects of motion and energy within the mind, so too do many cognitivist approaches emphasise motion and energy with regards to language, and our understanding and use of it. Approaches such as the 'text world' of Paul Werth operate on a model where readers are far more actively engaged with the task of active processing and the construction of understanding, rather than just being the passive recipient at the end of a chain.² Their subsequent reading is the desired end-product, but such readings require far more back-and-forth interplay between author, text and reader than simple absorption of data by the last of these three. The reader must enter into a dialogue with the text, must question it, disbelieve it, and reconstruct its constituent parts in order to recreate what they perceive to be the message. The process is analogous to what actors, producers and designers do to 'stage' a play. If the reader pursues what they believe to be an understanding of the text, they must weigh the text against their existing

² Paul Werth, *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse*, (Harlow: Longman, 1999).

knowledge, and their worldview. It is thus for us to ponder how far the dialogic structure of psychoanalysis itself enters into psychoanalytical writing; in effect, how the practical act is performed through the written text.

Thus, important to our analysis of Freud's texts is the notion of physicality – that a textual representation carries with it some of the energetic, physical connotations associated with cognition. We must thus explore just how a physical space may itself have a textual characteristic, as it becomes itself a medium for language – whether spoken or physical. It is then that we may explore how Freud is able to insert a performing 'self', in order to engage the reader on the multiple levels of discourse presented by the text. However, Freud's 'self' is not a singular entity, but is a composite through which thought emerges as a resultant force formed between conflicting constants, usually drive and repression. It is possible to go further, and understand that Freud's authorial persona may more correctly be labelled 'personae'. The confidence with which Freud writes a piece contains traces of his own shadow, his analytical persona shadowed by his constant role as patient. Thus, his written 'self' is as much a composite as the 'self' he ascribes to us all.

We therefore discuss not how personality is reflected by the text, but how persona is constructed within it, that is, Freud's self-representation as a fabricated identity within the text. Much as in the dialogue of the 'talking cure', the reader encounters that self – or dialogic 'selves', in this case – and, in doing so, is tasked with locating their own self relative to it. That act of self-location is formative of a reading of the text. Yet, in recreating his own self in a narrative form, Freud's authorial self also becomes a 'character' within the tale of which he purports to be the narrator. Such a creation necessarily opens the text to various readings; there is always more than one textual 'world' at work at any given time, likewise, there is also more than one Freud. Thus, we shall examine psychoanalytical writing not in light of the famous Delphic maxim 'know thyself', but as an imperative for the reader to '*locate* thyself'.

Finally, having established Freud's textual mechanics relative to his conceptual dynamism, we shall take the opportunity to pursue the reading a step further. Ostensibly, we shall have presented Freud as an author blending meta-fictive and scientific approaches in order to establish a discipline that could achieve what each of its constituent parts alone could not. Yet, recombine the terminology, and we have a term for a specific genre which itself was gaining the conceptual traction to enter a golden age at the time of Freud's writing, that is, the formative era of science fiction. While this thesis does not make the reductive suggestion that Freud's work *is* science fiction, it does assert that the coupling of those two words does embody the constant paradox that his work is both scientific and fictive. The mechanics and logic behind scientific and speculative fiction may be reconfigured to shed light on Freud's own textual mechanics, and their operation, more broadly, in the era in which Freud was writing. Thus, this reading will move beyond a cognitivist approach to recontextualise Freud's work in the era of proto-science fiction, the increasing use of the motive force of electricity, and that of spectre-speculation, in which unseen forces began to permeate every aspect of life.

In this thesis, the work of Arthur Conan Doyle is the major comparative figure for the Freudian scientific fictioneer. He is an author who is likewise remembered for his paradoxical relationship with fiction and science, and so provides a key point of context in an exploration of Freud's fictive dimensions. Doyle's commitment to positivistic logic would seem at odds with his more speculative enquiries into the existence of the paranormal, and the parallels between the approaches of the two authors will help shed light on the dynamics of Freud's logical movement beyond the positivistic scope of his contemporaries. This anxious relationship between science and fiction is especially demonstrable in Doyle's science fiction, which will be used as a source of comparative texts in order to highlight how Freud evokes those anxieties in his own theoretical texts.

From examining Freud's relationship to Doyle's more anxious works, our final analysis will turn to the supposed self-assuredness of Doyle's most famous creation, Sherlock Holmes. The final chapter will weave together an analysis of the detective genre, to that of a specific case study of Freud's, 'On Screen Memories', in order to demonstrate just how useful a genre comparison is to a case study Freud specifically felt operated like a detective story, before finding further comparisons to Freud's less detective-like narratives. We will examine the possibility of reconstructing Freud as a character within his own narrative similar to the detective figure of Sherlock Holmes, emphasising how the detective story demonstrates the anxious and counter-narrative elements which problematise the creation of any textual world, and are equally important to a textual study of psychoanalysis.

1.2 Secondary Material: Literature Review

In this section, we shall introduce some key texts on the debates surrounding Freud and narrative.

1.2.1 Critiques of Freud's Narrativity

Stanley E. Hyman's 1962 analysis of the works of 'Darwin, Marx, Frazer and Freud, as imaginative organizations, as though they were poems', where 'the power and influence of their ideas is due in some substantial part to their ability as imaginative writers', regards an appreciation of Freud's prose as inseparable from an appreciation of his theory.³ Freud's writing style, in Hyman's English language appreciation of it, is thus described as 'a running dialogue, or debate with an enlightened reader.' (p. 384) Malcolm Bowie's 1987 work, *Freud*,

³ Stanley Edgar Hyman, *The Tangled Bank*, (New York: Athenaeum, 1962), pp. ix-x.

Proust and Lacan deals with much the same concept.⁴ Bowie likewise analyses Freud's 'desire' as analyst and author, seeing his theories of desire as driving the human psyche, importantly intertwining with his desire as a theorist.⁵

For Hyman, 'Freud becomes the hero in his own epic poem... Freud's origin myth, the myth of the primal artist, and Freud's self-image... in the heroic role is unshakeable.' (*The Tangled Bank*, 391) Bowie echoes that thought, by exploring what he terms the 'wishful substratum of Freud's scientific writings', his constant recasting of his authorial role by filtering his philosophical consideration through his 'self-images as archaeologist and as *conquistador* – the two favourite means whereby this redoubtable theoretician of a timeless unconscious sought to endow his discoveries with the resonance and prestige of history.' (Bowie, *Freud, Proust and Lacan*, p. 16) Bowie is supported by Harold Bloom, who states that 'Freud has more in common with Proust and Montagne than with biological scientists, because his interpretations of life and death are mediated always by texts.'⁶ Bloom's commentary thus focusses on the rift fundamental to the early study of psychoanalysis, that between art and science.

John Wisdom argues that 'ostentation' and perspective-shift through language is the both the role of philosophy and psychoanalysis.⁷ This point is echoed by Richard Geha in a

⁴ Malcolm Bowie, *Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁵ More succinctly by Bowie in his introduction to *Freud, Proust and Lacan*, '...I shall speak about theory and about desire; about theories of desire and desires of theorists.' p. 2.

⁶ Harold Bloom, *Agon: Towards a Theory of Revolutionism*, 'Freud and the Sublime', (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 117-118, as quoted by Bowie, p. 8.

⁷ John Wisdom, *Philosophy and Psycho-analysis*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 1.

controversial claim that Freud was a pure ‘fictionalist’. Geha writes of Freud that, ‘[l]ike Plato, he was an exemplary artist disowning the identity of an artist.’⁸ Both of these positions broadly agree that Freud’s narrative style was not a feature of the exercise, but the end in and of itself. Not only is the tension between art and science presented as the driving force behind Freud’s work, but Freud definitely appears to fall on the ‘art’ side of that tension, thus his case studies are far more ‘constructionist’ than realist as a result. Instead of viewing Freud’s case studies in factual terms, Geha’s view in particular presents them as creative, cognitive models designed to rationalise and communicate theory.

Paul Ricoeur’s view of Freud extrapolates from the human narrative onto the narratives created through the psychoanalytical process; the act of superimposition being important to the thus narrativised experience of spatial-relations.⁹ Roy Schafer examined the importance of the analysand, reclaiming their narratives in dialogue with the analyst through literary technique, such as exploiting the use of mimesis over diegesis in the creation of a more personal self-narrative, and demonstrating greater scope for the agency of the analysand as they reclaim their narratives.¹⁰ Doan and Parry maintain that Freud is the ‘first narrative therapist’¹¹ and their own more postmodern approach to narrative therapy focusses on that need for the patient to reclaim their own narrative in a delegitimised and delegitimising world. Donald Spence

⁸ Richard Geha, ‘Freud as Fictionalist: The Imaginary Worlds of Psychoanalysis’, *Freud: Appraisals and Reappraisals*, reprint, ed. by Paul E. Stepansky (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 121.

⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, reprint, trans. Denis Savage, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

¹⁰ Roy Schafer, ‘Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue’, *Critical Inquiry*, 7:1 (Autumn, 1980), 29-53 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1343175.pdf>, accessed 28/8/19.

¹¹ Robert E. Doan and Alan Parry, *Story Re-Visions: Narrative Therapy in the Postmodern World*, (New York: The Guilford Press, 1994), p. 9.

commented on the effect of a narrative approach to therapy from the perspective of Freud as a psychoanalytical writer:

Freud's most effective case histories also possess an important literary quality that can best be defined as a masterful control of style and content. The facts alone are not sufficient: they must be presented in a context that allows their full significance to be appreciated even by a reader who has no other information about the case.

We can assume that the same definition would hold for an interpretation: the framing of the formulation is just as important as its content.¹²

Spence's uncomfortable consideration of Freud's method as 'narrative technique' would seem to concur with Geha's interpretation of Freud as a 'fictionalist'. For Spence, the creative control which Freud maintains over his work is the means by which Freud best explicates his uncanny subject. As a means of drawing in his reader, Freud's narrativity serves as a metanarrative for both analyst and analysand, as he blurs the distinction between the two positions, and so demonstrates more than just rhetorical creativity. Yet, Spence's criticism is double-edged. In exercising such creative control, what the reader is thus given is a controlled image of Freud, and the psychoanalytic process.

1.2.2 Other Critiques

Freud's engagement with literature would also, however, lead to his detraction. Although this thesis will not criticise Freud from this standpoint, it is worth noting that the interaction between the internal logic of the text and the external logic of the reader is problematic in this

¹² Donald P. Spence, *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis*, (London and New York: W. W. Norton and co., 1982), p. 22.

line of criticism. Critics such as post-positivist Karl Popper (*Conjectures and Refutations*, 1963), literary critic Frederick Crews (*The Pooh Perplex*, 1963; *Analysis Terminable*, 1980) and philosopher of science and prominent Popper-critic Adolf Grünbaum (*The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*, 1984), would all require far more evidence for the validity of the theories presented by Freud. Popper and Crews in particular bear down on Freud's logic as being too internally derived. Popper comments on Freud's 'apparent *explanatory power*', thus '[o]nce your eyes were thus opened you saw confirmed instances everywhere: the world was full of *verifications* of the theory.'¹³ For Popper, Freud's theories placed the burden of proof upon the reader, as the case studies themselves were unverifiable. Popper thus surmised that Freud's readers were being made to look for verifications of the Freud's 'truth', rather than questioning its falsifiability. Or, as Freud states in his attack on pure scientific method in 'Drives and their Fates', 'the advance of knowledge will brook no rigidity here.'¹⁴

For Popper, the reader was easily able to verify Freud's pronouncements through seemingly constant verification in the world around them.¹⁵ Popper's criticism thus addresses Freud's engagement with the reflective space of criticality as a misuse, his invitation to criticality is located within an ad-hoc framework buried within its own verifiability rather than testability. Freud is able to manipulate that critical space, while the 'voice' which comes across

¹³ Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1963), p. 35.

¹⁴ Freud, 'Drives and their Fates', *The Unconscious*, trans. Graham Frankland, (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 13.

¹⁵ The constant verification of Freud and Adler's theories, 'in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.' Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 35.

in his case studies and philosophical musings is very much constructed as a narrator, whose principles are verified through the act of narrating them.

Robert Wilcocks has labelled the propensity to assert and exert performative control as the ‘Anton Mesmer side of Freud.’¹⁶ Though Freud abandoned his research on hypnosis, Wilcocks claims that he never lost his liking for hypnosis, in its most performative sense. Wilcocks’ commentary arises from his analysis of the case of Frau Emmy von N. from *Studies on Hysteria*, on which he comments:

Freud’s ‘literary businessman’ has been hard at work. We are deep in the realms of deception where the artful narrator of the case history allows his inventive fictional disguise of the several encounters with Frau Emmy von N. free reign. (Wilcocks, *Of Mousetraps and the Moon*, p. 44)

For Wilcocks, Freud is well over the Science/Literature divide, camping within literary territory. Details of the case studies are reconfigured not only to engage the reader, but to deceive. Freud exploits all the power of creative control, and makes use of it to re-configure the narratives he presents to best exemplify his theories, and thereby place himself in the role of an ideal narrator. The ‘literary businessman’ is a personification of the creative control embodied by rhetoric, the ability to modify an audience’s response based on the control of the presentation and referentiality of the information given. The ‘literary businessman’ has the ability to remodel a theory, repackaging a problem for the audience and making its solution seem a new and exciting development in the field. Thus, the audience is provided with a universal key in order for them to continue to solve these problems within the parameters

¹⁶ Robert Wilcocks, *Of Mousetraps and the Moon: The Strange Ride of Sigmund Freud and the Early Years of Psychoanalysis*, (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2000), p. 44.

provided. These critiques may be too damning for our purposes, but their focus on that shifting relationship between author, text and reader is nonetheless important to consider. However, the two following critics are more positive in their view of that relationship.

1.2.3 Royle and the Uncanny Text

Nicholas Royle's critical position on meta-commentary in psychoanalysis may be summarised by his reference to Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen's comment that 'Psychoanalysis is a mystery to itself – foreign to itself, *unheimlich*.'¹⁷ For Royle, both parties within analysis are subject to desire and drive, and both require each other to complete their part in the equation of analysis. Royle comments that the fundamental difficulty of writing the mind is that it is an uncanny subject that requires an uncanny mode of study, and thus documenting such a study requires an uncanny text. He writes that:

Psychoanalysis is uncanny on account of what Freud himself calls its capacity for 'laying bare... hidden forces': for many people, at least, it brings to light things that perhaps should have remained hidden or repressed. It makes the familiar (the self, desire, memory, sexuality, everyday language and behaviour) uncomfortably, even frighteningly unfamiliar. Freud's work (and 'The Uncanny' is perhaps exemplary in this respect) teaches us to be uncertain, to question, in strangely new ways. (Royle, *The Uncanny*, p. 24)

¹⁷ Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *The Freudian Subject*, trans. Catherine Porter (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 221, as quoted in Nicholas Royle, *The Uncanny*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 24, with the summary that 'the uncanny overflows psychoanalysis'.

Royle's account details a philosophy of the impact of the uncertain, drawing from the seemingly disparate models of the existentialism of Martin Heidegger, the formalism of Viktor Shklovsky and the postmodernism of Derrida, to present a seemingly unified field of the uncanny. In Royle's *The Uncanny*, both the concept and Freud's written work are inextricable. The conceptual uncanny 'makes the familiar... uncomfortable, even frighteningly unfamiliar', and so presents us with that duality, where the familiar has the power to frighten as it is returned to us in a way which is removed from us, 'frighteningly unfamiliar'.

Royle sees that lesson of uncertainty as much in the Russian formalist's technique of defamiliarisation, that 'making strange' (Остранение, *ostrananie*) that shaped works such as Tolstoy's *Kholostomer*, where the narrative is told from the perspective of a horse, as in the deconstruction of Derrida. Defamiliarisation was, according to Royle, a technique 'to register and affirm the power of literature (especially poetry) to make strange.' (Royle, *The Uncanny*, p. 5) Freud's famous declaration, 'wo *Es* war, soll *Ich* werden' ('where it was, I shall be'),¹⁸ whereby the self must be recognised as existing alongside the unconscious, alone contains the ability to defamiliarise. The self, the 'I', is not complete without the *Es*, the 'it', the unconscious. The I also does not exist, it instead 'shall be', and only in the place where 'it' was.

Although translation of 'Es' into English has its difficulties, as the semantic impersonality of the English 'it' emphasises the Otherness perhaps a little more than its German

¹⁸ Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol 15 (Berlin; S. Fischer; 1961), p. 86. Or, as translated by W. J. H. Sprott in the manner of James Strachey, who consulted on his translation, 'where id was, there shall ego be.' Freud, 'The Anatomy of the Mental Personality', *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, 3rd edition, trans. W. J. H. Sprott, (London, Hogarth Press, 1946), pp. 78-106 (p. 106), Henceforth, the *New Introductory Lectures* are abbreviated to *NIL*.

usage, Freud nonetheless highlights a being of the Other fundamental to the makeup of the self, over which the self has no control. The familiar is thus returned to us with the potential to make us uncomfortable, especially when Freud undermines all notion that the conscious self holds all of the power in that relationship: ‘the ego is not master in its own house.’¹⁹ For Royle, deconstruction offers a similar return, in its parodistic separation of text and meaning as unlike concepts, ‘[d]econstruction makes the most apparently familiar texts strange, it renders the most apparently unequivocal and self-assured statements uncertain.’ (Royle, p. 24) Such a blow to human pride in certainty resonates with a writer who states that his was the third great blow to the ‘naïve self-love of man’, the first being Copernicus, who destabilised the notion of earth’s, and therefore mankind’s, relative centrality in relation to the Sun, and the second Darwin’s destabilisation of mankind’s relative position to the creatures with which it shares that earth.²⁰ Royle uses this challenge to self-certainty to invert the paradigm: ‘it is now perhaps possible to see psychoanalysis as a branch of the uncanny, rather than vice versa.’ (Royle, p. 24)

Royle’s analysis therefore presents Freud’s writing fundamentally as an encounter with the uncanny. Not only is the self returned to us no longer whole and easily explained, but veiled and uncertain. Instead of certainty, we are not so much given a cure as a method, a method which appears to embrace that uncertainty. When we read Freud, what we are reading is an overlapping of several encounters. We encounter a Freud who purports to guide us through this maze of uncertainty; we encounter ourselves, returned to us in uncanny fashion, and we

¹⁹ Freud, ‘A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis’, *S.E.* vol. XVII, pp. 135-144 (p. 143).

²⁰ Freud, ‘Fixation upon Traumas: The Unconscious’ *Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis*, 11th ed., trans. Joan Riviere, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), 231-241 (pp. 240-1).

encounter serious blows to our ‘narcissistic’ self-certainty. In Freud’s case studies, a (potentially) real-life encounter *becomes* a work of literature. A human problem thus becomes a problem of genre, as method and medium overlap.

1.2.4 Holland and the Practical Text

Norman Holland tackles the potential friction between medium and method in *Holland’s Guide to Psychoanalytic Psychology and Literature-and-Psychology*. As he explains, if we divorce our study of the mind from the practical medium, ‘we turn psychoanalysis into language games or airy speculation.’²¹ He warns that without practical purpose, psychoanalysis is relegated to a thought-experiment. Treating psychoanalysis as just a series of texts removes the medical component to make it a philosophical or literary area, ‘often just the latest or most fashionable version of psychoanalysis.’ (*Holland’s Guide*, p. 2) He elaborates:

Psychoanalysis is the science of human subjectivity. It offers insights into the mind’s ways of thinking, dreaming, imagining, wanting, and especially the mind’s ways of hiding from itself. Ultimately, each of us has to find those ways out in our own minds since we do not have access to the minds of others. In other words, the laboratory for this science is one’s own mind. (p. 2)

In treating the texts as literary works, we necessarily place the philosophical ahead of the practical. The human element, where patients with genuine psychological problems are treated by the writers of these texts, seems somehow distant when we come to analyse the texts as texts

²¹ Norman Holland, *Holland’s Guide to Psychoanalytic Psychology and Literature-and-Psychology*, (Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1990), p. 3, henceforth abbreviated to *Holland’s Guide*.

themselves. We would also, theoretically, distance ourselves from the classroom. Holland urges any student of psychoanalysis to experience analysis first-hand, as ‘it is a mistake to read psychoanalytic literary criticism and then try to practice it.’ (p. 3) And thus, we return to the fundamental paradox, psychoanalysis as an unscientific science. Holland has us negotiate that paradox with great difficulty:

Because psychoanalysis has traditionally regarded itself as a science, one should read psychoanalytic literature keeping that claim in mind. One should also be mindful of the view widely held today that psychoanalysis is not a science, but a *hermeneutic*, a system for interpreting texts – language. (p. 13)

Our encounter with a work of psychoanalytical literature is thus beset with overlapping paradoxes, or, at the very least, problems guiding our approach to the text. Do we read a work of Freud’s, for example ‘scientifically’, or ‘hermeneutically’? Or is it possible to read from purely one perspective or the other, given how ‘hermeneutic’ the science would seem to be, and how literary the texts created to explain it are? It is arguable that the most fundamental problem in approaching Freud is not so much in his scientific reasoning, but in locating the methodology within his texts – the methodology which Holland recognises to have the highest importance. Returning to Royle, and his own take on Bowie’s notion of Freud’s ‘self-images’, we find an analysis of Freud’s ‘The Uncanny’ which addresses this multiplicity:

Freud’s text is more literary, more a work of storytelling, than his rhetoric of analytical detachment might suggest. His royal ‘we’ is already strange enough, but it is also to be distinguished from the at least equally strange third-person ‘he’ with which, as we have seen, the essay (*Das Unheimlich*) begins. Like ‘the storyteller’ to whom he refers, ‘Freud’ is multiple, split and proliferating. But he is also very much alone, writing a text with an uncertain addressee (the implied reader, after

all, is neither a student of aesthetics nor a student of psychoanalysis). (Royle, *The Uncanny*, p. 26)

Royle thus disagrees with Holland on practicality and thus on the implied reader of the piece, as for Holland, it is definitely a student of psychoanalysis. Royle's view of the implied author, however, appears to consider the innate paradoxes, presented by Holland as interchangeably scientific and hermeneutic, by targeting that interchangeability. A 'proliferating' author is thus adaptable to the multiplicity of spaces created by the overlaps and paradoxes inherent in the process of writing a theory of mind, which itself draws attention to paradoxes in the construction of what is perceived as the self. Freud's position as the author therefore becomes tenuous, when we start to see him as 'authors'.

This is especially true of Freud's work stemming from his period of self-analysis between 1895 and 1900, which prompted texts using his own experiences as referential material. Texts such as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899) and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) use Freud's own material extensively.²² In the essay, 'On Screen Memories' (1899), Freud commits the very uncanny act of voicing himself in both parts of the analysis, as doctor and patient. And so, we arrive at a problem of location: locating Freud's method within texts that are decidedly more 'hermeneutic', locating Freud amid his multiple voices, and, locating ourselves relative to his texts. It is one thing to broaden the description of reading Freud's texts to an 'encounter' with them, yet that encounter now seems to pertain not only to a single reading, but to an overlapping multiplicity of sub-encounters with the various

²² Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 3rd ed., ed. and trans. James Strachey, (New York: Basic, 2010), henceforth, abbreviated to *TIoD*. Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, reprint, trans. Anthea Bell, ed. Paul Keegan, (London: Penguin, 2004).

‘Freud’s’ at work. In doing so, we must not forget Holland’s concern, that there is an implicit practicality to Freud’s work, while at the same time reconciling that that with the clear multiplicity and ‘proliferat[ion]’ demonstrated by Royle. To understand Freud’s dynamic is to understand it as an oscillation between these states: the practical is demonstrated at the points where Freud is seemingly more hermeneutic. The dialogue so necessary to the practice of psychoanalysis is exemplified at the points where Freud seems most uncertain and ‘alone’. In examining the text on the printed page, if we have to perform this process of locating, then it is possible to state that there is a practical, dynamic side to the literature, a form of method-in-text.

1.3 Approaches

The approach taken by this thesis is to open Freud’s texts to a new interpretation by viewing them as overlapping cognitive spaces, and reading them as sites of dynamic exchange. Thus, we must delineate what a cognitive space is, and what is being exchanged within and between them. Freud’s own theory of the mind school focussed on the resultant psychical energy produced through the conflict between drive and repression. However, the dynamics do not end with the information that Freud conveys, but also in the manner in which he conveys them.

We have already touched on several multiplicities in Freud’s work: between art and science; between the physical, methodological act of psychoanalytical practice versus its existence in theory; and between the ‘multiple, split and proliferating’ versions of Freud’s written persona and the ‘analytical detachment’ with which he maintains them. Even though the written word may be said to be a static medium, these concepts are not static in Freud’s use of it. Instead, they appear to operate in constant dialogue with each other, as Freud attempts to demonstrate the importance of multiple, seemingly polarised perspectives at once. Thus, instead of a validation or refutation of Freud’s theories using a competing school of thought,

we instead attempt to demonstrate how valid the textual dynamics recognised by a cognitive approach are to the study of Freud's psychodynamic writing.

Paul Werth defined cognitivist thought on literature as a recognition that cognition is not, in fact, a passive phenomenon, but an 'active agent, constantly interpreting and achieving understanding.' (Werth, *Text Worlds*, p. 26) Broadly speaking, cognitivist thought recognises a more dynamic relationship between reader and text, establishing the text as both physical artefact and active site of exchange. The relationship is constantly redefined by the reader's conception of its content; readers respond to information differently based on prior knowledge, and knowledge gained through reading the text. This approach allows us the dynamism to explore the text as a conceptual space, and a medium for active exchange.

The 'exchanges' that we shall note are those between physical reality and abstract thought, Freud's 'selves' as contradictory constructs, and narrative and counter-narrative elements which both establish his premises and recede from oversimplification. Each of these represents boundaries that the reader must navigate multiple times. As the text is read, the conceptual relationship between the reader and it is altered in the active model of cognition – thus establishing another dynamic and potentially paradoxical interrelationship. Tying these interrelationships together will be the theme of metaphor. Literally meaning 'a change in motion'²³, metaphor is a concept governing how we interact with concepts by establishing a dynamic between them. Thus, a study of Freud's dynamics necessitates an understanding of metaphor, especially given that those dynamics hinge on the use of metaphor. Royle chose the uncanny as a governing metaphor for his own study, both as a study of the concept and a

²³ As translated by Phillip E. Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality*, (Bloomington (IN): Indiana University Press, 1962).

concept for the study. This thesis will instead focus on Freud's development of the metaphors of drive, energy and oscillation. Freud's energetic metaphors are key to his models of the mind, but also metaphors which may themselves be applied to his texts as they 'drive' them, give them 'energy', and have them 'oscillate' between conceptual frames.

We shall continue to make further exchanges of our own, by broadening our own conceptual framework to include further comparison. In the case of this thesis, the comparison to Arthur Conan Doyle, as writer of science fiction, scientific articles, and earnest pseudoscience offers exaggeratedly similar paradoxes to Freud's seemingly contradictory dynamics. To establish a 'dialogue' between these two authors is to establish a conceptual dynamic of our own; one which will consider the establishment of thought beyond the physically tangible in the electric age. However, of greatest interest will instead be a comparison between Freud's authorial persona(e), and Doyle's character of Sherlock Holmes. The metaphor of Freud as Sherlockian detective emphasises how the dynamics of Doyle's construction of Holmes may be overlaid onto Freud's own self-constructions.

However, in order to do this, a greater theoretical framework must be briefly elaborated upon. In order to do so, we must analyse constructs which cause readers to locate themselves relative to the information and language presented as they begin to interpret Freud's texts and theories. Our model hinges on three key concepts, these being:

1. Metaphor, and theories of dynamism between the physical and abstract in the establishment of concepts.
2. 'Text-worlds', or how that dynamic functions in the creation of a conceptual space.

3. Performance, or how Freud is able to use those constructed, overlapping realities in order to use the text to create performative personae, and illustrate both the practical and theoretical aspects of his texts simultaneously.

Thus, before we continue to our analysis, we must further define, and give some theoretical background for our usage of these concepts.

1.3.1 Metaphor

The approach that this thesis will take has its basis in cognitive metaphor theory. Largely, cognitive metaphor theory – or conceptual metaphor theory, henceforth, CMT – may be thought to be a successor to, and development from the linguistic relativism of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which dominated the field of metaphor studies, in which a structure of a language is thought to be determined by the native speakers' perception and categorisation of their experience. Broadly speaking, the development of a cognitivist approach to language rests on the division between the 'physical' and the 'abstract', and their interrelationship as we require language to encompass both spheres. We are 'physical' beings, bound to a single body in physical space bound by set rules. However, we conceive of this space through 'abstract' thought, substituting physical action with non-physical concepts as we use tools such as language to rationalise it. Cognitive linguistics thus owes a debt to the 'speech act' theory of J.L. Austin, who rationalised speech as able to be both an expression and an action in its own

right.²⁴ Likewise, written language is a static medium, yet it may convey movement and space beyond its existence on the page.

This linguistic dynamism was developed by Ronald Langacker, who studied how grammar reflected physical structures through his work on ‘cognitive grammar’, initially known as ‘space grammar’. He presents a spatialized model, whereby the internal processes within a sentence are relative to physical experience.²⁵ Instead of looking at grammar as a pure function of language, he would examine the ‘energy’ of what the sentence was attempting to convey through its grammatical structures. Langacker’s chapter on clause structure (pp. 354-405) is of particular interest, highlighting how structures within sentences interact as they would in reality. One model that he uses to demonstrate this is ‘the billiard-ball’ model – whereby each clause acts after the reader receives information from the previous clause – to demonstrate the ‘action’ of the structures within a phrase or sentence, in the manner of collision between billiard balls. (pp 356-7) Langacker’s operational metaphor demonstrates the method of operation metaphorically signified through language. Paul Werth Summarised Langacker’s cognitive grammar as an exercise in taking grammar ‘away from a mechanistic conception, and more towards a conception more appropriate for biological systems.’ (Werth, *Text Worlds*, 35)

Of particular note to this study is the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who broadened the field from cognitive grammar to conceptual metaphor theory.²⁶ The relationship

²⁴ J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words*, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

²⁵ Ronald Langacker, *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁶ Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980); George Lakoff, *Women Fire and Dangerous Things*, (Chicago and London:

between humans and the space in which they exist is presented as defined by the body, so perception of space is inextricably linked to the perceiver existing and forming that perception as a part of that space. That spatialisation is, however, only part of the metaphorical process. Humans are not only capable of abstract thought, i.e. thought which need not constantly evoke its space, body, or immediate needs. Concepts such as thought and language bridge this divide, in that they may express, or be underpinned by the immediate, biological or spatial, but they may convey these through terms which obscure or defamiliarise these bases, or use them to express something more abstract: i.e. metaphorical, metaphysical, or metafictional – a thought may utilise language and metaphor to conceptualise the nature of thought itself.

Lakoff and Johnson, along with Gilles Fauconnier, created the Idealised Cognitive Model as a means to explain the human capacity for abstract thought.²⁷ The ICM is not a direct representation of reality, but a mental space indicated through language. For example, one category of ICM is the image-schema. The image-schema is designed to provide a contextual basis for the content presented in the sentence. Take, for example, the simple sentence, ‘I sat on the chair.’ You have a subject, (I), an object (the chair), the past tense of the verb (sat), and a preposition (on). Cognitivists such as Lakoff, Johnson, and Rudolf Arnheim²⁸ would identify the sentence as having a ‘trajector’, a function normally ascribed to the subject, combined with a verb and a preposition, in this case, ‘sat on’, in order to establish an action relative to time

University of Chicago Press, 1987); Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason*, 2nd ed. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

²⁷ Gilles Fauconnier, *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

²⁸ Rudolf Arnheim, *Visual Thinking*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

and place. The past-tense verb (sat) locates the action in the past, whereby the subject (I) has progressed from a state of standing to a state of sitting. The preposition (on) specifically locates the motion of the action relative to the object, and therefore gives the reader a ‘schema’, a specific frame of reference in which to locate the motion of the trajector.

Whether the reader wants to imagine me sitting on a chair or not, the schema which allows us to conceptualise the action is not in itself an image, but a verbal structure. Specifically, according to Johnson, a ‘means of structuring particular experiences schematically, so as to give order and connectedness to our perceptions and conceptions.’ (*The Mind in the Body*, p. 75) Such a construction would be labelled a ‘contact’ schema by Mark Johnson, whereby the motion is defined by contact with the object, in this case, the chair. One may also delineate a schema of a path from sitting to standing, but to return to the preposition ‘on’, and the basic contact schema it evokes, we may note that it also has a use in abstracted space. A theory may ‘touch on’ something, it can “rest on” an idea, or ‘take on preconceived notions.’ Such constructions are metaphorical, allowing the abstracted being of the theory to ‘own’ the agency of an anthropomorphised element and hence to act as a trajector in these schemas of metaphorical contact and motion.

Thus, we are able to map conceptual effects onto a metaphorical space through reference to aspects of physical reality, and our understanding of the structure of it. A series of rules are established for the cognitive space, those rules are derived from our experience of physical space. Those rules may translate to how we perceive language itself, given that we cannot transmit thoughts directly, but they must be transcribed through a physical medium, i.e. through writing or speech. As Lakoff and Johnson formulate it:

We speak in a linear order; in a sentence, we say some words earlier and others later. Since speaking is correlated with time and time is metaphorically

conceptualized in terms of space, it is natural for us to conceptualize language metaphorically in terms of space. Our writing system reinforces that conceptualization. Writing a sentence down allows us to conceptualize it even more readily as a spatial object with words in a linear order. Thus, our spatial concepts naturally apply to linguistic expressions. We know which word occupies the first position, in the sentence, whether two words are close to each other or far apart, whether a word is relatively long or short. (Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, p. 126)

Language, an abstract concept, enters into reality, can thus be considered to have a spatial dimension. One of the pre-requisites of the physics of reality is that no two objects may exist in the same place at the same time. The word, whether written or spoken, becomes an object in this sense: for it to exist within an intelligible utterance, it cannot exist at the same time as another word. The word is capable of multiple meanings, accessible via contextual information, and may stand in place of another word. To place two words together at the same time, however, would render them illegible, or unintelligible in speech. Lakoff and Johnson therefore conclude that if form is so important to how we consider the sentence to function, and that if the meaning of the sentence may be derived from this form, then the sentence's form is 'anything but arbitrary' (p. 126). They summarise this position on form meeting function thus: 'we spatialise linguistic form, spatial metaphors apply to linguistic form as it is spatialised, and linguistic forms are themselves endowed with content by virtue of spatialisation metaphors' (ibid)

CMT is the dominant force in the contemporary world of interdisciplinary metaphor studies', according to Raymond Gibbs.²⁹ Criticism of the concept may fall – very broadly – into two categories: those that find its examples too prescriptive, and those who do not find it prescriptive enough. Those that remain sceptical of its over-prescription tend to belong to either the postmodern, pragmatic or natural-language 'camps'. The postmodernist objection is obvious; the pragmatic or natural-language-based attacks are more difficult, given that CMT largely arose from both schools of thought. After all, according to Lakoff, The source to target 'mapping' of a metaphor has to be '*natural*, in that it is *motivated by the structure of our experience*' (Lakoff, *WF&DT*, p. 276) A pro-CMT theorist, Zoltán Kövecses, has identified and attempted to argue against the view that CMT is a claim to inherent cultural universalism of the individual's experience in *Metaphor in Culture*.³⁰ Writing on 'embodiment', he argues that 'the notion is indeed problematic if it is conceived mechanically and as something monolithic in all cultures' ³¹

Natural-language critiques raise concerns that the 'abstract' is not so easily explained by metaphor, such as that by Stephen Pinker, that 'people not only use conceptual metaphors, but often question and discount them... people could not analyse their metaphors if they didn't command an underlying medium of thought that is more abstracted than the metaphors themselves.'³²

²⁹ Raymond Gibbs, 'Why Do Some People Dislike Conceptual Metaphor Theory', *Cognitive Semiotics*, 5:1-2 (2009), 14–36.

³⁰ Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³¹ Zoltán Kövecses, 'Conceptual Metaphor Theory: Some Criticisms and Alternative Proposals, *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics*, 6:1 (December 2008), 168-184, (p. 182). ·

³² Stephen Pinker, *The Stuff of Thought*, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), p. 249.

Those that criticise its under-prescription, meanwhile, tend to be those dismissive of the abstract nature of thought in the first place, and require that non-linguistic evidence be used to determine the metaphorical nature of thought.³³ Critics such as Matthew McGlone embody this line of criticism, McGlone writing acerbically that ‘the claim that idioms represent the metaphoric structure of abstract concepts cannot be objectively evaluated without evidence that is independent from our intuitions. At present, there is simply no evidence sustainable for this evaluation.’³⁴ Raymond Gibbs refutes this claim, proffering a multitude of studies to suggest otherwise, including those from the field of experimental psychology, from Boroditsky and Ramscar³⁵, and Casasanto and Boroditsky³⁶.

For their part, both Lakoff and Johnson themselves, together and independently, have been largely cognisant of the limitations of what constitutes a conceptual metaphor throughout.³⁷ Lakoff’s *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* supports the notion of categorisation of metaphors into overarching schemas, but is also critical of the use of this as an over-prescriptive approach, or of overly objectivist approaches to language, as they do ‘not

³³ See Gibbs, p. 25, who provides a list of studies which provide this evidence across several disciplines, including Lakoff and Johnson’s *Philosophy in the Flesh*, (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

³⁴ Matthew McGlone, ‘What is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?’ *Language and Communication*, 27 (2007), 109-126 (p. 116).

³⁵ Boroditsky and Ramscar, ‘The Roles of Body and Mind in Abstract Thought’, *Psychological Science*, 13 (2002), 185-189.

³⁶ Casasanto and Boroditsky, ‘Time and the Mind: Using Space to Think About Time’, *Cognition*, 106 (2002), pp. 579-593.

³⁷ Lakoff and Johnson, ‘The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System’, *Cognitive Science*, 4 (1980), 195-208.

recognise that truth and falsity are relative to conceptual frameworks.’³⁸ Lakoff and Turner explicitly state that metaphors may not all be conceptual, or constructed by the same process.³⁹ These arguments on limitation influence this thesis as much as CMT, and will form the basis for the examination for Freud’s use of energy metaphors in chapter 3. For now, however, let us consider possibly the most radical development in CMT in the past forty years, the progress from ‘conceptual space’ to a ‘text world’ by Paul Werth.

1.3.2 The Text World

In addition to analysing the use and effect of metaphor, we shall also analyse the textual space of Freud’s work, as he attempts to represent both the mental space of the mind – through use of physical metaphors – and also the physical space of the site of consultation – through the case study, and the dynamics in which the reader interacts with the text. Crucial to this argument is Werth’s ideas on the ‘cognitive space’ developed between author and reader through the encounter with the text, which he termed ‘the text world’.

The development of this conceptual space arises from CMT. The processes of ‘mapping’ (Lakoff and Johnson), and ‘blending’ (Fauconnier), form the

These concepts are attempts to describe aspects of the same cognitive process, the means by which the like term of the metaphor, commonly termed the ‘vehicle’, may share conceptual aspects with the original object of description, the ‘tenor’. Lakoff and Johnson broaden their approach from I. A. Richards’ terminology, emphasising the transcendental property of

³⁸ See Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, pp. 117-118, and p. 160.

³⁹ Lakoff and Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989).

metaphor from linguistics to wider-ranging thought processes. They instead use ‘source domain’ and ‘target domain’ explaining that:

‘Mapping’ occurs between conceptual domains – i.e. in there are structures between source and target domains that correspond, or display similarities... these ‘correspondences’ are mapped onto source and target. (*Metaphors We Live By*, pp. 3-4)

Once again, the linguistic form is spatialised, even down to the very language used to describe the process, that is, as ‘mapping’. Through the mapping of the source’s characteristics onto the target domain, we receive a third object, one that exists within conceptual space.

Paul Werth made use of the interactions between physical and mental space in order to describe the conceptual space being created as a ‘text world’:

Nevertheless, it is physical experience which gives us the basic layers of expression, while non-physical experience is mapped on to the physical by means of figurative devices: image-schemas, metaphor, metonymy. Thus, the language we use for talking about non-physical processes, such as thinking, understanding, and the like, is modelled on the language we use for physical processes. (Werth, *Text Worlds*, p. 36)

Developed from the ‘mapping’ and ‘blending’ aspects of metaphorical dynamics, Werth’s model develops the notion of a form of non-real reality, a ‘world’ or series of subordinate ‘worlds’, formed not purely by author, reader or text, but by the process of negotiation between them inherent in the act of reading. Or, as he explains:

A text world is simply a representation of the cognitive space which the reader and author are co-operating to form between them... the cognitive space is not a fixed, strictly defined scene.⁴⁰

Although the language used to define the concept is that of 'space' and 'mapping', the cognitive space still maintains an intangible quality, as it is 'not a fixed, strictly defined scene.' Abstract cognition is granted the language of physical dimension as we attempt to negotiate the boundary between the two. As physical beings forced to rationalise this through abstract thought, it makes sense that the language of the metaphorical 'world' Werth employs to describe this negotiation itself draws from physical space.

Werth's research is also influenced by that of Charles Fillmore, another founder of the cognitive linguistics movement, like Langacker, who explored spatial relations in language in terms of 'frames' of knowledge. He advocated a similar style of close reading, yet with the understanding that the written word or utterance is only one part of the puzzle, divorced from the whole. For any form of understanding to take place, that part has to be re-situated within the reader/listener's own contextual frames of reference. He explains that:

Any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or onto a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available... words represent categories of experience, and

⁴⁰ Paul Werth, 'World Enough and Time; Deictic Space and the Interpretation of Prose', in *The Language and Literature Reader*, ed. Carter, R., And Stockwell, P., (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 155-166 (p. 157).

each of these categories is underlain by a motivating situation occurring against a backdrop of knowledge and experience.⁴¹

Werth's text worlds, built through frame knowledge and inference, are thus heavily influenced by Fillmore's 'frames'. Here, we have the concept, not just of active knowledge acquisition, but active situation of the acquired knowledge into its position in a conceptual structure of knowledge already possessed. In Fillmore's work, we see a development of Austin's speech act, and the energy of Langacker's cognitive grammar as the reader, or listener, actively attempts to determine the 'motivating situation occurring', or as Werth presents it, the 'function advancing components' of the proposition. In exploring how linguistic and grammatical detail may develop an 'utterance' into detailed language, Fillmore may also be credited as the earliest proponent of the term 'deixis' in the field, a concept which Werth would use as a key component in the formation of the 'text world'.⁴²

Deixis, meaning 'to point', is the term used for information that requires contextual information in order to conceptualise it. It is the means by which the text may 'point' the reader towards textual detail, to locate aspects of the text specifically to the text itself, so that the reader may conceptualise the space described. It is also, by extension, the means by which the text may 'point', beyond itself, so that the space may constitute a space as the reader forms it. To clarify by means of example, the pronoun 'I' requires contextual clarification. In the sentence 'I sat on a chair', 'sat on a chair' is the subsequent descriptive information. The past-

⁴¹ Charles Fillmore, 'Frame Semantics', *Linguistics in the Morning Calm* (Seoul: Hanshin Publishing, 1982), pp. 111-137 (pp. 111-2).

⁴² Fillmore, 'Deictic categories in the semantics of 'come''. *Foundations of Language*, 2 (1966), 219-227.

tense 'sat' locates the action in time. 'Sat on a chair' locates it in space, I exist relative to the chair, the chair exists relative to me, and the action of sitting provides an image schema of a 'path' of action (sitting to standing) and one of contact ('me' in contact with the 'chair'). 'A' chair, as used in the example, may be any chair, the definite article 'the' is more deictic, in that it denotes a specific chair. The deictic information serves as the basis for further contextualisation beyond this statement – if 'I' were to 'stand up', I must first get off the chair, etc.

Deictic information thus locates any 'functional components' within the text, as well as the reader themselves, who may be said to be a functional component within the reading of the text. Werth clarifies the concept of linguistic function thus:

Deictic information, frame knowledge and inferencing combine ... to give the reader a very rich mental representation of the setting of a novel or story... They constitute what I call the world-building elements of the text. But this, in most cases, provides only the background to the story. The foreground consists of the descriptions and events which propel the story forward. I call this the function advancing component, and it is made up of language denoting states, actions and processes. (Werth, *World Enough and Time*, p. 155)

In Werth's model, the reader is given scope to change, their formation of the text world, so that it becomes a constantly shifting construct as the text world is always in the process of being created as they read. Frame knowledge references information by which the reader can construct the scaffolding of the space: if it is set in a specific place or time, frame knowledge represents what the reader may already know about that place or time. The text may 'set the scene', and may draw from and advance the reader's knowledge of that place or time. **Deictic information** is how the text may influence that knowledge: it represents specific details

locating specific points within that place and time, thus allowing the plot of a narrative or descriptive element of a poem an amount of relativity: details become specific to *that* place or *that* time.

Inferencing draws on both of these concepts: metaphor and metonymy serve to test the reader's relationship between worlds. The reader may have to understand that something within the text pertains to something outside of it, in the 'real world', or references something within that world. Such a test is there either to strengthen the bonds between 'worlds', or to 'legitimise' the content of the text world, a concept we will explore later on. To return to the manner in which a text may relativise: the 'function advancing components', i.e. plot, dialogue, character action etc., or the 'face-to-face' components of the text, as we shall examine them, are there to change the reader's relationship to the world. Whereas deictic information gives an idea of place or time, the function advancing components relativise that time: they are the 'living', dynamic details of a text.

We thus have a specific approach to an analysis of Freud's ambiguities. However, the specificity isn't prescriptive; like CMT, this approach is highly relativistic. The approach will thus serve us well when attempting to navigate how Freud develops his concepts, and will allow the reading to move beyond an analysis of Freud's work as narrativistic. Of particular note to this model are the counter-narrative elements, or, now that we have the terminology to express them correctly, counter-deictic. These aspects will be of particular note in chapter 5, in which elements which appear contrary to the construction of a text world are analysed relative to the detective story genre, which hinges on the limitations of a deliberately flawed deixis in order to advance its plot. However, in order to understand Freud's self-characterisation relative to this cognitivist discourse, we may need to do some mapping and blending of our own. The world of performance, and the space of the stage, serves as a useful metaphor for the textual

space detailed here. In examining the construction of that alternate space in both the physical and conceptual domains, we also gain insight into Freud's own dualistic self-construction.

1.3.3 Text as Performative Space

Regarding Freud as a figure, or figures, within his texts as well as without, the comparison to performance becomes useful. The concepts of presence and performance may seem alien to a discussion of the mechanics of a printed page. Performance is an interpretation, a vehicle by which an actor may bring life to their printed source material. So too presence, which in performance theory remains a dynamic concept that includes debates about how it may be generated, to what extent it is technical and methodological in nature, and whether it is possible to translate it from literature to stage to cinema screen to small screen. Anthony Easthope, in his introduction to *Poetry as Discourse*, may hold the answer to some of those questions. In his weighing of these contrasting models, which all seek to answer those same fundamental questions, he proposes a new model, which is to allow that the author only exists 'as product or effect of the text.'⁴³ Easthope examines the language of a poem in creating its unique 'voice', and in so doing endeavours to separate the 'speaker' in the poem from its author. He instead argues that the 'I' of a poem, as a product of its language, is a similar exercise in self-creation to the 'I' used in rhetoric.

Thus, the poem's 'voice' exists only as a rhetorical perspective, reinforced through a progression of symbolism and linguistic detail. Easthope's model, leaning towards a post-structuralist liberation of discourse without necessarily killing off the author, allows for the poet, or in a broader model, the author, to exist in a similar 'fluctuative' state, as we might call it, to the endless chains of signification of Derrida's *différance*. Each signifier within the text

⁴³ Anthony Easthope, *Poetry as Discourse*, (New York and London: Methuen, 1983), p. 7.

is entirely dependent upon allusions to other signifiers, within and without, in order for it to exist and signify as a block with which to build the text.

Likewise, the author must exist in the same state of constant re-evaluation relative to text and context. As textual voice becomes apparent, so too does presence. In demonstrating this position, Easthope's thinking embodies Barthes' theory that the author is 'the joker of the pack ... a receptacle, a zero degree, like the dummy of the bridge game.'⁴⁴ Or, to put it differently, an entity subject to the limitations of language and form and given into the hands of the reader. Thus, the author is able to manipulate a form of proxy selfhood by recreating, through those very limitations, an author who is a product of the text. In describing the form and function of discourse in poetry, Easthope gives a compelling argument for the importance of presence in the cognitive space that exists in the reading of a text. As he states of Shakespeare or Donne:

Whatever ghost walks the boards of the National Theatre or haunts the study of *Songs and Sonnets* has stepped from the pages of a text, a script or book, held by a twentieth century hand. (Easthope, p. 5)

He thus raises the notion that, in addition to the 'I' of the author existing in a fluctuative state, the cognitive space in which that 'I' is received also constantly shifts, yet the 'I' must remain. In treading the boards of the National Theatre, this ghostly metaphor neatly dramatizes the key problems facing a discussion of textual performance on the printed page. Those problems would seem to hinge on the concepts of presence, and notions of intimacy and immediacy; the actor generating presence by actually being present, while the text is fundamentally made up

⁴⁴ Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. by Richard Miller, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), p. 35.

of absences – the author, unseen, writes a character, place, or set of situations and an unknown reader must recreate them through instruction and extrapolation from textual detail. Writing on Antonin Artaud's depiction of theatrical 'presence', and acting in the theatre in terms of a 'living' versus a 'dead' medium such as literature, Cormac Power states:

There is no art form better suited to making presence 'enigmatic' than the theatre, where the 'immediate' is represented, and where the character or stage world is in 'proximity', while being, in a very real sense, absent.⁴⁵

If one is to regard the theatre as a physical expression of the cognitive space represented by the reading of a text, then the notion of the actor as representative of the 'I' of the text is for Power, a problematic notion. Life is breathed into the text as it is given a new voice, and as such, it obeys Artaud's decree of the finite life-and-death utterance. Yet that life is also the crux of a deception of the real.

Power's critique may be postmodern, but it finds agreement in cognitive and developmental psychology, a successor to psychoanalysis in terms of critical development.⁴⁶ has spawned a number of critical approaches centring on this idea of a 'virtual' or 'cognitive' space. The ambiguity between absence and presence in Power's performative space finds agreement in object-relations psychologist D. W. Winnicott's hypothesis of a 'potential space', whereby an infant adapts to physical space through a feedback mechanism creating an

⁴⁵ Cormac Power, *Presence in Play: A Critique of Theories of Presence in Theatre*, (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 2008), p. 86.

⁴⁶ See *Holland's Guide*, p. 53. His following page details reader-response criticism as a successor to that mode of thought.

internalised world.⁴⁷ A more crystallised form of that feedback loop is cognitivist Alison Gopnik's adaptation of the probabilistic Bayesian network to explain an infant's capacity to adapt to the real world through a trial-and-error process of world-building.⁴⁸ As a representation of textual space, the conceptual space of the performance utilises a practical demonstration of oscillation between the paradoxical physical and abstract spaces. The performance is an overlap of text world and real world. Power references Keir Elam's notion of the stage as 'a spatio-temporal *elsewhere* represented as though actually present for the audience.'⁴⁹

If a 'text world' is one born of co-operation between author and reader, then that *elsewhere* is a form of text world mapped onto the contours of the real, the caveat being that no spatio-temporality or text world is able to physically occupy the real. A visit to the theatre does not put us face to face with King Lear in the flesh, and we never actually visit fair Verona. The text world is created as a form of Pepper's Ghost, by the recreation of the real projected through the lens of the text convergent with a projection of the text through the lens of the

⁴⁷ See D.W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, reprint, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Winnicott first posits the concept of potential space as that formed between the infant and its mother (pp.55-63), which broadens to the individual and their environment (p. 135).

⁴⁸ Gopnik's research is centred upon a causal relationship of theorisation. A Bayes net may be expressed as a flow diagram, detailing a trial-and-error approach to theorisation as the mind develops its relationship to the physical world. See Alison Gopnik, 'Explanation as Orgasm and the Drive for Causal Understanding: The Evolution, Function and Phenomenology of the Theory-Formation System.' *Cognition and Explanation*, (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2000), pp. 299-323.

⁴⁹ Keir Elam, *The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama*, (London: Routledge, 1980) p. 99. Quoted in Power, p. 17.

real.⁵⁰ We shall examine this dynamic, of abstract and real overlapping into a potential third space, in chapter 2. Of note in that chapter, and throughout the thesis, will be Freud's self-construction, as both 'product and effect of the text', and as the originator of the desires which shaped it. The performative analogy is useful to explore the implied 'immediacy' of his textual I, and the implicit 'practicality' – in Holland's view – which Freud demonstrates through dialogue, the tool of performance.

⁵⁰ Often mistaken for a hologram, a Pepper's ghost is an optical illusion, developed to create the impression of a 'ghost' on stage. It is made by placing a sheet of glass at a 45 degree angle between the object to be viewed and the space in which it needs to appear, so that the object is partially reflected as a transparent facsimile in a seemingly empty space on stage. Its contemporary usage could be considered even more macabre than the Victorian melodrama of its inception: it is often combined with electronics to project seemingly three-dimensional facsimiles of invented characters, or even the actual dead, such as the Tupac Shakur 'hologram' at the 2012 Coachella music festival. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGbrFmPBV0Y> (Accessed 29/08/19). For a Victorian version see the re-creation of this Victorian stage-effect at the Charles Dickens Museum in Doughty Street, London.

Chapter 2 Freud, Narrative, and the Problem of Immersion

2.1 Altered States

Freud's early medical practice involved the use of altered states of consciousness in order to generate the required situation for psychological treatment. Freud's mentors, Jean-Martin Charcot and Joseph Breuer, adhered to a model of hysteria in which the symptoms may be retrieved through the altered state of mind induced by the technique of hypnosis, the cathartic act of retrieval theoretically allowing patients to work through their symptoms. In Charcot's case the dramatic use of hypnosis in demonstrations was every bit as performative as Mesmer's 'animal magnetism' from which the technique was developed.⁵¹ During the 1880s, Freud would also experiment, professionally and recreationally, with altering states of consciousness with the use of cocaine. Throughout this period, he published a series of works on the beneficial effects of cocaine in bridging the gap between internal medicine and psychology: *Über Coca* ('On Cocaine', 1884), *Nachträge über Coca* ('Addendum on Cocaine', 1885), *Über die Allgemeinwirkung des Cocains* ('On the Working of Cocaine', 1886) and the last, *Beiträge über die Anwendung des Cocains* ('Posts on the Application of Cocaine', 1887).⁵² Each of

⁵¹ Jonathan Marshall has written a great deal on the intersection between Charcot's performance and pedagogy. See *Performing Neurology: The Dramaturgy of Dr Jean-Martin Charcot*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). See also Barry Stephenson, 'Charcot's Theatre of Hysteria', *Journal of Ritual Studies*, 15:1 (2001), 27-37.

⁵² These texts are difficult to find in the English language, absent from the *Standard Edition*, and not published in the Penguin Modern Classics editions of Freud's works to date. Collected in Freud, *Cocaine Papers*, ed. Robert Byck, (New York: Stonehill, 1974).

these works passionately extolls the medical use of the narcotic, *On Cocaine* in particular delving into the many merits of its personal use. Like hypnosis, cocaine was a habit which Freud would eventually kick, both personally and professionally, going as far as to attempt to erase all traces of his involvement with the drug, and destroying the letters, essays and lecture notes associated with its use.

If Freud's younger 1880s were years of experimentation into altered states; the 1890s saw him discomforted by them. Were one to view a single year, (other than 1899) when *Interpretation of Dreams* was published), as a formative crux in the development of psychoanalysis, then 1895 would be the most promising candidate. In that year we have the infamous near-fatal malpractice in the case of Emma Eckstein, on whom an experimental piece of psychosomatic surgery was performed by Freud with Wilhelm Fliess, using highly dangerous amounts of cocaine. The writing of the unpublished positivistic *Project for a Scientific Psychology*,⁵³ also took place in 1895, as did the publication of *Studies in Hysteria*.⁵⁴ The latter was a collaboration with Joseph Breuer on cases conducted around half a decade previously, in which the use of methods such as hypnosis left the developing Freud unsatisfied with the outcome. Freud went on to reject all these 'interventional' approaches; but both the *Project* and the *Studies* seem to haunt his work. The *Project's* quantifiable approach to his development of the economic principle fell by the wayside, but many of its core ideas

⁵³ Freud, *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, *The Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes 1887-1902*, ed. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris, trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey, (London: Imago, 1954), pp. 347-446. Henceforth abbreviated to *Project* and *Origins*, respectively. Italics for the title of the work within another work reflect convention, similar to those of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

⁵⁴ Freud, *Studies in Hysteria*, trans. Nicola Luckhurst, (London: Penguin, 2004), *S.E.* vol II.

resurfaced after his establishment of the psychoanalytical method, which will be explored in Chapter 3.6. The case of Emma Eckstein also haunted *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in which details of her treatment resurface in Freud's own 'dream of Irma's Injection'. Finally, *Studies in Hysteria* gave us the term 'the talking cure', coined by the most famous patient of the case studies, 'Anna O', Bertha von Pappenheim. Freud's dissatisfaction with Breuer's theories, such as the theory of hypertonic excitation, and with the cathartic approach to treatment, would lead him to abandon Breuer, hypnosis, and the performative experimentalism inherited from Charcot's theatrical laboratory of hysteria.

Laplanche and Pontalis note that Freud's use of the term 'analysis' first appears in the 1894 article on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence', in various guises, as 'psychical analysis', 'psychological analysis', or, tellingly, 'hypnotic analysis'.⁵⁵ The term 'psychoanalysis' first appeared in 1896, introduced initially as '*psycho-analyse*' in a French article.⁵⁶ Then the German original, '*Psychanalyse*', made its debut in the subsequent 'Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychology of Defence'.⁵⁷ As they remark:

The adoption of this term served as formal confirmation that catharsis under hypnosis and suggestion had been dropped and that the obtaining of material would henceforth depend exclusively upon the rule of free association.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ *S.E.*, vol. III, pp. 43-71.

⁵⁶ 'Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses', *S.E.* vol. III, pp. 141-58.

⁵⁷ *S.E.* vol. III, pp. 159-166 (pp. 165-6).

⁵⁸ Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, 6th edition, trans. David Nicholson-Smith, (New York: W. W. Norton and co., 1974), p. 367.

So, psychoanalysis arrives at the end of hypnosis, the end of using altered states. For Freud, the ‘talking cure’ thus became the dominant state in which psychical material may be obtained and analysed. Instead of an altered cathartic state, Freud’s consultations would instead attempt to evoke a state in which the patient would uncritically provide the necessary information for the psychoanalyst to determine the deeper cause of the symptom, rather than relying upon techniques which could potentially influence the patient’s discourse. Freud manages to take a shot at hypnotically derived treatment and espouse the need for in-depth analysis in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in which he claims that

Inadequate reasons ... usually conceal unconfessed motives. They remind me of one of (Hippolyte) Bernheim’s hypnotised patients. When one carries out a post-hypnotic suggestion and is asked why he is acting in such a way, instead of saying that he has no idea, he feels compelled to invent some obviously unsatisfactory reason. (*TIoD*, p. 172)

Immediately post-hypnosis, Freud observes the mind’s imposition of a self-critical function, the need to narrativise the incongruous, imposed action in order to have it make sense to the patient’s own sense of self-agency. This is therefore an act of repression. Instead of simply causing more repression, and therefore more layers of negation between analyst and analysand, *The Interpretation of Dreams* details the method by which these unconfessed motives might instead be revealed:

My patients were pledged to communicate every idea or thought that occurred to them in connection with some particular subject; amongst other things they told me their dreams and so taught me that a dream can be inserted into the psychical chain that has to be traced backwards in the memory from the pathological idea. (*TIoD*, p. 126)

That insertion into the psychical chain describes the act of narrativization, granting a seemingly disparate fragment of communication a place within a greater causality. The act of communication is thus given a special importance, as any utterance may contain valuable psychical data. That data, delivered as seemingly irrelevant fragments, gains its value through the ‘development’ by the analyst of those seemingly inconsequential utterances, relativizing them temporally as part of a stage in the development of the symptom from the ‘pathological idea’. Freud continues:

We must aim at bringing about two changes in (the patient): an increase in the attention he pays to his own psychical perceptions and the elimination of the criticism by which he normally sifts the thoughts that occur to him. In order that he may be able to concentrate his attention on his self-observation it is an advantage to him lie in a restful attitude and shut his eyes ... He must adopt a completely impartial attitude to what occurs to him, since it is precisely his critical attitude which is responsible for his being unable, in the ordinary course of things, to achieve the desired unravelling of his dream or obsessional idea. (*TloD*, p. 126)

Thus, Freud does indeed present us with an un-coercive altered state, one in which criticality may be abandoned. Ostensibly, the analysands suspend their own critical function and entrust it to the analyst’s informed development of it (as a technician ‘develops’ a photograph in a darkroom), generating a broader picture where the analysand had only seen disparate images or fragments, or latent ideas embedded within, or distorted to resemble, others. The consultation with the psychoanalyst thus represents a different space, both physically, as Freud would control physical aspects of the room to aid this state of uncriticality, and mentally, in that the patient would have to enter a separate conceptual space in order to perform this uncritical act.

Of course, many Freud sceptics have pointed out both the residual performative elements, and the internalised logic of psychoanalysis, effectively stating that Freud had simply swapped one altered state for another.⁵⁹ Also, sceptics maintain that the overall narrative coherence is imposed upon the vulnerable psyche by the analyst. But some of Freud's defenders essentially approach his texts from a similar point of view, arguing instead that narrative forms the ordering force in which the patient's free association may be brought to reason. For example, Peter Brooks argues that Freud's texts exemplify narrativity, and that the narrative capacity to order seemingly disparate information is the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis:

We might think of plot as the logic or perhaps the syntax of a certain kind of discourse, one that develops its propositions only through temporal sequence and progression. Narrative is one of the large categories or systems of understanding that we use in our negotiations with reality, specifically, in the case of narrative, with the problem of temporality: man's time-boundedness, his consciousness of existence within the limits of mortality. And plot is the principal ordering force of those meanings that we try to wrest from human temporality.⁶⁰

Brooks' highly Freudian work on textual dynamics highlights the way Freud's dynamic study of the psyche may be applied to the dynamics of texts themselves. Rather than approaching the text from a formalist perspective, as one might do in a study which prioritises narrative, he references Susan Sontag's view 'that rather than theories of interpretation we need an 'erotics' of art', (p. xv). Taking her cue, Brooks speaks of narrative in terms of desire, drive and repression; the physical medium is charged with abstract 'motor forces which drive the text

⁵⁹ See Chapter 1.3.2.

⁶⁰ Peter Brooks, *Reading for the Plot*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. xi.

forward', taking into account the 'dynamics of temporality and reading', and the 'highly charged field of force' which carries a text from beginning to end (pp. xiii-xiv). Following Freud's dynamic model of the psyche, Brooks' 'dynamic' model of the text 'will have to provide more ways to think about the movement of plot and its motor force of desire, its peculiar relation to beginning and ends, its apparent claim to rescue meanings from temporal flux.' (p. 90).

Conversely, Donald Spence was more wary of psychoanalysis as a narrative discipline, or, at least, any claim to scientific objectivity presented in its findings. He argued for a difference between 'narrative truth' and 'historical truth'. Psychoanalysis achieves 'narrative truth' because of its ability to re-order contingent events meaningfully, but in doing so, it forsakes any 'historical truth', as subjectivity and the means of representation alter the objective reality of facts. For Spence, psychoanalysis can never take up the mantle of science; in order to be effective, but must embrace its own pragmatic, literary nature. As he summarises it:

It may be time, once again, to reaffirm the tentative nature of our theory, thinking of it more as metaphor than established fact; to spend less time searching for confirmation ... and more time accumulating data; and to begin to look at particular events ... that come as close as possible to representing the original encounter of analyst and patient in all of its complexity.'⁶¹

Spence articulates his discomfort with the omnipotence of fact gained through narrative, ultimately resting on the 'art' side of the art/science divide. However, importantly, Spence

⁶¹ Donald P. Spence, *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis*, (New York and London: W. W. Norton and co., 1982), p. 296.

identifies the need for the psychoanalytical text not just to argue the case for a particular theory or method, but also to demonstrate the unique relationship between analyst and patient on the printed page. In this, his views align with Brooks' view of metatextual dynamics. Where, for Brooks, the psychodynamic text must evoke the dynamics of narrative, for Spence, the textual representation of psychology must capture and evoke the dynamic, dialogic space in which treatment occurs. As the study of history has moved on from the polarisation of narrative and historical fact, we too may gain a retrospective appreciation of the synthesis of these concepts in the dialogic structure of Freud's psychoanalytical writing.

One could just as easily argue that Freudian psychoanalysis is as much a counter-narrative discipline as a narrative one. The Freudian analyst is tasked with piecing together a rational narrative from a disparate series of utterances garnered through free association, and examining them in light of the patient's psychological development, linking seemingly disparate symptom to cause, and thus hopefully progressing to cure, thus establishing a narrative of cause and effect. Yet, one could just as easily claim the adverse is true: that psychoanalysis is as deconstructive as it is constructive. Through the method of free association, the analyst must unravel the work presented to them, and ultimately challenge the narcissistic relationship that the patient has to their own self. The popularity of psychoanalysis, especially in the arts, is as much to do with its ability to explain the self as it is to defamiliarize it. The analyst must be aware of these contradictory forces as they themselves establish a paradigm of dialogue with the patient. That paradigm is presented, through transference, as both potentially combative, and one in which each party may identify themselves in the other.

Thus, we cannot completely abandon Brooks, Spence, and the role of narrative in Freud's written discourse. However, a discussion of counter-narrative elements, and the meta-textuality of the 'dynamics' at play in Freud's work opens up his texts to a discussion of textual forces acting outside of the printed page. Brooks' criticism is prescient of cognitivist linguistics

in his concentration on metaphor and metonymy, which would become two of the key building blocks of Werth's text world. Both are highly constructivist: for Werth, the text world is a collaboratively constructed abstract space beyond text, author and reader, whereas for Brooks, narrative and metaphor are likewise constructively interconnected. 'Narrative operates as metaphor in its affirmation of resemblance,' he writes, 'in that it brings into relation different actions, combines them through perceived similarities... appropriates them to a common plot, which implies the rejection of merely contingent (or unassimilable) incident or action.' (Brooks, p. 91) He claims that metonymy, the condensing act of signification wherein a part may represent the whole, is given even greater importance in Brooks' narrative of anti-contingent narrative. 'The description of narrative needs metonymy as the figure of linkage in the signifying chain: precedence and consequence, the movement from one detail to another, the movement *toward* totalization under the mandate of desire.' (p. 91) For each approach, motion holds the key. For Brooks', the crucial thing is the condensation of human experience into narrative, a narrative of desiring to understand desire. For Werth too, the text has that condensing function, but the relationship to the text itself is given as an additional functional dynamic, the 'world' of the text formed through narrative, but existing beyond it.

Freud's dynamic model of the psyche holds that psychical drives are kept in check by opposing forces, and Werth's model of the text has a similar dynamism. The construction of a textual space allows greater interplay between narrative and counter-narrative 'movements' within the text, which are not accessible through a purely narrative based study. The text world is a co-production in that each force acting within the text, is generated by both the author in making it, and the reader in interpreting it. The two have to counter-balance each other. To consider Freud's text world is to consider how he evokes a textual landscape of his consulting room; how practical psychoanalysis is not only explained, but demonstrated. The field is

accessible through interpretation, as we sift through clues, symptoms, or free-associations to form narratives.

In his medical work, Freud appeared to be searching for an ‘altered state’ in which great insight into the depths of the psyche could take place, yet one which did not alter the patient’s discourse to skew it in favour of the interpreter. He may have abandoned altered states generated through hypnosis and narcotics, but the dialogue of the consulting room nonetheless represents a partitioned reality, through which the analyst and patient may work together to form an overview of an individual’s access to reality, and the hidden but equally real unconscious, affecting their access to reality. In his search for this perfect state of uncritical psychoanalysis, Freud’s evocation of it on the printed page captures that dialogic structure, so we may understand his work less as a narrative of narrative therapy, and more as a performance of this discipline, replete with its necessary conflicts, through the abstract space of the text world.

2.2 Narrative Fact

The work of cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner challenged behaviourism for its inability to account for advanced cognitive constructions, such as metaphor, or theorisation.⁶² Yet Pierre Gilles Guéguen unfairly categorises the ‘cognitivists’ (his quotation marks) as disciples of John B. Watson’s behaviourist movement.⁶³ However, the cognitivists themselves often prefer to be characterised as having *rebelled* against the behaviourist movement. Charles. C. Spiker argues

⁶² Jerome Bruner, ‘What is a Narrative Fact?’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 560 (November 1998), 17-27 (p. 18).

⁶³ Pierre Gilles Guéguen ‘To Those who Think that We Think for Ourselves’ <http://www.lacan.com/lacinkXXXVII4.html>, (accessed 07/05/19).

that the truth is somewhere in between, and that cognitivists did not entirely rebel against methodological behaviourism, but only against the reductive assumptions prevalent in conditioning-based theory.⁶⁴ Bruner wrote of the need to narrativise and relativise supposedly objective truths, calling such a process the creation of a ‘narrative fact’. (Bruner, p. 52) He introduced the example of the ‘attractive nuisance’, a term in United States tort litigation denoting an object which lies on one’s own property, and may present a hazard to a third party having entered the property, whether lawfully or not.⁶⁵

Bruner argues that points of fact are decided by juries, and points of law by judges, yet here, he we have something which crosses these boundaries. He states that the fact of something constituting an ‘attractive nuisance’ is disputable, based on the relative importance of the facts in question to the case. The facts in question, as Bruner demarcates them, are that the object is there – in his example, a pool of water, and exists on the property. He introduces an example case, of a stranger falling into the pool, drowning, and having been discovered at 7.15 a.m. on a specific date. ‘These are the facts, all right,’ he states, but the question is, ‘are the homeowners liable?’ (p. 18) The answer, he explains, does not require the concept of fact, but the concept of ‘narrative fact’. In order to determine liability, the court must take into account the precise situation as to how the stranger could have got into the pool. ‘Almost certainly they [the homeowners] will be found so [that is, guilty] if the pool in question was factually unfenced,

⁶⁴ See C.C. Spiker, ‘Cognitive Psychology, Mentalistic or Behaviouristic?’ *Advances in Child Developmental Behaviour*, 21, (1989), 73-93.

⁶⁵ ‘Attractive Nuisance: a dangerous condition on a landowner’s property that may attract children onto the land and may involve risk or harm to their safety. Because child trespassers may not appreciate the risks that the dangerous condition poses, landowners have the duty to either eliminate that danger or make it inaccessible to trespassing children.’ From Cornell University’s Open Source Legal Information Institute
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/attractive_nuisance, accessed 07/05/19.

unlocked, and in a thickly settled neighbourhood.’ (p. 18) Yet, it is not even that simple. As these ‘facts’ are extrapolated and established, they must also be judged relevant. For that, there is precedent. The facts in question must be *presented*, which means the same as the term ‘developed’, which was used in 2.1, above, to designate the analyst’s narrativisation of the disparate data produced when the patient free-associated. The prosecution must present the facts in a manner which shows that the pool in question constituted an ‘attractive nuisance’, so that the facts now add up or stack up and constitute an offence. The defence, by contrast, must ‘present’ the facts so that they imply no wrongdoing, showing an accident, and not a crime, has taken place. As Bruner states:

There seem to be two things that make facts malleable, whatever their ephemerality might be called. The first is that mere facts are not viable until they have been categorized. They are not even facts. Is an unfenced pool way out in the boondocks factually or categorically an attractive nuisance? The second thing is relevance: live facts do not become probative, even once categorized, until they can be shown to be relevant to some sort of theory or story dealing with something more general. Neither law nor life has room for irrelevant facts; they are immaterial. (Bruner, pp. 18-19)

Bruner thus hitches a disclaimer to a legal fact: that it is ‘malleable’. If the prosecution proves that the unfenced pool was a hazard, it was a hazard. If the defence proves that their pool could present no significant risk, it is not a hazard, and therefore not an ‘attractive nuisance’. Every fact provided in the case must be proven to be relevant, lest it be struck from the record. In order for a fact to be proven relevant, it must be examined alongside previous legal ‘facts’, represented by legal precedents. So, the fact is only a fact based on whether a determination of

the details of the case results in the fact being determined a fact. The dominant narrative results from competition between these presented narratives.

Bruner's argument establishes a strong theme within the cognitivist movement: that theme is subjectivity, and the need for narrative and metaphor to establish and connect the contexts of each individual human encounter. He concludes that 'facts live... in context, what holds most human contexts together is a narrative.' (p. 26) The law, for Bruner, is exemplary of a fundamental need for closure, for establishing a concept as completely as possible, yet that concept is ultimately *relativised*, and *narrativised* by the means of its establishment. A principle of law, by which everyone is bound, is therefore based on circumstance, and subjective circumstance at that. How that law is applied is the result of a process of conflict in shaping these 'malleable' facts to best suit a proposed narrative of innocence or guilt. 'Categorisation', Bruner's term for the judge's position in determining whether an assertion is a point of fact or a point of law, represents the mind as it is faced with the task of determining what is objective truth and what is subjective 'truth'. Bruner allows for an objective truth, the indisputable 'facts in question', yet requires that their interpretation be constantly filtered through, and made relevant to the human consciousness.

In his 1899 essay 'On Screen Memories', Freud detailed how a memory may not indicate a point of fact, but that the facts may be accessed through an understanding of the narrative of their formation. The essay examines childhood memory, before 'a constant relation is established between the psychical significance of an experience and its persistence in memory'.⁶⁶ A 'screen memory' is a manifest form of repression, in which a childhood memory

⁶⁶ Sigmund Freud, 'On Screen Memories', *The Uncanny*, trans. David McLintock, (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 3.

is altered by taking elements of a traumatic or troubling event occurring in childhood, and emphasising banal details over troubling ones in order to downplay the ‘psychical significance’ of the event. Consistent with Freud’s economic principle, this disturbance is demonstrated as an imbalance, as ‘two psychical forces are involved in producing these memories. One of them takes the importance of the experience as a motive for wanting it remembered, but the other – the force of resistance – opposes this preferential choice.’ (pp. 6-7) Freud’s concept of the ‘screen memory’ is ostensibly a narrative fact, illustrated through the mechanisms of repression and displacement. It is a fabricated memory formed in the unconscious as the conscious attempts to access the memory of an event. It downplays the ‘psychical significance’ of a real event and it does so by the construction of alternative memory which is created in order to displace the ‘psychical significance’ of the event. A kernel of that event remains, but its significance is understated compared to the events of the new narrative. Through free association, it is for the psychoanalyst to identify and locate this kernel, to find the point at which psychical significance does not correlate, and aid the patient in developing a narrative in which the events of the patient’s life are restored to their true psychical significance.

This kernel is similar to Bruner’s example of the ‘attractive nuisance’. The legal position of the ‘defence’ in this case is represented by the repressive forces enacted by the formative super-ego, which have made an attempt to alter the resultant narrative through ‘conflict, repression, substitution involving a compromise’ (Bruner, p. 9) of the facts in question. It is the job of the ‘prosecution’ – in this instance, the analyst – to re-establish the importance of the original facts from the narrative they have been provided with. They must do this in order to re-build and re-relativise the resultant narrative, to allow the patient to finally come to terms with the ‘psychical significance’ of the event which they experienced, which has become lost to them. In order to re-access these events, the analyst must interrogate the

negative space of the memory, locating the facts which are not immediately accessible. Freud illustrates his point with an example of repression and displacement:

I once had occasion to report a . . . case of substitution that occurred in the analysis of a patient suffering from paranoia. This was a woman who heard voices repeating to her long passages from Otto Ludwig's *Heiterethei*, the most trivial and irrelevant passages in the work.⁶⁷ Analysis revealed that other passages in the story had actually aroused the most distressing thoughts in the patient. The distress they caused was a motive for putting up a defence, but there was no way of suppressing the motives for pursuing them, and so a compromise was reached in which the innocuous passages emerged in the patient's memory with pathological force and distinctness. (pp. 8-9)

The kernel, the 'attractive nuisance', is the repetition of the passages from '*Heiterethei*'. Freud establishes that there is a disconnect between the 'trivial and irrelevant' passages from the work, and the distressing effect that they are having upon the patient. The passages thus become a focal point for analysis, a potential clue as to how to rationalise this irrational occurrence. The analyst must determine why those passages, which seem insignificant, are repeated to the patient. Freud's answer, in this case, is that the disconnect is caused by other passages within the work causing distress. The unconscious may substitute the harmless passages in the memory, but it cannot substitute the 'pathological force and distinctness' of the emotion the patient felt when encountering them, which manifests itself in the repetition, even if the original material does not. The solution demonstrates the 'psychical significance' of the lost details

⁶⁷ Otto Ludwig's *Die Heiterethei und Ihr Wiederspiel* (1851), a title that is difficult to directly translate into English.

surrounding the apparently-harmless screen memory, just as the ambient surrounding features disguise the presence of the ‘dangerous nuisance’ in Bruner’s legal example.

Freud’s previous example, the paranoiac, is a stepping-stone in his own narrative to establish the principle of the screen memory as a basis for diagnosis. The movement into the territory of paranoia grants psychological weight to the seemingly innocuous phenomenon, which Freud’s interjection is attempting to prove the validity of as other psychologists would ‘neglect’ it. (p.8) Freud also grounds his screen memory concept in a previous study of ‘normal adults’, an 1895 survey on childhood memory by the brothers V. and C. Henri. Although Freud begins the essay with his experience in the psychoanalytic treatment ‘of hysteria, obsessional neurosis, etc’, (p. 3) we move between the neurotic symptom in a diagnosis of paranoia to one which affects ‘normal’ people. Moving beyond the Henris’ survey, Freud defines the concept, coining the term ‘the screen memory’, and applies it through a case study of his own. The study itself is presented in the form of a dialogue, between himself in the position of analyst, and an unnamed ‘patient’. The ‘patient’s’ part is presented in direct speech, in inverted commas, as though they were speaking directly to the narrator. (Freud, pp. 9-19) Through dialogue, both the patient and the narrator represent a functional part within a polyphonic narrative, rather than just a single level of narrative function. The proof-of-concept reaches to us in narrative form as the problem is resolved through the patient giving their own narrative, and the narrator analysing it relative to the introduced concept of the screen memory, and responding to each detail accordingly, in order to present the ‘true’ narrative.

After some preamble, in which the patient is introduced, he goes on to describe his screen memory:

The scene seems to me fairly inconsequential, and I can’t understand why it should have become fixed in my memory. Let me describe it to you. I see a square, rather

steeply sloping meadow, very green and lush; among the greenery there are lots of yellow flowers, clearly common dandelions. At the top end of the meadow is a farmhouse. . . In the meadow, three children are playing; one of them is myself, aged between two and three; the others are a male cousin, a year older than myself, and a female cousin, his sister, who is exactly my age. (p. 10)

The scene being ‘fairly inconsequential’ establishes the psychical imbalance, and need for attention to detail, that others may have ‘neglected’. The details which the patient’s narrative hinges on, thus far, are the meadow, the yellow flowers, the farmhouse, and the participants in the dream, namely, the patient ‘aged between two or three’, and his male and female cousins. These are the ‘clues’ that the analyst’s narrative must consider and hinge upon. The fixation in memory reminds the reader of the ‘pathological force and distinctness’ of the paranoiac’s symptom, an innocuous image that nonetheless finds itself ‘fixed in memory’. In this case, the ‘pathological force and distinctness’ may be felt in the vivid description of the lush greenery and contrasting multitude of yellow flowers. It is from this that we may take our first clue, which is the contrast between the vividness of the image and the banality of its content. Also, interesting to note is the change of tense, it is not ‘I saw’ but ‘I see’. As well as the patient of this case study being given a direct ‘voice’, he also presents the memory as if it is happening as he speaks. However, for now, let us return to the description of the memory:

We are picking the yellow flowers, and each of us has a number of them. The little girl has the nicest bunch, but we two boys, as if by prior agreement, fall upon her and snatch her flowers from her. he runs up the meadow in tears, and the farmer’s wife consoles her by giving her a big slice of black bread. No sooner have we seen this than we throw the flowers away, run up to the house, and ask for bread. And we are given some. The farmer’s wife cuts the loaf with the long knife. I remember

that this bread tasted absolutely delicious. At this point the scene breaks off. (pp. 10-11)

The yellow flowers gain significance, as they find themselves utilised in the narrative. All three children pick them, but then the boys take the bunch of flowers from the girl. The farmhouse is utilised as the girl runs to it to receive bread; the long knife used to cut them may hold some significance. The scene ends with an olfactory sensation, instead of a vivid image, a strong lasting impression of the scene. The analyst pays special attention to those most vivid aspects, the flowers and the bread, pressing the patient for greater detail. In doing so, a teenage fantasy is revealed, which may be transposed back onto the 'original' memory, revealing that the first is not a 'memory' at all. The composition of the 'screen memory' is revealed as a distortion between memories of the patient's cousin, and another teenage girl whom he fantasised about on his first return to that area after having to leave almost fifteen years previously.

After explaining about the teenage girl, the patient ends his musing with the thought 'well I remember how long I went on being affected by the yellow colour of the dress she was wearing at our first meeting, whenever I saw the same colour again somewhere.' (p. 13) Of the cousin, although when he returned to the area, he did not harbour any overt desire for her, he was aware of a plan hatched by his father and uncle that he and his cousin should marry. Later, 'when the hardships of life closed in' on him, he reflected on that potential marriage in a different light. (pp. 13-14) Freud's diagnosis incorporates all of these states, working the information recalled after the fact back into the narrative of the first memory:

As the most intense element in the childhood scene you single out the delicious taste of childhood bread. Don't you see that this imagined experience, which you feel to be almost hallucinatory, corresponds with the idea contained in the fantasy: about how comfortable your life would have turned out to be if you'd stayed in

your home town and married that girl – or, to put it metaphorically, how tasty you would have found the bread that you later had to struggle hard for? And the yellow of the flowers points to the same girl. Besides, the childhood scene contains elements that can only relate to the second fantasy – that of being married to your cousin. Throwing away your flowers for a piece of bread seems to me not a bad disguise for the plan your father had for you. You were to renounce your unpractical ideas in favour of ‘bread-and-butter studies’, weren’t you? (p. 14)

The flowers and the bread become the ‘attractive nuisance’ around which the entire narrative turns, the clues to the ‘real’ narrative, and the points on which the proof must hinge. Instead of a childhood memory, we find a psychical act which transposes later details onto the childhood scene, distorting it by repression. In this case, the repression is of desire – the taking of flowers from a girl is a metaphor of ‘defloration’ (p. 17) – while the lingering taste of bread reflects different desires, of ‘material comfort’ (p. 17). The intensity, which makes the memory ‘almost hallucinatory’, remains, while the details are banal. The diagnostic reply is as rhetorically shaped as the patient’s narrative, each section of the diagnosis being framed by a rhetorical question, i.e. ‘don’t you?’, ‘weren’t you?’. The diagnosis itself has the Freudian hallmarks of free association – yellow flowers/yellow dress – regression to infantile sexuality – the desire for the teenaged daughter of the family friends – and the diagnosis having a potentially linguistic turn, where ‘bread’ can be representative of ‘bread and butter studies’. Each detail of the diagnosis corresponds neatly to the problem of its pathology, which in turn strengthens the narrative of the screen memory as a concept.

That narrative is shaped by dialogue. Freud has us consider the dream as it would be encountered through free association, rather than simply reporting it as a distant entity. ‘Almost hallucinatory’, the vividness of the detail engenders the vividness of the screen memory. The

boundaries of distinction between memory-objects, the malleable factors in the narrative of the screen memory, are also reflected in the blurring of the boundary of subject and object. In analysis, the thoughts of the subject become ‘an object of *conscious* mental perception’. The unconscious cannot be directly accessed, and the position of analyst is one removed from the position of subject, while simultaneously being a distinct ‘I’ subject to their own unconscious drives. The establishment of any points of fact should be objective – an impossibility, according to Bruner, given the malleability and subjective relevance of facts. The establishment of fact here must bridge a similar gap of subject-/objectivity. ‘Psychical significance’ is a subjective term, the establishment of which is the key to the process of a subject seeking to better understand themselves. But between the subject and itself is a gap of objectivity. The subject cannot perceive itself as subject, because to do so would be to enter a hall of mirrors of subjectivity. Therefore, to recollect is to locate events happening to a different, past self.

Freud’s concept of the screen memory is a recognition of the nature of the human encounter. Specifically, the encounter between the subject, party to mis-remembered information, and the past self an ‘object among other objects.’ (p. 4) The human encounter has been decontextualized through time, as the present self is no longer the past self. Freud elaborates:

[I]t is clear that the memory image cannot be a faithful replica of the impression that was received at the time. For the subject was then in the middle of the scene, paying attention not to himself, but to the world outside him. (p. 20)

We must be aware of the interpretive distance as subject becomes object, but we must also understand the subjective nature of the subject, as it were during the original event. Freud describes the discrepancy of seeing the self in the recollection as that between ‘the acting self versus the recollecting self’ (p. 20). David McLintock’s translation here is straightforward,

illustrating the discrepancy between the subject recollecting, and the thus-objectified subject, who performs the actions of the memory. To think of it in terms of an ‘actor’, however, has connotations of a different kind of ‘mental performance’, such as those that take place on the stage, emphasising the implications of fabrication and narrative.

Bruner has us consider a fact as ‘live’ – another potentially double-edged metaphor: the fact may be ‘living’ in that it is adaptable, or ‘live’ like a grenade. Instead of viewing fact as the ultimate rational paradigm, realising that the fact *is* reality, and that therefore more facts equal more reality, we realise that the fact is representative at best. It is both ‘malleable’, and potentially explosive in relation to the legal case, in that the case may turn on the appropriation of context. For Bruner, narrative binds contexts together, but it also binds humanity. To return to the quotation above, ‘... facts live... in context, what holds most human contexts together is a narrative.’ (Bruner, p. 26) Freud’s text is both narrativistic, and very human. The dialogue between analyst and patient, delivered through direct speech rather than indirect quotation, gives it an immediacy, as though the reader is observing the dialogue unfold in the moment. If the screen memory is, as Bruner puts it, a ‘live fact’, then Freud’s essay is an attempt to be as ‘live’ as possible.

It is also an exercise in self-division into subject and object. The ‘analyst’ character is Freud, but so is the patient.⁶⁸ In his memory, figures distort and blur into each other, the cousin and the teenage girl are united through the dominant, driving theme of yellow, which finds itself thematically dominating the memory. In the metanarrative, the analyst and the patient are also subject to similar distortion, the dominant thematic link is the concept of the screen memory, and both characters are projections of its exegesis. The dialogue illustrates the

⁶⁸ As noted by Siegfried Bernfeld in ‘An Unknown Autobiographical Fragment by Freud’, *The American Imago*, 4 (1946), 3-19.

different positions within analysis, but also the subjective and objective positions the self takes in self-interrogation. Of course, the nature of the ‘case study’ was not necessarily apparent at the time. That is itself an omission in the establishment of Freud’s own narrative fact, the screen memory. Considering that Freud plays both parts in this ‘case study’, interjections such as this one are strikingly strange:

I can remember well a multitude of emotions took hold of me at the time. But I see that I shall have to tell you a good deal of my life history. It belongs here, and your question has conjured it up. So listen! (p. 12)

The patient’s dialogue perfectly confirms Freud’s method, through his unprompted willingness to delve into his own history. The ‘question has conjured up’ further levels of free association, which the patient will naturally explore in order to provide the relative details to re-establish the narrative surrounding the remaining elements. But the exclamation of ‘so listen!’ is a strange interjection, an attempt, perhaps, to further differentiate an invented character and provide it with a distinctive ‘voice’.

This interrogative, dialogic aspect of Freud’s text demonstrates the importance of narrative in reading him, but also allows us to move beyond narrative in our own reading. Where narrative is key to our understanding of both Freud’s establishment of psychoanalytical concepts, and the concepts themselves, there is more to the story. The text is a narrative, supplementing a larger narrative, yet it also urges caution when dealing with narrative. The text is a warning. It is, after all, one in which narratives are broken down to their constituent parts, before those parts are returned to the ‘real’ narrative. That narrative is certainly not the one provided by the patient, and to think of it as a ‘memory’ is to likewise give it narrative complacency, for ‘no reproduction of the event has ever entered our consciousness’ (p. 20) We must be careful when discussing the ‘screen memory’, and even of thinking of it as a real

‘memory’ at all. Freud goes further still. Where the rest of the essay is relatively tight, he finishes on a more open-ended note. He concludes that *all* childhood memories may be screen memories, ‘it is altogether questionable whether we have any memories *from* childhood: perhaps we only have memories *of* childhood’ (p. 21) Thus, the essay, which starts with the premise that childhood memory is more important to psychology than traditionally thought, ends with the modified premise that unconscious fraud is more prevalent than we suppose.

2.3 Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud

The crux of Freud and Breuer’s *Studies in Hysteria* was catharsis, the idea that a ‘cure’ may be attained through the erasure of repression to allow an intense encounter with the original trauma. Two moments had to thus overlap: the moment of trauma had to take on the same properties as the moment of its recollection. This division of the self (into the self of ‘then’ and the self of ‘now’) formed the basis of Freud’s division with Breuer, as recollection and repetition would not give the patient ‘the sense of the necessary correctness of the construction.’⁶⁹ The Post-*Studies* Freud would focus on having the patient ‘remembering it, as something which belongs to the past’ (p. 288), in order to ‘re-experience some portion of his forgotten life, but [the analyst] must see to it, on the other hand, that the patient must retain some degree of aloofness.’ (p. 289) However, in the ‘Preliminary Statement’ to the *Studies*, Freud and Breuer write:

⁶⁹ Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, On Metapsychology*, trans. Strachey et al., ed. Angela Richards, (London: Penguin, 1984), pp. 269-338 (p. 288), henceforth abbreviated to *BtPP*.

The psychological process that had originally taken place has to be repeated in as vivid a way as possible, brought to its *status nascendi* [nascent state, that is, its moment of first emergence], and then ‘talked through’. This makes any phenomena involving stimuli – cramps, neuralgias, hallucinations – appear once more at full intensity and then vanish [*schwinden*] forever. (Freud and Breuer, *Studies in Hysteria*, p. 10)

Rachel Bowlby’s introduction to the Penguin Modern Classics edition of the *Studies* begins by examining this passage, essentially beginning at the end of the therapy, that is, at the moment of the cure. She sees this return as ‘dramatic’, as a narrative of rebirth and sudden death in which ‘a performer makes a final appearance, a reprise for one last time, charged with the built-up emotion... of the finale.’ That performance is a ‘twofold drama’ the retrospective event relived, but with the self-knowledge allowing patients to contextualise the significance of the event relative to their psyche. (p. vi) As Bowlby states:

This recalls, or anticipates, what was to be the future role in psychoanalysis of an actual play: Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*. Oedipus’ story gives Freud the model of (male) childhood development in the structure of the Oedipus complex, but this is not all the play suggests. Its action, as Freud points out in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), consists of nothing other than dialogues that ultimately rewrite Oedipus’ history by showing it in a completely different light: the combination of present conversation coupled with a reinterpretation of the past is exactly what happens in psychoanalysis. (p. viii)

Bowlby’s emphasis is placed on performativity and theatricality. Performance dominates the development of the concept of hysteria in Charcot’s laboratory, in which episodes were triggered through hypnosis for the purpose of demonstration, to Freud and Breuer’s own

language in what would become an abortive manifesto for cathartic therapy. The patient gains two narratives of their history, the raw trauma re-lived, and the narrative allowing them to comprehend that trauma and its effects. Effectively, in order to become psychically and emotionally complete, a patient must first become divided. The self which experiences the trauma is the same self which gains an understanding of it, but the patient must perform both roles to comprehend the process.

Bowlby further examines how Freud's case studies present us with a performative identity versus reality, as she comments on how the 'Anna O's alias of Bertha von Pappenheim extends beyond a pseudonym. 'It was Anna O, not Bertha Pappenheim, who would figure for psychoanalysis as its ambiguous ghost, or largely forgotten mother.' (p. x) In her transition from real person to element of a case study, Pappenheim's becoming Anna O renders her both a speaking subject and an analytical object. According to Bowlby, the shift separates the two, and Anna O gains a 'life ... independent of Pappenheim's.' (p. x) In his self-analysis, Freud often becomes his own Anna O, so to speak. For example, many of the dreams discussed in *The Interpretation of Dreams* are Freud's own, allowing the dreaming Freud to present himself as proof of concept. In doing so, the personae he creates through providing multiple voices gain an independent 'life' of their own, and reflect upon Freud's role as author. Thus, we shall examine how Freud's dialogic structure gives 'life' to his texts.

In *On Cocaine*, Freud performs one of his first works of self-analysis, ostensibly writing himself as a character for the first time. Freud's analysis of the clinical uses of the drug are undercut by his own excitement at this miraculous medicine, which he sees as a curious mixture of objective scientific writing and a subjective reflection on his passionate belief in the magical

properties of the drug'.⁷⁰ For example, in the scientific vein, Freud notes on the metabolic effect of cocaine:

A system which has absorbed even an extremely small amount of cocaine is capable, as a result of the reaction of the body to coca, of amassing a greater store of vital energy which can be converted into work than would have been possible without coca. If we take the amount of work as being constant, the body which has absorbed cocaine should be able to manage with a lower metabolism, which in turn means a smaller intake of food. (Freud, *Cocaine Papers*, p. 68)

The passage is very much a product of the twentieth century, complete with references to energetics, i.e. 'vital energy'⁷¹, and a very mechanical take on biomechanics. What is being discussed here is how cocaine alters human metabolism, the body's ability to synthesise energy from digestion. Energy is a unit of work, so it makes sense to conceptualise 'vital energy' in these terms, but there seems to be a disconnection between the relatively vague 'vital' energy with the physical specificity of 'work'. Freud's commentary here is, in a clinical guise, excited. It is, of course, a lot more medically rigorous than the 'esteemed brain tonic and intellectual beverage' advertisements of the coca-leaf derived Coca-Cola, invented the following year.⁷² However, *On Cocaine* ostensibly approaches the drug from the same perspective,

⁷⁰ See Rik Loose, 'The Place of Cocaine in the Work of Freud', *The Pre-Psychoanalytic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, ed. Gertruidis Van de Vijver and Filip Geerardyn, (London: Karnac, 2002), p. 61.

⁷¹ See Section 3.3, for a discussion on vitalism and the impact of developments of physical sciences into mental hypotheses.

⁷² Commonly paraphrased from late nineteenth century advertisements such as this one: <https://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/food/coca-cola-ad-1886.png> accessed 15/4/19.

contemplating the exciting possibility of a panacea, which would land the then-struggling Freud the recognition that he desired.

Whether that excitement was generated as a property of his consumption of the stimulant, or at the possibility of the medical breakthrough which would grant him the recognition that he craved, that excitement permeates the text, and his letters of the period. For example, in a letter to his future wife, Martha Bernays, Freud writes on the clinical application of the drug that ‘it is only now that I feel like a doctor, because I have been able to help a patient, and I hope to help others.’⁷³ As Rik Loose notes, desire was the dominant factor in Freud’s experimentation with cocaine, and also in his abandonment of the drug. He examines this process psychoanalytically, in that Cocaine itself was an object representing Freud’s desire to marry the psychic and somatic in a medical solution to psychological problems. This was a ‘fantasy’ which Freud had to ‘work through’ in order to rid himself of it. (Loose, p. 64) There are thus two Freuds in evidence in the text - the clinical observer keen to document the drug’s effects in great detail – Analyst-Freud – and the Freud who is ostensibly being experimented upon – Patient-Freud. There is something very like Jekyll-and-Hyde about the self-experimentation and fragmentation into personae, which would become more distinct as Freud experimented further, not with chemicals, but with stylistics.

Arguably one of Freud’s most impressive feats, the treatment and cure of his own addiction, and his subsequent rejection of the narcotic as beneficial to medical treatment, gives us a glimpse of the first of Freud’s alter-egos: Analyst-Freud. In Freudian thought, the Ideal-I (*Ichideal*, often translated as ego-ideal) is an ‘agency of the personality resulting from the coming-together of narcissism (idealisation of the ego) and identification with the parents, their

⁷³ Freud, letter to Martha Bernays, 25th May 1884, in Byck, *Cocaine Papers* p. 7.

substitutes or with collective ideals. As a distinct agency, the ego-ideal constitutes a model to which the subject attempts to conform.⁷⁴ If one were to identify an Ideal-I in Freud, it is this masterful clinician, the paternalistic figure whom the clichéd term the ‘father of psychoanalysis’ fits so easily. This is the figure who can, through sheer willpower and self-knowledge, cure himself of what was by all accounts a serious addiction, is a powerful figure indeed.

When one mis-uses the term ‘ego’ to criticise this narcissistic tendency within Freud, it is this characteristic, or rather, the supersession of this characteristic over the second ‘Freud’ to which they are referring, Patient-Freud. This figure is a seemingly unflinching self-exegete, the addict of *On Cocaine*, and the most represented dreamer in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, one whose fundamental honesty is taken for granted. The *Interpretation of Dreams* is thus often a bizarre read for its juxtaposition between its technical specificity and its anecdotal honesty. For example, he introduces the topic of somatic content in dream formation, in which he discusses how physical stimuli may affect the dream’s content ‘if they fit in appropriately ideational content derived from the dream’s psychical sources.’ (p. 257) His dream analysis for this section is one of his own, in which he is on a staircase, ‘very incompletely dressed’, bounding up the stairs three at a time. He is suddenly confronted by an elderly maidservant, and freezes to the spot. Having established that each dream is the fulfilment of a wish, Freud elaborates on just what the psychical source of the dream setting might be, arriving at the

⁷⁴ This definition is from Laplanche and Pontalis, pp. 144-5. Initially the same concept as the super-ego in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), the ego-ideal develops in subsequent works, to become a narcissistic function of the super-ego in the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933). Post-Freud, the ego-ideal has continued to enjoy greater autonomy in psychoanalytical models.

conclusion that it is a combination of a staircase in his own residence, and one in the house of a patient whom he had visited that day. He writes:

How do these stairs and this woman get into my dream? The shame of not being fully dressed is undoubtedly of a sexual character; the servant of whom I dream is older than I, surly, and by no means attractive. These questions remind me of the following incident: When I pay my morning visit at this house, I am usually seized with a desire to clear my throat; the sputum falls on the stairs. There is no spittoon on either of the two floors, and I consider that the stairs should be kept clean not at my expense, but rather by the provision of a spittoon. The housekeeper, another elderly, curmudgeonly person, but, as I willingly admit, a woman of cleanly instincts, takes a different view of the matter. (*TloD*, pp. 257-8)

This is a bizarre admission. He may have had a dream of a potentially sexual nature about an elderly maidservant, who is ‘by no means attractive’. Of course, this is not the diagnosis, and Freud’s introduction of the topic is tongue-in-cheek. In the end, the potential for a fantasy of self-debasement is discussed as a potential somatic stimulus, his movement arrested in his sleep, translating to psychical inhibition in the dream-work. Yet, incongruously, the Freud who elaborates on how somatic sources may represent ideational content is now writing confessionally about regularly coughing up phlegm in a patient’s house – and in his own, it is to be implied on the following page, so the figure haunting this text has a distinct cough, and a penchant for disgusting habits.

Patients are tasked with putting aside criticality, and laying the psyche bare to another, and are required to reconcile the fact that certain behaviours stemmed from a breakdown in the mechanism of repression or drives which was probably provoked by taboo subject matter. In his own case, however, Freud merely plays with sexuality as a false diagnosis, before revealing

how the dream may be slightly more complex – and less sexual, than a ‘state of undress’ might indicate. Yet, even though his stairwell indiscretions may have read differently over a hundred years ago, he nonetheless highlights a self-imperfection, and does so with self-deprecating humour.

Freud’s frank discussions of sexuality and repression and his ability to portray himself as a flawed subject serve to humanise him. The clinician of *On Cocaine* seems to be capable of a form of self-deception which prevents that honesty, setting his self-analysis within clinical, botanical and anthropological research – the paper is extremely broad in its defence. And a defence it is, as Loose notes:

In response to Poeppig’s description of physical and intellectual decadence, Freud wrote that ‘all other observers affirmed that the use of coca in moderation more was likely to promote health than to impair it, and that the *coqueros* [cocaine users] live to a great age.’⁷⁵

So, Analyst-Freud makes a compelling case to Freud’s Victorian and Edwardian public, providing a demonstration of mastery and offering a key to success in an era where inventors and explorers were idolised. The anthropological data on the ‘coqueros’ of Peru above is as characteristic of the period as the concept of ‘vital energy’, and one in which Freud may present himself as much of a pioneering explorer as clinician.⁷⁶ By contrast, the more controversial Patient-Freud appeals far more to a contemporary general audience, for whom conversations on mental illness and addiction have – at least, in theory – moved on from the idea of mental

⁷⁵ Loose, p. 61, quotation from Byck, p. 52.

⁷⁶ See Chapter 3, for a discussion of how difficult a term ‘vital energy’ was to Freud’s predecessors.

‘weakness’. That ‘weakness’ factors into another text Freud wrote on the subject of cocaine, in which he examines its clinical use in the treatment of ‘states of weakness and depression of the nervous system without organic lesions.’ (Byck, p. 116) Rather than the rejection of hypnosis, Loose sees a progenitor of psychoanalysis in the shift towards examining those psychical states that are without a defining somatic cause. Or, as Jean Allouch summarises it, ‘where cocaine was, shall psychoanalytic treatment come to be.’⁷⁷

Arguably, Freud’s application of psychopathology to supposedly ‘healthy’ minds makes the concept of weakness fundamentally redundant. The honesty of *The Interpretation of Dreams* paves the way for a conception of psychology that goes beyond the idea of mental weakness. In a similar vein, in the case of ‘Frau Emmy von N.’ in the *Studies in Hysteria*, Freud talks about her character development as being flawless, in spite of her diagnosis as a hysteric. ‘We would do well to make a conceptual distinction between ‘disposition’ and ‘degeneracy’,’ he writes, ‘lest we be forced to confess that humanity owes a large proportion of its great achievements to ‘degenerate’ individuals.’ (*Studies in Hysteria*, p. 95) In the *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud derides authors who claim a direct relationship, a ‘categorical imperative’ of the psyche in the dream: ‘we could only hope for their sake that they would have no such reprehensible dreams of their own to upset their firm belief in their own moral character.’ (*TioD*, p. 96) Yet, a divide between ‘strength’ and ‘weakness’, and subsequent perceptions of character based on such criteria, provide areas in which Analyst-Freud eclipses Patient-Freud.

According to David Cohen, Ernest Jones stated unequivocally that Freud’s personal usage of Cocaine ceased after 1887, claiming that Freud did not have an addictive personality.

⁷⁷ Jean Allouch, *Lettre pour lettre : Transcrire, traduire, translittérer* (Toulouse : Eres, 1984), p. 40, translated by Loose, p. 66.

Unlike Jones' portrayal of a dominant intellect, Cohen's *Freud on Coke*, portrays Freud as an addict, so that the development of psychoanalysis is inextricably linked to that addiction. As Cohen reports, 'Jones either did not know, or chose not to reveal, that Freud in fact continued, when under stress, to use what he deemed 'modest' doses of cocaine, 30 to 50 milligrams, for the next 15 years or more,' pithily summarising the situation as, 'sometimes it seems Freud relished fooling his biographer.'⁷⁸ By contrast, E. M. Thornton's scathing *Freud and Cocaine* attacks Freud's addiction, claiming that psychoanalysis was less a detailed study of symptoms and more a symptom in its own right.⁷⁹ Cohen's criticism, however, addresses the inherent performativity in Freud. In Cohen's study, the figure strongly urging honesty and uncriticality in the consulting room is exercising creative control over his own legacy. The Analyst-Freud has thus stepped in to curate and censor the speaking 'I' who is Patient-Freud.

2.4 Freud and Implied Authors

Wayne C. Booth's concept of the 'implied author' may go some way towards theorising the construction of Freud's authorial 'selves'. As a pragmatist, Booth examined the role of the authors of the text, explaining that when one forms a conception of the author from the text, and one's relationship to it, that it is not the author that the reader encounters, but a constructed identity, a 'second self':

⁷⁸ David Cohen, *Freud on Coke* (London: Cutting Edge Press, 2011), digital copy, no page number given.

⁷⁹ Elizabeth M. Thornton, *Freudian Fallacy: Freud and Cocaine* (London: Blond and Briggs, 1983)

It is curious that we have not terms either for this created ‘second self’ or for our relationship with him. None of our terms for various aspects of the narrator is quite accurate. ‘Persona’, ‘mask’, and ‘narrator’ are sometimes used, but they more commonly refer to the speaker in the work who is after all only one of the elements created by the implied author and who may be separated from him by large ironies. ‘Narrator’ is usually taken to mean the ‘I’ of the work, but the ‘I’ is seldom identical to the implied image of the artist.’⁸⁰ (Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, p. 73)

For Booth, authors create a self-image, beyond character or narrator, which may permeate the text even as these other archetypal features either profess to speak for them, or demonstrate the ironies of their own position and work against supposed authorial intention.

For the author, the work supersedes the person, to create the persona. Or, as Brooks quotes Sartre’s morbid image, ‘I became my own obituary.’⁸¹ In his autobiography, *Les Mots*, Sartre writes about escaping meaninglessness through imagining himself as a character within a biography. Sartre based this on the discovery of a book in his grandfather’s library, *L’Enfance des hommes illustres* [The childhoods of famous men], in which figures such as Bach and Rousseau were biographised as children named ‘Johann-Sebastien’ and ‘Jean-Jacques’, the description of their young lives peppered with hints as to who they would become, the ‘future greatness’ defining their lives. As Brooks summarises it, ‘he undertook to live his life retrospectively in terms of the death that alone would confer meaning and necessity on

⁸⁰ Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed., (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 73.

⁸¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Les Mots*, (Paris, Gallimard, 1947), p. 171, quoted in Brooks, p. 95.

existence.’ (Brooks, p. 171) Effectively, Sartre, in Brooks’ analysis, defines narrative in a similar way to Bruner, taking the view that authors may exist as a person within one reality, but their existence as a persona is (only) a ‘narrative fact’.

In controlling his own narrative, and the narratives of the case studies he presents, Freud retroactively ‘becomes his own obituary’. With each revision of psychoanalysis, the dual implied authors (Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud) develop as the discipline develops. The author of *Studies in Hysteria* (1895) is the same man as that of *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* (1937), but with the space of time and theoretical distance between the two concepts, the dual implied author is altered, and retroactively alters that of the previous text. This is evident in the number of revisions many of Freud’s texts were to undergo.

Studies in Hysteria is a prime example of this authorial self-revisionism, with the five years between text and publication allowing for self-reflection, which grants the texts a self-editorial uncertainty in the critical analysis of past diagnoses. For example, ‘it was while studying the somnambulistic state of Frau v. N. that I first experienced doubts about the validity of Bernheim’s proposition [Suggestion is everything]’ (*Studies in Hysteria*, 92-3) The narrative is transposed from that particular case study, to one of a transition in the development of the discipline in which that case study is already rendered obsolete. Subsequent revisions would emphasise this in later years, in which sheepish footnotes appear discrediting Freud and Breuer’s earlier approach. ‘I am aware no analyst can read this case history today without a smile of pity’⁸² writes Analyst-Freud, in a barb to his old colleague and younger self that does not so much sting, as patronise. Freud thus reframes the text as formative, but not definitive, to

⁸² Footnote added to the case of ‘Frau Emmy von N.’, *Studies in Hysteria*, p.108.

the mega-text of the development of the art/science of psychoanalysis itself across a long chain of successive case studies.

The optimism of Freud and Breuer's preface to *Studies in Hysteria*, in which the symptoms 'will vanish' if the method is followed correctly, contrasts with the 'pessimism' of Freud's *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* (1937).⁸³ The 'cure' of the *Studies* becomes a part of a narrative problematising the notion of it in the latter text. Although the cure remains the goal of therapy, the Freud of *Analysis Terminable* is lot more pragmatic about its achievability. The concept 'end' of analysis' is explained, flippantly; 'an analysis is ended when the analyst and the patient cease to meet each other for the analytic session.' The flippancy links back to the mission statement of the piece, of premature termination of analysis, and the premature setting of time-limits which ultimately detract from the process. Analysis can be concluded whenever the analyst says it can be concluded. This does not necessarily mean that it is concluded correctly.

The *first* condition for this termination is 'that the analyst shall judge that so much material has been made conscious, so much that was unintelligible has been explained, and so much internal resistance conquered, that there is no need to fear repetition of the pathological processes concerned.' This is followed by the caveat that 'if one is prevented by external difficulties from reaching this goal, it is better to speak of an *incomplete* analysis than an *unfinished one*.' The *second* is 'whether the analyst has had such a far-reaching influence on the patient that no further change could be expected to take place in him if his analysis were continued.' (All from p. 219)

⁸³ According to the editor's note in the *Standard Edition* version of *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, S.E. vol. XXIII, pp. 209-254 (p. 211).

The terms used of the first type, ‘incomplete’ versus ‘unfinished’, are relatively difficult to grasp. Presumably, a factor outside of the bounds of the analysis terminates analysis in one sense, but not another. The analysis may be said to be ‘finished’ in that the analyst has done all that they are able to, but it is not complete in the sense that the symptoms may still persist, or there may still be the possibility of a relapse. The second type demonstrates the continued need, in Freud’s view, for the analyst to maintain a persona, which may impact upon the patient. The analyst’s role, in having a ‘far-reaching’ influence on the patient, is not only to be knowledgeable and adaptive to the patient’s psychology, but to be an analyst. There is a sense of the Analyst-Freud being behind this, as all these formulations absolve the analyst of any possible blame for a botched outcome, but the analyst must still maintain a definitive, idealised analyst role in the transference situation of the analysis.

But the work features a level of self-deprecation; a factor that it shares with *Studies in Hysteria* is that it is dedicated to the exemplification of Freud’s failures. The first case study of the text is a recapitulation of his study ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918), the case of the now-infamous ‘Wolf Man’ Sergei Pankeyev, a patient of Freud’s between 1910 and 1914.⁸⁴ Freud documents how the case initially seemed a success, but turned into a failure, as the patient relapsed into neurosis. The treatment had stalled at partial success, but in his fixing of a time-limit to speed up the process, he inadvertently introduced an external factor which caused the analysis to become incomplete. By 1914, all the patient’s resistances seemed to have been conquered, and the memories Freud felt to be relevant were drawn up with relative ease. Freud concludes this passage with ‘when he left me in the midsummer of 1914, with as little

⁸⁴ Freud renders the connection explicit in his footnote to the text, p. 217. Even after his analysis with Freud, Pankeyev continued to adopt the pseudonym ‘Wolf Man’, and continued psychoanalysis for six decades after his treatment with Freud.

suspicion as the rest of us of what lay shortly ahead, I believed that his cure was radical and permanent.’ (p. 217) With as little suspicion as the rest of us’ does read rather like partial self-absolution, if nobody else may have been able to hazard a guess either. However, the tone of Freud’s documentation of his failures seems, at times, like self-flagellation, almost as a punishment for the Analyst-Freud administered by Patient-Freud. For example:

It is obvious that the more recent the successful outcome of analysis is, the less utilisable it is for our discussion, since we have no means of predicting what the later history of recovery will be. The optimists’ expectations clearly presuppose a number of things which are not precisely self-evident. (*S.E.* vol XXIII, p. 223)

Freud therefore does not hold an optimist’s view on therapy. The expectation which caused the dissolution of the treatment of the ‘Wolf Man’ is thus the optimist’s view, his relapse a cause for a more realistic view of therapy, namely its impact and longevity. Patient-Freud vicariously voices the analysand’s frustration at his permanent entrapment in within his neurosis, in spite of receiving the best possible professional treatment. Freud maintains that the overall theory is correct, even going as far as to return to the metaphor of strength/weakness in the outcome of a terminable analysis:

It is a question of the instincts being excessively strong – that is to say, recalcitrant to taming by the ego – or of the effects of early (i.e. premature) traumas which the ego was unable to master ... Only when a case is predominantly a traumatic one will analysis succeed in doing what it is superlatively able to do, only then will it, thanks to having strengthened the patient’s ego, succeeded in replacing by a correct solution the inadequate decision made in his early life. (p. 220)

The optimism is still here, in the certainty of the underlying principle. So, this is not the start of a schismatic paradigm shift, in which psychoanalysis meets the same fate as hypnosis and the cathartic method. The act of strengthening the patient's ego is unmistakably psychoanalytical, and, according to Freud, an assured method of treatment in cases of psychical trauma. Amidst Freud's problematising of psychoanalytical treatment, this certainty is striking, a place to figuratively weigh anchor after a narrative of therapeutic failure. That is, before continuing to the conclusion that the presuppositions and realities in psychoanalytical treatment are, at points, distant. This is a point of contact at which theory and practicality, for the time being, align.

Freud returns to the position of critic, however, returning to the target he expressed doubts about in the critical commentaries to his 1895 *Studies in Hysteria*: hypnosis. Freud writes:

Hypnotic influence seemed to be an excellent instrument for our purposes; but the reasons for our having abandoned it are well known. No substitute for hypnosis has yet been found. From this point of view we can understand how such a master of analysis as Ferenczi came to devote the last years of his life to therapeutic experiments, which, unhappily, proved to be in vain. (*Studies in Hysteria*, p. 230)

Although Freud takes aim at hypnosis as an inadequate tool in plumbing the depths of the psyche, that desire for an altered state in which the mind may be explicated is alive, but diminished. The 'pessimism' is certainly there, in the example of Ferenczi's efforts to locate a physical therapy, which 'proved to be in vain'. There is a potential optimism in the sense that no substitute has 'yet' been found, but it would seem that Freud would doubt, quite correctly, that it would be achieved in his lifetime.

In this case, he urges caution, and realistic attention to facts, rather than the potential excitement of seeing psychoanalysis as a panacea – such as a much younger Freud allowed himself to do with cocaine. What remains clear, though, is Freud's insistence on the importance of the analytical persona in the treatment. Freud's implied author fluctuates between masterful ideal analyst and honest self-exegete, providing both sides of the psychoanalytical equation. Freud's implied analyst, however, has to be aware of the implied role when the responsibility of a patient is taken on. On forcing a time limit before the decision to discontinue analysis in *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, he writes:

For, once the analyst has fixed a time-limit, he cannot extend it; otherwise the patient would lose all faith in him... A miscalculation cannot be rectified. The saying that a lion only springs once applies here. (*S.E.* vol XXIII, p. 219)

Part of the problem of therapeutic application versus theory is that there is no margin for error. There is no state in which analysts may present themselves as both subject and object in the process, even though they have to understand their role as both. Rather than write in the Ideal-Freud as a construction of his own psyche, Freud here details the effects of the idealisation of the analyst as they are objectified by the patient. A miscalculation equating to a broken promise, and that status as an object is shattered. That does not necessarily mean that the patient sees them as another subject, rather, it taints the view of the object to the point at which any 'desire' imparted upon it no longer functions. The desire to be cured, to put one's trust in the figure supposed to guide one to that cure, is thus essential to the process. There is an ideal analyst, and here Freud urges caution as to how that persona is created and used.

The caution that Freud has his implied reader take is basically the result of his observation of the same trepidation Breuer felt when treating Anna O. The 'optimism' of his writings on cocaine similarly turn to caution when encountered in *Analysis Terminable and*

Interminable. Although Freud derides the analyses of the *Studies in Hysteria* with the same self-deprecation that may be read in his critical return to the ‘Wolf Man’ analysis, and practically erases all traces of the cocaine papers, they both have parts to play in the narrative of psychoanalysis.

Yet, if we view narrative in this way the definable event – that the analysis failed, and no cure took place - supersedes its details. An issue that one may take with the concept of the implied author is that it constitutes an assumption as to how the reader is able to conceptualise it. Read in isolation, each paper would constitute a ‘world’ from which we derive our relationship to that implied author. However, in addition to the overarching legacy of Freud which dominates our relationship to him and makes textual isolation impossible, these texts are also not meant to be read in isolation. Inter-referentiality - i.e. Freud explicitly referring to his own previous case studies – is common within the texts, such as with the ‘Wolf Man’ example, indicating not only a theme of re-evaluating his past work, but in peppering later editions of his texts with footnotes detailing the development of the work in question. Hence, the failure of the Wolf Man analysis can be viewed in the context of the wider success of the psychoanalytical project as a whole, and in that light it is merely a childhood setback in the life of a person who goes on to fame and success in later life. With his constant revising and reframing of his theories, Freud is very much attempting to move forward the defining event, and remain in control of the narrative. To return to Brooks’ concept of the ‘sense of the ending’, Freud attempts to modify the relationship between beginning and ending, especially with regards to how he is perceived as the author of his work. If one may pick a version of psychoanalysis as the ‘end’, then the beginning must somehow grant a sense of it.

In exercising control over his own narrative, Freud sets the parameters of that space. The broader perspective view of the Wolf Man failure as a setback on the road to psychoanalytic success fuses Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud into a duality of implied

authorship. The contradictory nature of his printed persona gives the reader a contradictory sense of that 'implied author'. They must thus engage in dialogue with that construct in order to determine the construct's nature. Psychoanalysis is an act of negotiation, of reading between the lines. Freud has given us the tools to interrogate a text, just as the psychoanalyst must interrogate and read into the information given by the patient. In doing so, readings such as Loose's, in which Freud's fixation on cocaine as a panacea is presented as a symptom become highly credible. Freud teaches us how to decode the symptom. It stands to reason that the 'implied author' cannot stand apart from those symptoms, especially when his self-analysis gave rise to works such as *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904) and *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), in which the symptom is common to everyone. Freud's returns to these 'symptoms' to view them 'in status nascendi'. That could be seen as an exercise in excision, as per the cathartic method, yet his returning to them in order to understand them is a psychoanalytical act. He returns to the beginning in order to re-determine the end.

2.5 'Lain Beside Gold': Freud and Architecture

In 'A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis', a paper addressed as an open letter to Romain Rolland in 1936, Freud writes of his first visit to the Acropolis of Athens in 1904:

When, finally, on the afternoon of our arrival I stood on the Acropolis and cast my eyes upon the landscape, a surprising thought suddenly entered my mind: 'So all this really does exist, just as we learnt it at school!'⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Freud, 'A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis', *On Metapsychology*, pp. 447-460 (p. 449).

Freud's appreciation of the ancient citadel is presented as an affirmation of its existence. A gulf is bridged between the physical reality of the structure and its location, and Freud's memories of childhood study, where the reality would have been reinforced through images, or reference to its importance in antiquity. However, as that reality is immediately confirmed, Freud reports that he became uncomfortable with it. Instead of remarking on its grandeur or historical significance, it is its existence itself which Freud comments on. However, this presents an innate problem: Freud at no point remembers ever doubting the existence of the Acropolis, even in childhood study. Thus, paradoxically, he is in two psychical states, one in which he knows the ancient citadel is very much real, and one in which it is unreal to him, even as he is standing in it. He summarises:

The essential subject-matter of the thought, to be sure, was retained even in the distortion – that is, incredulity: 'By the evidence of my senses I am now standing on the Acropolis, but I cannot believe it.' This incredulity, however, this doubt of a piece of reality, was doubly displaced in its actual expression: first, it was shifted back into the past, and secondly, it was transposed from my relation to the Acropolis on to the very existence of the Acropolis. And so something occurred which was equivalent to an assertion that at some time in the past I had doubted the real existence of the Acropolis – which, however, my memory rejected as being incorrect, and, indeed, impossible. (p. 455)

Freud, as a physical being at the location of a physical object, understands that object's location in physical space, but feels the reality of it denied to him in mental space. Freud explores the cognitive dissonance through self-analysis. As in his self-analytical correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess between 1887 and 1904, Rolland – the implied addressee of the paper – serves

as confessor, and sounding board for Freud's explorations into his own unconscious.⁸⁶ In this case, such exploration takes a number of different routes.

Freud at first asks whether the reason he can't believe the Acropolis is real that it was an object of such high status in his classical childhood education, but he continues along the path of analysis which is leading him to conclude that his is not simply the reaction of an awestruck tourist, but a neurotic symptom. Instead of 'not believing', he saw his unconscious as denying him that belief by its falsification of a memory of disbelief. The physical location of the Acropolis becomes, for Freud, a series of overlapping abstracted spaces as he attempts to understand the reasoning behind his unwillingness to confirm the reality of a physical space.

Further abstraction is notable in Freud's character itself. He is both victim and observer, analyst and analysand. Freud's letter reaches the reader in the form of a narrative dialogue, Freud presenting his case anecdotally, not only to Rolland, but also to himself as a third-party analyst. His speculation that 'what I see here is not real' is immediately met with an explanation, 'such a feeling is known as a "feeling of derealisation."' (p. 453) Thus, his narrative of an event also contains counter-narratives, which first introduce the concept that Patient-Freud is experiencing a symptom, then appraise the source of the neuroses from several different potential conclusions formed by Analyst-Freud. The letter is an exercise in projection: Freud projects his neuroses onto the Acropolis, projects a narrative of those neuroses and their potential source, and projects different 'selves' in the introduction and potential solution to the problem.

Returning to Malcolm Bowie's analysis of Freud's 'self-images', one of the key 'selves' Freud presents is that of the archaeologist. 'Archaeology was for Freud the supreme

⁸⁶ See *Origins*, pp. 51-346.

combination of art and science', Bowie writes, noting that in Freud's literary science, the two are inseparable. (Bowie, p. 18) Archaeology provides, for Freud, 'as both clinician and writer . . . a versatile set of readily available conceptual models.' (Ibid) Bowie continues:

Psychoanalysis, like archaeology, is the quest for, and the systematic study of anterior states: for Freud *that which came before*, whether in the life of a civilisation or in the life of the mind, has a peculiar and unparalleled capacity to organise our perception of *that which is*. (Ibid)

With Freud's self-casting as the intrepid archaeologist, in essays such as *Moses and Monotheism*, we see not only the boyish enthusiasm of an intrepid explorer fantasy, but also a pressing need to self-legitimise through a conflation of methods. Freud would find a kindred spirit to his method in the form of archaeology, a means to piece together details of the past from unearthed objects and the remains of architecture.

Freud's discipline focussed on reconstructing structures beyond the conscious mind through details unearthed in the speech and writing of the conscious subject. Archaeology would thus seem a logical parallel; its practitioners take partial objects and remains and attempt to insert them into a wider frame of reference in order to relativise them, to place them into greater narratives of structure, place and history. Figuratively placing uncovered remains alongside other finds grants us a stratified view, of the uncovered objects' role in a wider society, and where that society fits into our conception of history. There is science, in order to locate, acquire and date remains with ever increasing accuracy, yet there is also narrative at work. 'That which is' becomes, to return to Bruner's term, a 'narrative fact', it is relativised by 'that which came before'. The importance of finds is weighed next to other finds, or a lack thereof, and their ability to prove, disprove, or completely shift the paradigm of our conception of both 'that which was' and 'that which is'. It does not take a great leap of the imagination,

even leaving aside my use of terms such as ‘unearthed’ both literally and figuratively,⁸⁷ to conceive of how Freud would extend that conceptual framework to his own expansion of details found in conscious thought to attempt to rationalise the workings of the unconscious and extrapolate its architecture.

Being ambitious, Freud does not stop with a basic comparison between the archaeologist and the psychologist. His archaeological ‘excavation reveals not a workshop or stable but a palace, treasure-house and temple, just as inscriptions, once deciphered, are seen to record notable events rather than, say, the contents of a granary or warehouse.’ (Bowie, p. 19) Freud’s unearthing is normally characterised as a great discovery; the details revealed in slips of the tongue, in dreams, or in false memories are thus the products of mining a paradigm-shifting treasure trove. His situation of psychological research as the ‘third and most bitter blow’ to the narcissism of mankind, which ‘humanity has had to endure from the hands of science’ certainly proves this desire for discovery. The first ‘two great outrages upon its naive self-love’ are, of course, Copernicus’ discovery of the earth as moving heliocentrically, and Darwin’s theory of evolution.⁸⁸

As Freud himself would write in his essay ‘On Screen Memories’, ‘if a certain childhood experience asserts itself in the memory, this is not because it is golden, but because it has lain beside gold.’ (Freud, ‘On Screen Memories’, p. 7) The memory described here is a screen memory, a memory in which an aspect of the original content has been replaced so as to subconsciously evade the trauma of a recollection of the original event. The ‘gold’ is that

⁸⁷ Which may thus be considered a spatialised conceptual metaphor, to return to the logic of Lakoff and Johnson.

⁸⁸ Freud, ‘Fixation on Traumas: The Unconscious’, *NIL*, pp. 231-241 (pp. 240-1).

recollection, the screen memory renders it mundane by encoding the original content. Thus, to discover the true memory is to strike gold. Within Freud's direct challenge of the mastery and completeness of the self comes the premise that the symptom, far from being an Othered concept relegated to 'the mad', is in fact a function normal to everyone. *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904), and its analysis of forgetfulness and revelatory slips of the tongue, would thus normalise the symptom. However, such normalisation is a double edged-sword, seemingly normal events become 'gold', in that detail becomes the basis for neurological narrative. Freud would not only legitimise his own narrative, but seek to surpass those of archaeology.⁸⁹

There is a paradox at work here, one that is interrogated by Dietmar Schmidt in an essay on 'refuse archaeology'. Schmidt examines the link between Freud and nineteenth century German archaeologists, Heinrich Schliemann and Rudolf Virchow.⁹⁰ Freud's archaeological aspirations may have much to do with Schliemann's archaeological heroism in his famed rediscovery of Troy. He remarked in a letter to Fliess of 1899, that a breakthrough in treatment of a 'difficult and persistent patient' was 'as if Schliemann had once more excavated Troy.'⁹¹ Schmidt notes that Schliemann's 'discovery' did not centre on palaces or rich treasures, but that he was able to date his find through the dating of debris and detritus, the archaeology of refuse. He finds something self-contradictory in Schliemann's work as a 'refuse archaeologist'

⁸⁹ In legitimising his study with reference to archaeology, Freud also distances his own work. Bowie describes it as 'Freud's most spectacular attempt to disengage himself from his peers.' (p. 30).

⁹⁰ Dietmar Schmidt, 'Refuse Archaeology: Virchow – Schliemann – Freud', trans. Andrew Gledhill, *Perspectives on Science* vol 9(2), 2002, pp. 210-232.

⁹¹ Freud, in Masson, *Letters*, p. 391. Quoted in Schmidt, p. 226.

– he found great archaeological value in debris and detritus, yet what they really sought was a kind of gold. ‘Despite a certain distance from the paradigm of treasure hunting, Schliemann’s undertaking remains clearly orientated towards this paradigm,’ Schmidt notes (p. 223). Where ‘refuse archaeology’ grants an objectivity to the field, paradoxically, Schliemann also had eyes for ‘King Priam’s Treasure’ (p. 224). That need not necessarily mean the physical objects, but the metaphorical treasure of the discovery of Troy.

That paradoxical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, in understanding the ‘refuse’ of the mind, but in searching for ‘gold’, is inseparable from Freud’s own archaeology of the mind. We have the ‘refuse archaeology’, but we also have Freud’s reimagining himself as an intrepid archaeologist. Returning to Freud’s own comparison of his field to that of archaeology:

[J]ust as the archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and positions of the columns from depressions in the floor and reconstructs the mural decorations and paintings from the remains found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from the fragments of memories, from the associations and from the behaviour of the subject of the analysis. Both of them have an undisputed right to reconstruct by means of supplementing and combining the surviving remains.

Freud’s archaeological analogy reverses the process of the ‘disturbance of memory’. Instead of fabricating a situation in which the walls of the ruin may not exist in reality, non-existent walls are rebuilt in the imagination by inferring detail from the remains. This process is akin to world-building in a text – we may imaginatively create details from textual inference. Freud continues the analogy:

Both of them, moreover, are subject to many of the same difficulties and sources of error. One of the most ticklish problems that confronts the archaeologist is the notoriously difficult determination of the relative age of his finds; if an object makes its appearance in some particular level, it often remains to be decided whether it belongs to that level, or whether it was carried down to that level owing to some subsequent disturbance. It is easy to imagine the corresponding doubts that arise in the case of analytic constructions.⁹²

In attempting to solve the ‘ticklish problem’ of dating and mentally remapping the finds, we again encounter Bruner’s ‘narrative fact’ model. In order to enter a narrative of history, archaeological remains must be relativised. The first stage of that relativisation is spatial reconstruction: whereby the scene is recreated from fragments. The next stage is temporal reconstruction, whereby the fragments, and the scene they represent, may be mapped onto history, as the archaeologist ascertains the relative age of the pieces. Interpretation is intrinsic to the method, according to Freud, ‘an undisputed right.’ In describing it thus, Freud’s analogy not only attempts to legitimise his own field through comparison, but also grant it an ultimate, ‘undisputed’ authority.

The ‘subsequent disturbance’ in Freud’s analogy is geological, yet the analogy stands for the ‘disturbance of memory’. If finds are properly relativised, then their proximity reflects an impossibility, solved through an imaginative reconfiguration through inference. The same is true of Freud’s Acropolis, which is presented as a thing which is both there and not there, resolved through exploration. Yet, in the entirety of ‘A Disturbance of Memory’, there is no physical description of the Acropolis. Its lack of description, or even of Freud’s reaction to it

⁹² Freud, ‘Moses and Monotheism’, *S.E.* vol. XXIII, p. 259, quoted in Bowie, p. 21.

other than 'So all this really does exist', grants it the role of a constant, an assumed presence within a text formed around its psychological absence. Its reality is a given, a thing not up for negotiation from Freud's perspective as analyst. The reader is not here to explore the Acropolis. Instead, the exploration the text takes is not a physical or imagined landscape, but the functioning of a psychological reality.

For example, the paper's setting as an open letter and first paragraph situates it as a letter both to, and celebrating a close friend. The letter begins in homage: '...I have made long efforts to find something that might in any way be worthy of you and might give expression to my admiration...' It then turns, by contrast, to self-deprecation: 'all that I can find to offer you is the gift of an 'impoverished creature who has 'seen better days.' (p. 447) What the paper has to offer is a worked exercise in psychoanalysis. The gift, it would seem, is that of honesty.

The essay launches into a description of Freud, on holiday abroad with his brother Alexander, visiting Trieste, and hoping to sail to Corfu. Having visited a 'business acquaintance' of Alexander's, they are advised that such a trip would be unwise, and that they should instead embark for Athens. There may be no description of the Acropolis, but the words of the unnamed 'business acquaintance' of Alexander's are represented through direct speech. The business acquaintance is not a fully formed character, but his influence on the Freuds and the text is delivered more personally and directly than through anecdotal description. Both brothers leave the encounter 'in remarkably depressed spirits', they wait to make the amendments to their journey 'wandering about the town in a disconnected and irresolute frame of mind.' (p. 448) The term disconnected paves the way for what is to come; the disconnect between their depression and the joy they should feel at visiting Athens, and the disconnect between realities experienced at the Acropolis when there.

The elements of personal narrative interlink with the narrative of psychoanalysis itself. The initial narrative, the 'disappointment at Trieste' leading to the 'disturbance of memory' is

reframed and contextualised through psychoanalytical detail, as Freud first elaborates on, and then presents himself as trying to solve the problem. The transitions between elements of anecdote and analysis are often performed through a contextualisation of the specific analysis within the broader context of the development of psychoanalysis.

For example, after first framing the text as a letter in homage to his friend, the second paragraph provides an additional frame. The narrative of the ‘disappointment of Trieste’ is introduced through a more general discussion of the development of psychoanalysis, and its applicability to the problem the text is about to develop. Freud introduces his topic thus:

You know the aim of my scientific work was to throw light upon unusual, abnormal or pathological manifestations the mind – that is to say, to trace them back to the psychical forces operating behind them and to indicate the mechanisms at work. I began by attempting this upon myself and then went on to apply it to other people and finally, by a bold extension, to the human race as a whole. (p. 447)

The ‘unusual, abnormal or pathological manifestations of the mind’, although perfectly true as a mission statement for the discipline, read almost like the introductory passage to a contemporary story of the supernatural. This will be a tale, then of the unusual, abnormal or pathological. Freud presents himself as the character to solve it. This is achieved by re-working the history of the discipline into those ever-expanding parameters: a study of the self, then applied to others, and then ‘by a bold extension’, humanity itself. Broadly speaking, this is true, but Freud does conveniently leave out the pre-psychoanalytical factors instrumental in forming his discipline. Also, this is markedly *his* discipline. Self-analysis, presented as the foundational stage of the discipline, is what is being returned to here. The gift Freud appears to be giving is that of a return to the origins of psychoanalysis in order to demonstrate how far the discipline has developed. Although ‘by a bold extension’ touches on the same self-deprecation of ‘an

impoverished creature', Analyst-Freud is hard at work in establishing himself as the implied author of the piece.

After the discussion of the case itself – the 'disappointment' and 'disturbance' – Freud turns his attention towards its solution. 'When we have established the existence of a phenomenon,' he writes, 'the next question is of course as to its cause.' (p. 450) The 'disappointment' is initially presented as a potential 'too good to be true'⁹³, before elaborating on why the mind may choose to 'repudiate a piece of reality' through Freud's established model of pleasure/unpleasure. The problem, according to Freud, is that to travel to Athens and visit the Acropolis should be a pleasurable experience, yet the brothers are dejected before they travel to it, and Freud experiences an issue with its very reality when they are there. He arrives at the initial conclusion that the symptom at work here is 'a materialisation of our conscience, of the severe super-ego within us, itself a residue of the punitive agency of our childhood.' (p. 451)

Freud reaches the conclusion that the distorted relationship, in which 'the actual situation on the Acropolis' is not just a lapse in memory, but that it 'contained an element of doubt of reality' (p. 452). That element of doubt, he concludes, is a manifestation of a psychical defence mechanism, 'the most primitive and thoroughgoing of these methods, 'repression', was the starting point of the whole of our deeper understanding of psychopathology' (p. 454) Once more, diagnosis is re-couched in a narrative of the formation of psychoanalysis. The letter may be to celebrate a birthday, but there is an element of psychoanalysis 'becoming its own obituary' here.

⁹³ 'A Disturbance of Memory', *On Metapsychology*, p. 450. This phrase originally appeared in English.

While Freud's narratives, of his trip and experiences at Trieste and the Acropolis, and the subsequent entry of the narrative of psychoanalysis build to propel the text forward, the 'energy' of the piece is not always unidirectional. The overall meta-narrative of the piece is that of symptom and diagnosis. This metanarrative, instead of guiding the reader forward throughout the piece to a central point of importance, instead has us interact with it retrospectively. We must re-evaluate the clues so that we may better understand the diagnosis, and each narrative's role in its construction. Freud's diagnosis, the 'solution of the little problem' is presented thus:

. . . the whole psychical situation, which seems so confused and is so difficult to describe, can be satisfactorily cleared up assuming that at the time I had (or might have had) a momentary feeling: 'What I see here is not real.' Such a feeling is known as 'a feeling of derealization...' (Ibid, pp. 452-3)

That a situation 'so confused and difficult to describe' may be 'satisfactorily cleared up' is the work of Analyst-Freud. While the Patient-Freud remains confused thirty years prior to the essay, Analyst-Freud reassures us that the difficulty is not so great in light of analysis. This is reminiscent of a passage in *The Unconscious* in which Freud also deals with distortions between external and internal realities as the analyst attempts to determine the mental topography:

Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal perception

will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception – that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world.⁹⁴

Although an implicit warning, that not all is as it seems, Freud takes on a paternalistically reassuring role here. It may be difficult to separate fact from fiction, but the internal world is, in fact, knowable; more so, alleges Freud, than the external world. Any attempt for the analyst to traverse, conceptually speaking, to the internal world, must be one made with the understanding that reality is a less conceptually fixed in light of the symptom. They must be able to resolve how an external perception of a very real structure, such as the Acropolis, may not reflect the internal perception of it, such as Freud's Acropolis, which inhabits reality and unreality at the same time. Freud's 'derealisation' provides us a neat, cogent term to diagnose a symptom that has, up until that point, only been accessible through narrative.

The 'gold' of this sequence, which the memory of the visit has 'lain beside', is provided by Freud in the very last paragraphs of the piece. To identify the symptom of derealisation is one thing, but an analyst must press further to the cause. Where the diagnoses of a psychological defence mechanism manifested as derealisation is relatively clinical, Freud's transcription of the potential cause is a little vaguer:

It was something to do with a child's criticism of his father, with the undervaluation which took the place of the overvaluation of earlier childhood. It seems as though the essence was of success was to have got further than one's own father, and as though to excel one's father was still something forbidden. (p. 456)

⁹⁴ Freud, *The Unconscious, On Metapsychology*, p.173.

The 'something to do with' implies an incomplete summary; 'a child's criticism' depersonalises it. Patient-Freud is rendered as an object, as the cause of his symptom is laid bare. The openness of the language here contrasts with the definitive language of the diagnosis. Yet, the diagnosis must be read in light of this cause. One must return to the 'feeling of derealisation' armed with this knowledge, and to the Acropolis, and to the despondency of the brothers at Trieste, after which Freud hints at the cause with his analysis that 'too good to be true' essentially signifies 'I'm not worthy of such happiness, I don't deserve it.' (p. 451) The more open ending to the piece should, at least, cause the analyst implied-reader to attempt this reconfiguration of their view of each of the details in the sequence in light of the final pronouncement.

The narratives may be said to build to this moment of revelation, but the revelation, in turn, sheds light on the narratives, and their interrelation. Likewise, it sheds light on the problem being addressed, that the real and unreal Acropolis is created by a distorted interrelation between narratives of the self. Freud's encounters with his patients are marked by dynamism: not only the dynamism of a human interaction with another human, and the dynamism of free association, but also that of interpretation. The 'screen memory', for example, is not gold in and of itself, but has 'lain next to' it. Each detail, given over time, mounts up to provide an overall image which the analyst must decode and present to the patient as a symptom. Association does not stop with the patient, the analysts themselves, although presented as unbiased recorders, nonetheless provide detail through inference.

Freud often turns to linguistic evidence in order to support his theories of subconscious processes. In 'On Screen Memories', Freud examines the linguistic elements of manifest image-based content in a false memory. We find in memories of the taste of bread a father's admonition for the patient to return to 'bread-and-butter' studies'; taking flowers from a girl may represent a desire to 'deflower' her; a false memory of breaking off a branch of a tree may

represent masturbation, through the ‘well known German vulgarism, “to tear one out”.’ (Freud, ‘On Screen Memories’, pp. 16-18) Freud, infers details based on inference taken from what he sees as the placement and importance of juxtaposed detail, yet combines frame knowledge with that inference in order to attempt diagnosis.

From the fragments of a false narrative, Freud recreates a narrative which he believes to be truer than that considered true by the patient. In ‘A Disturbance of Memory’, Freud’s writing reflects this inferential structure, by having us first examine the narrative of the case, and that which prompts diagnosis of the symptom, before directing the conceptual ‘eye’ back to infer differently in light of the symptom’s potential cause.⁹⁵ Yet, although the reader is tasked with conceptual ‘work’ through inference, we are never in control of the text. For all of the breadth of scope of Freud’s topics, we are rarely treated to the same free association that Freud’s patients would supposedly grant him. To consider such a dimension as an effect purely of narrative or literature would be to discount the inferential and dialogic qualities of the piece. Just as the Acropolis oscillates between reality and unreality, so does Freud’s implied author.

2.6 Analysis 1: The ‘Emma’ case study of *Project for a Scientific Psychology*

In order to demonstrate the two ‘Freuds’ at work, and show how narrative and counter-narrative work in the creation of a distinctly Freudian text world, we shall now compare two

⁹⁵ In true analytical fashion, it is not unusual for a psychoanalytical reading not to accept Freud’s diagnosis, continuing to read his narrative as the dialogue of the patient, and that his diagnosis is thus itself a form of repression. See Mark Kanzer, ‘Sigmund and Alexander Freud on the Acropolis’, *American Imago*, 26:4 (Winter, 1969), pp. 324-354, for a discussion of Freud’s symptom not in light of his relationship to his father, but to that of his deceased brother, Julius.

case studies. The first, the ‘Emma’ case from *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, is a relatively straightforward case study in which memory and temporality are called into question, and overlapping narratives are pulled apart and re-sutured to demonstrate the case and diagnosis. The second, the ‘Dream of Irma’s Injection’ from the *Interpretation of Dreams*, which may or may not be about the same Emma, nonetheless sheds further insight into conflicting impulses and erasure as Freud investigates, or rather, does not completely investigate, himself as a patient.⁹⁶

The first ‘Emma’ is ‘Emma’ case study from Freud’s *Project for a Scientific Psychology*.⁹⁷ The *Project* remained unpublished in Freud’s lifetime, and contains many technical details which he was to abandon. However, it demonstrates early aspects of the formation of psychoanalysis: the method of the talking cure, the development from analysis of a symptom to its placement within a narrative framework of sexual development, and a problematisation of a simplistic analysis with a more subtle approach based on the idea that time, instinctual impulses and trauma do not function as expected when they are repeated in the ‘memorising-sphere’, as we might call it.

The ‘Emma’ here is a young woman suffering from agoraphobia, unable to go alone into shops.:

⁹⁶ Masson believed the two ‘Emmas’ to be one and the same, that Emma Eckstein is the agoraphobic Emma from the *Project*. See Masson, ‘Freud and the Seduction Theory’, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1984/02/freud-and-the-seduction-theory/> accessed 28/3/19. Likewise, the ‘dream of Irma’s injection’ appears in the *Project, Origins*, pp. 402-3. The analysis of the dream is very different.

⁹⁷ Freud, *Origins*, pp. 352-356.

She explained this by a memory dating from the age of twelve (shortly before her puberty).⁹⁸ She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-assistants (one of whom she remembers) laughing together, and rushed out in some kind of fright. In this connection it was possible to elicit the idea that the two men had been laughing at her clothes and that one of them had attracted her sexually. (Freud, *Origins*, p. 410)

Freud thus presents the initial problem of a fragmentary narrative which seems to make little sense, suggesting a quandary of pleasure versus unpleasure. Her clothes would have changed, according to Freud, between childhood and adulthood, and, ‘moreover, it makes no difference to her clothes whether she goes into a shop alone or in company.’ Emma is humiliated, and flees from the shop in an ‘affect of fright’, yet remembers that one of the assistants had ‘pleased her sexually.’ For Freud, working on a prototype of his economic theory of mind, in which impulse and affect had to be balanced, the cause did not match the effect.

Emma’s first relevant memory is later labelled ‘Scene I’ for convenience, as it transpired that, through further analysis, she revealed another, earlier, memory which informed the ‘affect of fright’ that she felt during the first, the potential sexuality of the experience, and also the phobia with which she continued to suffer into her adult life. ‘Scene II’ as Freud labels it, is a memory which Emma, at eight years old, experiences a sexual assault in a sweet shop. Emma recalls the shopkeeper groping her through her clothes. Yet, she also recalls returning to the shop on a different occasion, ‘she reproached herself... as though she had wanted to

⁹⁸ ‘Before’ is changed to ‘After’ in *S.E.* vol. I, p. 353. This is one of a number of changes to the text in what was undoubtedly a very difficult translation – based on rough handwritten notes – which may alter a reading of it.

provoke the assault.’ (p. 411) Freud thus surmises the psychological break to be ‘a state of oppressive bad conscience’ in which a child victim of sexual assault ultimately blames herself for putting herself in that position. Freud’s analysis concludes that this self-reproach from Scene II (shopkeeper) resulted in the ‘affect of fright’ in Scene I. As he summarises it:

We can now understand Scene I (with the shop-assistants) if we take it in conjunction with Scene II (with the shopkeeper). All we need is an associative link between them. She herself remarked that a link of this kind was provided by the laughter. The shop-assistants' laughter had reminded her of the grin with which the shopkeeper had accompanied his assault. The whole process can now be reconstructed thus. The two shop-assistants laughed in the shop, and this laughter (unconsciously) aroused the memory of the shopkeeper. (p.412)

Emma herself is not aware of the link between the two memories (p. 413), and so it is up to the analyst to draw up these memories and provide a causal link between them. Causally, the first memory, Scene I, is affected by the deeper memory, Scene II. The clues are there, and Freud ensures the narrative hinges on them in his case study. Both sequences involve shops and humiliation, and Freud is keen to denote the sexual element in both instances. So, Scene II registers the traumatic experience which would explain the phobia; the ‘gold’ which the previous memory could be said to having ‘lain next to’. Freud continues:

The second situation had the further point of similarity with the first that she was once again in a shop alone. The shopkeeper's grabbing through her clothes was remembered; but since then she had reached puberty. The recollection aroused (what the event when it occurred could certainly not have done) a sexual release, which turned into anxiety. In her anxiety she was afraid the shop-assistants might repeat the assault, and ran away. (p. 412)

Freud's interest is not necessarily that assault leads to phobia, but how the various layers of symbology are formed in the establishment of that phobia. If each element may be pursued 'in depth', then they must likewise reconnect to the 'surface', with the patient's perception of reality. Here, Freud establishes a conflicted binary of 'sexual release' which turned into 'anxiety'. Freud's logic does not stop there. 'In our example the remarkable thing is that what entered consciousness was not the element that aroused interest (the assault) but another which symbolised it (the clothes)' he states. (p. 413)

Having uncovered the repressed memory, Freud still has to expand on how the repression forms the symptom, and thus breaks down each individual element, the clothes, such as being alone, the shopkeeper/assistants, clothes, fright, laughter, etc. into a series of subsequent connections. Thus, his conclusion is drawn from a theoretical framework constructed from a mental space in which these events may be interconnected, even though the patient herself does not connect them. Thinking along Freud's archaeological lines, having excavated the ruins, they are rendered onto a working model in order to assess what is missing, and how each detail interrelates.

This conclusion may be said to be based within aspects of narrative structure, in that Freud ultimately relativises a phobia through re-establishing the facts as they happened, relative to their importance in Emma's psychical development. A 'narrative fact' is created through free association. That relativisation restores a form of temporality to the patient, and they are thus able to make connections that they would otherwise not have access to, to pull each fragment of their narrative into some semblance of a whole. To return to Brooks, and the view of narrative as 'the principal ordering force of those meanings that we try to wrest from human temporality,' (Brooks, p. xi) then what we have here is a patient to whom that human temporality is unavailable. Thus, a narrative is created in which 'meaning' is re-established

through a reconnection with her own narrative, effectively jump-started by an encounter with an external narrative purporting to explain her own.

The ‘text world’ is thus created by an explanation of the overlap between two subordinate ‘worlds’: Scene I and Scene II. The reader is thus provided with a similar scenic overlap, a superposition in which Scene II (shopkeeper) is laid on top of Scene I (shop assistants) to demonstrate the conflicting forces at work within the narrative, and thus the ambiguity of the impulse causing both effects, the ‘sexual release’ and ‘affect of fright’.

In the pre-psychoanalytical project, Freud attempts to demarcate the conflicting forces at work here:

It is quite certain that here we have a series of ψ processes of two sorts, and that the recollection of Scene II... took place in a different state from the first one. (p. 412)

The psi (ψ) in this instance relates to memory in Freud’s development of a quantifiable theory of neural activity, ‘whose contact-barriers make themselves felt, so that they allow quantity ($Q\eta$) to pass through them only with difficulty or partially. This second class (ψ) may be left in a modified condition after each excitation, and thus afford a possibility of representing memory’. (Freud, *Project*, p. 411) Effectively, Emma’s case becomes a subordinate ‘world’ of the text, as this narrative is part of a greater logical narrative to prove the inner working of the psyche.

Although, one may argue that an unpublished document cannot ‘prove’ anything, it nonetheless demonstrates a theoretical stepping-stone in the development of Freud’s theories on hysteria. Freud explains, ‘the fact that hysterical patients are subject to a compulsion which is exercised by *excessively intense* ideas.’ Strachey’s footnote to the translation of ‘*excessively intense*’ gives Freud’s original term, *Überstärk* (over-strong), a term which had already been used in the diagnosis of Frau Emmy von N., and would be used again in relation to Dora, in

order to denote hysterical compulsion.⁹⁹ The posthumous publication of Freud's pre-psychoanalytical writings thus served to fill in a negative space between the treatment of Fanny Moser ('Frau Emmy von N.'), conducted, during his work with Breuer, hypnotically and cathartically, and Ida Bauer ('Dora'), whose diagnosis was shaped by dream analysis and free association. Freud attributes all three cases to hysteria, in which physical symptoms have an underlying neurotic cause, all three relating to sexuality. Emma thus bridges a gap between the three diagnoses, the first, 'Emmy von N.', in which Freud begins to question the validity of hypnotherapy and Janet's idea of 'psychical insufficiency' (pp. 95-6).¹⁰⁰ In the second, 'Emma', the case study which fully rejects a concept of 'insufficiency' for an approach attempting to locate a balance between cause and effect in a confusion of impulses arising from memory. Dora, the third case, is characterised by the dream analysis being used to explore the symptom, and attempt to locate and explicate the nature of the balance, rather than revolve around unlocatable 'ψ's and 'Qη's.

However, the case, as is common in Freud, is also striking in its problematising of seemingly distinct relationships. Although he claims to have re-established Emma's narrative through the narrative of his own, it is ultimately one of division, in which internal conflict leads to a repression so severe, that the external gains a phobic compulsion, but also a denial of internal reality, i.e. Emma's denial of the connection between Scene I and Scene II, even though, in Freud's written study, they are painfully obvious to the reader. The reader-analyst

⁹⁹ Here returning to the *S.E.* version of the text, for James Strachey's footnote on the term's translation, p. 347.

¹⁰⁰ Freud, *Studies in Hysteria*, p. 93. Let us not forget that Freud's case-notes were also published in 1895, the year in which he wrote the *Project*, and during his intense period of self-analysis.

must be cautious to treat each detail with care, the analysis here hinging on laughter and clothing, but also to treat with suspicion even time itself, as it is proven to be disingenuous with regard to memory. The strength of the impulse, or its repression, here has greater bearing on what is recalled, and the importance placed on the memory. Thus, throughout the text, the reader must act in the place of Emma, redefining their relationship to the narrative through each revealed detail, and coming to understand the ψ or the $Q\eta$ through practical demonstration delivered through non-practical means.

2.7 Analysis: Freud and Counter-Freud in the ‘Dream of Irma’s Injection’, *The Interpretation of Dreams*

Analysis and self-analysis often intertwined in Freud’s work, and the *Interpretation of Dreams*. Where in our first ‘Emma’ case study, the roles of analyst and patient are well defined, Freud’s self-analysis allows us to examine the intricate development of analytical and performative ‘selves’ in more detail. As Freud quotes experimental psychologist and former colleague, Joseph Delboeuf, that ‘every psychologist is under an obligation to confess even his own weaknesses, if he thinks that it may throw light upon some obscure problem.’ (*TIoD*, p. 130) Freud is ostensibly teaching people to spot erasure, and writing in such a confessional style, in order to efface the ego of the analyst-as-subject, but he also presents himself as a worked example.

After he quotes Delboeuf, he launches into the ‘Dream of July 23rd-24th, 1895’, or, as it is commonly known ‘The Dream of Irma’s Injection’. Freud’s dream, in which ‘Irma’, a patient of his, is mistreated by her doctors, who are an ‘Otto’, a stand-in for Oskar Rie, a ‘Dr M’, usually read as Josef Breuer, and a ‘Leopold’, believed to be Robert Gersuny, all of whom are friends and colleagues of Freud. The more obvious attribution of the ‘Irma’ pseudonym is to Anna Hammerschlag Lichtheim, due to the fact that she was a young widow, a patient of

Freud's at the time, and later godmother to Freud's daughter, Anna Freud. Freud seems to corroborate this, providing a clue: 'I must add that the word 'Ananas' bears striking resemblance to that of my patient Irma's family name.' (*TloD*, 140) However, the meaning of the dream, and the identity of 'Irma' remains highly debated, (See, Robert C. Lane, 103) A consensus seems to have been reached that 'Irma' actually represents a composite figure. Anna Hammerschlag may certainly have represented some of the manifest content of the dream, but evidence also points to 'Irma' actually being Emma Eckstein, a patient Freud shared with his then friend and collaborator, Wilhelm Fliess.

The precise reasons for Eckstein's treatment are unclear, but they appear to be due to painful and irregular menstruation. Believing Eckstein's somatic symptoms to be psychosexual in nature, Freud referred her to Fliess, who diagnosed the problem as being caused by excessive masturbation. In February of 1895, Fliess travelled from Berlin to Vienna to conduct an operation to remove the turbinate bone in Eckstein's nose. This was an unnecessary piece of surgery to expound an untested naso-genital theory, and Fliess' malpractice almost killed the patient. She suffered two near-fatal haemorrhages, once in March, the other on April 10th.¹⁰¹ Surgical gauze had been left in the wound, which naturally became infected. Although Freud does not identify the participants in his dream, evidence certainly supports the case for the dream referring to Fliess' ill-advised surgery on Eckstein. For example, the dream's 'Otto' is commonly read as a stand-in for Freud's close friend Dr Oskar Rie, the dream's initial malpracticing party, having given dream-Irma:

¹⁰¹ Max Schur, "Some Additional 'Day Residues' of the Specimen Dream of Psychoanalysis." In *Psychoanalysis, A General Psychology*, ed. R. M. Loewenstein et al. (New York: International Universities Press, 1966), pp. 45-95 (see pp. 56 and 63).

an injection of propyl, propyls... propionic acid... trimethylamine (and I saw before me the formula for this printed in heavy type) ... Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly... And probably the syringe had not been clean. (*TloD*, p. 132)

Freud's introspective analysis of the dream identifies its 'wish' as that of professional jealousy. He thus exercises a fundamental honesty, in that he admits to jealousy of his friend and colleague, and a wish for him to be wrong where Freud is correct. He concludes that is how he gave him the features of a roguish and ill-favoured uncle, to exacerbate the disdain. However, in his detailed analysis, breaking down the dream into its key components, Freud analyses how trimethylamine happens to have entered his dream work. He connects it to a 'friend' who had a theory connecting the turbinal bones and sexual organs:

I began to guess why the formula for trimethylamine had been so prominent in the dream. So many important subjects converged upon the one word. Trimethylamine was an allusion to the immensely powerful factor of sexuality, but also to a person whose agreement I recalled with satisfaction whenever I felt isolated in my opinions. Surely this friend who played so large a part in my life must appear again elsewhere in these trains of thought. Yes. For he had a special knowledge of the consequences of affections of the nose and its accessory cavities; and he had drawn scientific attention to some very remarkable connections between the turbinal bones and the female organs of sex. (*TloD*, p. 141)

The ‘friend’ is very clearly Wilhelm Fliess, the ‘special knowledge’ having been the cause of Freud’s referral of Emma Eckstein to him in the first place.¹⁰² Yet the passage appears to exonerate his friend, ‘whose agreement I recalled with satisfaction whenever I felt isolated in my opinions’, and with whose correspondence Freud’s period of self-analysis shaped texts such as *The Interpretation of Dreams* itself. Whether Freud’s ‘Irma’ dream is actually a written representation of Fliess’ malpractical treatment of Emma Eckstein remains debateable; however, the evidence is certainly not lacking.¹⁰³ It would thus be a further leap to attempt to state with certainty whether the manifest content of the dream actually included latent content that Freud did not broadcast, and if the decision not to transcribe such an analysis was actually unconscious suppression, or an example of conscious editing.

Of those that take that leap, examples include Robert Langs, who writes of a Freud crying out for supervision. Freud would find himself caught at the cutting edge of his field, and supervising other doctors, yet problems such as this serve as a challenge to the trappings of ‘mastery’ of the field which he dons in the role of ‘father of psychoanalysis’. He had to make

¹⁰² Trimethylamine does naturally appear in the nose, genital areas, and gut. It does not, however, have anything to do with sexuality. It is a by-product of the respiration of a bacterial infection, recognisable by its distinctive odour of fish.

¹⁰³ Freud’s letters to Fliess would essentially corroborate each detail of the case, and would assume guilt, but stop short of accusing Fliess of malpractice. See the complete letters in *Origins*, pp. 116-7. In addition to Freud’s critics, such as Jeffrey Masson, a fairly vast and varied body of work has been devoted to the dream, Freud and Fliess’ treatment of Eckstein, and the nature of his subsequent relationships with all concerned parties. See Staci Leon Morris and Robert C. Lane’s extremely thorough chapter, ‘A Glimpse of Freud’s Professional and Personal Life as Reflected in His Irma Dream’, in Lane, R. C., *The Clinical Use of the Dream in Psychotherapy*, (Bloomington (IN): Trafford Publishing, 2011), pp. 93-129.

a decision, yet his constant return to this, for Langs, had Freud wondering whether he made the right one, and if he necessarily should be in that position (of ‘mastery’) at all.¹⁰⁴ Langs notes the elderly and decrepit nature of ‘Dr M’ in the dream, a stand-in for the once supervisory Josef Breuer, shown to be frail and weak in an era where Freud would break from his theories.¹⁰⁵ By the time the dream is reported in 1899, Breuer himself had already condemned Fliess’ malpractice. Freud’s own physician, Max Schur’s reading, thus focusses on the unhealthy nature of the relationship between Freud and Fliess, and the language, cited above, giving evidence of a transferential relationship between the two.

Schur based his study on a collection of previously unpublished letters between the two, setting out to prove this case as the beginning of the end of the transference. (See Schur, pp. 45-8) Noted anti-Freudians such as Jeffrey Masson would concur with Schur’s reading.¹⁰⁶ The evidence is fairly damning for Freud, who aids and abets medical malpractice, and whose subsequent theories on Eckstein’s transference not only compound the problem, but show Freud at his most speculative, and out of touch. Emma Eckstein becomes a symbolic focus for Masson, eager to use her as a focal point for Freud’s abandonment of seduction theory later in

¹⁰⁴ See Robert Langs, ‘Supervisory Crises and Dreams from Supervisees’, *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 18:4, 572-612

¹⁰⁵ He also bears the features, in the dream, of Freud’s deceased eldest brother (*TIoD*, p. 310), a subject also picked up in the ‘*non vixit*’ dream, discussed in section 5.5. There is more than one reading at work here, contrary to Freud’s notion that each detail of the dream corresponds to a single unconscious ambition.

¹⁰⁶ See Jeffrey M. Masson, *The Assault on Truth*, (New York, Farrar: Strauss and Giroux, 1984)

the decade – even though, in *The Assault on Truth*, he documents how Eckstein herself uses seduction theory in her own psychoanalytical work.¹⁰⁷

Freud follows his analysis with a curt ‘I have now completed my interpretation of the dream’, but this is followed, darkly in the assumed context, by the footnote ‘Though it will be understood that I have not reported everything that occurred to me during the process of interpretation.’ (*TloD*, p. 142) However, he does return to the dream later in the work, and, in doing so, Freud has us consider further the complicating possibilities of displacement and condensation.

He notes the same ‘Irma’s’ recalcitrance over opening her mouth brought an allusion to ‘another lady whom I had once examined’:

None of these figures whom I lighted upon by following up ‘Irma’ appeared in the dream in bodily shape. They were concealed behind the dream figure of ‘Irma’, which was thus turned into a collective image with, it must be admitted, a number of contradictory characteristics. Irma became the representative of all these other figures which had been sacrificed to the work of condensation, since I passed over to *her*, point by point, everything that reminded me of *them*. (*TloD*, p. 310)

Instead of a binary, internal versus external, we instead see a shifting overlap. The ‘wish’ and ‘content’ may be placed as polar opposites, but the movement between them, to return to Freud’s metaphors of energy, functions much as electrons actually behave under a current: excited, shifting, and not all actually moving in the same direction, contrary to popular belief. We here see further evidence of ‘Irma’ as a condensation of Hammerschlag, Eckstein, Freud’s

¹⁰⁷ As noted by Paul Robinson, *Freud and His Critics*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993).

own daughter, and even his wife.¹⁰⁸ Here, he breaks down how ‘Otto’ and ‘Wilhelm’ collide, seemingly exonerating Fliess through an additional of ‘the group of ideas attached to my friend in Berlin, who *did* understand me, who would take my side, and to whom I owed so much valuable information’ (*TloD*, p. 312). Thus, should we wish, we may follow the path of many other critics and attempt to judge whether the wish betrays Freud’s guilt, or consciously or unconsciously attacks or exonerates Fliess.

Such an analysis is beyond our scope, but the point that we shall note is that, as we uncover more details about the dream, we also uncover something strikingly *wrong* about it. If Freud’s role of writer is primarily as an educator, that wrongness should trigger the psychoanalytical instincts he should have been honing in us throughout the text. Much as we should exercise caution when placing ourselves within the analysis – something Freud did in his follow-up analyses of Eckstein, believing her continued haemorrhaging to be caused by transference to Freud, in relation to her childhood ‘seduction’¹⁰⁹ – we must thus exercise caution when dealing with Freud’s obviously account. He presents his account as a series of symptoms, and the symptoms he displays include anxiety, negation, and repetition. One can be forgiven for taking an alternative analysis.

A controversial opinion to interject at this point is that Freud’s writing is designed to be read as a fragmented discourse, rather than as a pure analytical achievement. As the self is split into multipartite, often conflicting entities, so too is Freud’s print persona. That persona not so much monologic, speaking out to its audience from a figurative armchair in a cosy study,

¹⁰⁸ A connection F. R. Hartmann is keen to make in ‘A Reappraisal of the Emma Episode and the Specimen Dream’, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 31:3 (June 1983), 555-585.

¹⁰⁹ See Freud, *Origins*, p. 183.

as dialogic. He is not only keen to demonstrate a split self in the patient, but also in the analyst, and subsequently, in the character of author of the case-study. In his works, we see narratives unfold in dialogues between himself and critical sources – such as that above – himself and patients, himself-as-analyst and himself-as-patient. There is an ongoing theme throughout his work, a dialogue between the ideal analyst and the human analyst. Just as the self may be, especially in Lacanian thought, presented as having an *ideal* ‘I’, so too does the analyst. We thus see multiple discourses at work here, one that desires mastery, to show its author as a master of his subject, the father of psychoanalysis, and one that seeks to demonstrate the defamiliarising of the discourse, from the perspective of the patient.

What we thus realise is that Freud’s writing demonstrates an interplay of transference and counter-transference, even where Freud does not himself render it explicit. Freud’s allusions to counter-transference were rare, seeing it as ‘a result of the patient’s influence on the physician’s unconscious feelings.’¹¹⁰ His approach was more guarded than that of many of his successors, noting that ‘no psycho-analyst goes further than his own complexes and internal resistances permit.’¹¹¹ Laplanche and Pontalis identify three main practical responses to counter-transference. The first, Freud’s own response, is to reduce manifestations of counter-transference through detailed self-analysis ‘so that the analytic situation may ideally be structured by the patient’s transference.’ (p. 93) The second and third methods, which would be adopted by Freud’s successors, stem from his remark that ‘everyone possesses in his own

¹¹⁰ See Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, p. 92.

¹¹¹ Sigmund Freud, ‘The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Theory’ (1910), *S.E.* vol. XI pp. 139-152 (pp. 144-5), quoted in Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, p. 92.

unconscious an instrument with which he can interpret the unconscious in other people.’¹¹² Thus, the second approach seeks to control and utilise counter-transference as a necessary factor in the analysis, while the third dispenses with the controlling factors entirely, allowing the counter-transference to influence actual interpretation, in the belief that it is ultimately the dialogue and recognition between the unconscious of two subjects at work in the process. Freud’s own response, however, was to remain controlled.

Rather than allow his own unconscious to influence the analysis, Freud’s practice, and advice, was to turn inward. Thus, to return to ‘The Dream of Irma’s Injection’, the written Freud presents us with introspection, literally in the form of dialogue with himself:

When, during the course of the morning, the dream came into my head, I laughed aloud and said: ‘The dream’s nonsense!’ But it refused to go away and followed me about all day, till at last in the evening I began to reproach myself: ‘if one of your patients who was interpreting a dream could find nothing better to say than it was nonsense, you would take him up about it and suspect that the dream had some disagreeable story at the back of it which he wanted to avoid being aware of. Treat yourself in the same way. Your opinion that the dream is nonsense only means that you have an internal resistance against interpreting it. (*TloD*, p. 163)

Ultimately, one way or the other, the dream is there to educate. The lesson that Freud teaches here is one of close-reading, and sensitivity to resistance. Where one understands his position in relation to Fliess is debateable, yet running through the entire work are currents of introspection necessary to the concept of a ‘cure’. Yet there are counter-currents of resistance,

¹¹² Freud, ‘The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis (1913), *S.E.*, XII, pp. 311-326 (p. 320), quoted in Laplanche and Pontalis, p. 93.

a constant factor which much be realised and overcome in the process of analysis, both from the perspective of the analyst and of the patient. Freud may not necessarily have practiced what he preached, but his writing of the discipline is highly practical, inviting the reader into the interplay between transference and counter-transference, with the obligation to be cautious competing with the need to personify a perfect embodiment of the discipline. There is a 'rage to cure', but a counter-current voice-of-caution. One voice raises the bar for a humanistic, nuanced discipline, the other stoops to conquer.

Chapter 3 Freud, Energy and Metaphor

3.1 Freud and Energy

With a background in physical medicine, it is little surprise that Freud's earlier work demonstrates a need to explain the psychological somatically. However, following his disappointment with the theoretical limitations of his work with Josef Breuer, and his period of self-analysis in correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, Freud's work demonstrates a pronounced shift from the somatic to a conceptual approach. His theories stem from an underpinning 'economic' logic; a principle of balance between the charge and discharge of psychical energies. His earlier 'somatic' work is marked by a need to locate the sources of these energies, and thus the self they underpin. However, his later work demonstrates a greater understanding of the metaphorical nature of the concept he employs, namely the conflation of physical energy with the conceptual energy demonstrated through a rendered model of psychical structure.¹¹³ As we shall explore, energy itself as a concept has a complex and necessary relationship with metaphor, and Freud's developing relationship with the concept (of energy) recognises and utilises that metaphorical nature. Freud pushes towards understanding the psyche on the conceptual level, which contrasted with an approach which prioritised the physical and the scientific, losing sight of the abstracted nature of the concept. Freud's work may thus be read in terms of the uses and limitations of metaphor.

The development of Freud's work, in this regard, may be charted in the development of his linguistic register and outlook between his unpublished pre-psychoanalytic work *Project*

¹¹³ A *rendered* model, in the field of computer graphics, is a detailed, extrapolated model of an image which, adds colour and builds the image from two dimensions to three.

for a Scientific Psychology (1895), and the published texts which very much shaped the clinical and popular understanding of psychoanalysis, that is, in particular, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1921). In the *Project*, he attempts to couch theoretical psychology in the language of neurobiology, in order to demonstrate a more scientific approach to the abstract side of his thought, especially the ‘economic’ principle which he adapted and developed from the work of Breuer. He wanted to demonstrate psychological functionality through a model of the charge (‘cathexis’) and discharge of neurological ‘energy’. In this text, unlike the later pair, he attempts to quantify the levels of energy of charge and discharge, differentiating between the different ‘types’ of neurones involved. The text seems like a complex algorithm of abbreviated terms representing the types and quantities of energy cathected and discharged.¹¹⁴

However, the ideological shift seen in the later pair of books is not so dramatic as it first seems. Freud’s psychoanalytical works move from emphasising the existence of a directly quantifiable neural energy to a more abstract notion of an aura-like conceptual energy, while maintaining that the fundamental principal of balance is required to maintain the system. The *Project* would be deemed a failure by Freud, because quantifying and qualifying these characteristics and functions could not be done by direct physiological evidence alone. So, he combined the ‘economic’ model of balanced charge and discharge with notions of the psyche depicted in spatialised metaphorical terms. This ‘rendered’ model acquired psychological ‘depth’, representing the conscious and preconscious descending into the unconscious, like Christ’s Harrowing of Hell in medieval theology, where he enters the oppositional realm of his

¹¹⁴ The complexity and difficulty of doing so is discussed at length in the editorial footnote to p. 355 of Freud, *Origins*.

divine self, as if it were a physical space, between his death resurrection, when suspended in a state which is neither life nor death. This parallel between the Christian ‘Trinity’ and the ‘topographical’ model of the ego (*Ich*), superego (*Über-ich*) I, and id (*Es*) is an obvious one.

Freud’s work is, ultimately, a study of the self, but whatever principle or model of Freud one follows, one is always tasked with locating, and understanding the causal, tripartite psychological relationships which make up the ‘I’, or the ‘ego’. In clinical practice, Freud’s readers are asked to locate the selves of another, even to the point at which they must regard their own selves as another in order to do so. Freud’s *Ich* is constructed through a complex negotiation between biological instincts and drives towards pleasure, but it also entails a self-aware, socially-constructed need to curb those drives, to be self-conscious and self-monitoring. ‘Drive’ (*Trieb*) is thus depicted through the economic principle as an energy, stemming from a psycho-biological impulse, and ultimately from an idea, which is balanced by a counter-current of repression.

Yet the seat of consciousness cannot be precisely located within the physical organ of the brain – even though Freud tries to do so in the *Project* – but it can be thought of as existing only in relation to the forces working upon it. Thus, it stands to reason that in later Freudian thought, the psyche is only accessible and observable through these mental reactive functions. Hence, to track back these functions to their initiating impulse requires the construction of a containing narrative and a conceptual framework. This framework is constructed as a series of mental models: the Freudian structural models, such as the tripartite composites of the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious realms, in which the dynamic series of relations between them is based on the binary concepts of pleasure and its repression. A dynamic theory which questions the fundamental ‘reality’ of our selfhood therefore requires a dynamic vehicle for it to function. Freud controversially sacrifices a position of falsifiability – justified, given

how easily many of the specific claims in the *Project* may be falsified – but gains an analogical structure which highlights analogical relationships.

The governing conceptual metaphor of Freud's underpinning economic principle is that of energy, which itself is governed by, and, as we shall explore, constructed through conceptual metaphors. Able to transcend the boundary between the physical and the abstract, energy as a metaphor also transcends that boundary in terms of Freud's influences. Freud gains an appreciation of the applied use and terminology of the physical sciences from figures such as Hermann von Helmholtz, and former mentor Ernst von Brücke. Where these positivists advocate a rational, scientific universality of energy as it is applied to biology and neurology, Freud's approach expands that universalised rationality to fundamentally explain the irrational. Initially, in works such as the *Project*, this is achieved through an adaptation of positivistic style and outlook. However, his later works would abandon that specificity to focus on the metaphorical nature of the subject: the 'I'. Where the positivists of the period attempt to define energy, Freud appears to be aware of the indefinable, metaphorical quality of their subject, and treats it as such when using it as his metaphorical vehicle.

From Jean-Martin Charcot, Freud gained an approach to psychoanalysis based on clinical studies into trauma and hysteria, and he developed alongside another mentor-figure, Josef Breuer. Under their guidance, he became interested in altered states of consciousness, such as hypnosis or the use of cocaine. However, the influence of Charcot which may be most relevant here is that of 'ideogenesis', the notion that the hysterical system is formed through

thought, the psychical ‘idea’ causing somatic damage in the form of a ‘functional or dynamic lesion of the nervous system’.¹¹⁵

Freud’s commitment to the basic concept of ‘ideogenesis’ was unwavering. The nature of drive was always underpinned by a fundamental ‘idea’ rather than a simple stimulus.¹¹⁶ However, Freud moved away from ‘functional and dynamic lesions’ as symptoms in a psychosomatic model to one in which the terms ‘functional’ and ‘dynamic’ would alter their meanings to an extent, in so far as one considers them as relative to psychological energies. Those ‘energies’ would ground the work as a scientific concept, but would also be liberated from a purely positivistic conception. Thus, what we are left with is an ‘ideogenic’ rather than a neurological energy – adapting the term as Freud himself adapted Charcot’s theory from the somatic, thereby producing an insight into the functionality of energy as metaphor, and metaphor in Freud’s writing.

We shall thus examine the importance of some of these individual metaphors of energy and what they contributed to the overarching narratives and practices in the study of the mind which were current at that time. Whether Freud managed in the end to gain a greater perspective on that age-old philosophical quandary, the mind-body problem, remains debateable. Yet, the movement of his theories towards a ‘rendered’ metaphorical model places his work ahead of those who would misapply the metaphorical and thereby merely demonstrate a discomfort with the abstract in a positivistic age.

¹¹⁵ Andrew Hodgkiss, *From Lesion to Metaphor: Chronic Pain in British, French and German Medical Writings 1800-1914*, (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodolpi, 2000), p. 119.

¹¹⁶ And thus, the problematic English-language translation of ‘*trieb*’ to ‘instinct’. See section 3.5 below.

3.2 Energy as Metaphor

Energy is the perfect metaphorical construct for Freud. He formulates a determinist theory of the mind, one which seeks to unite the conflicting desires of the organic being with the abstract, rational, sublimating subject with which it co-exists. It is a theory that places the subject, (the ‘*ich*’) in between conflicting forces of desire and repression, and the idea of energy would prove itself to be an important formative concept. As the fundamental force underpinning our entire physical universe, energy itself has been remarkably difficult to define. Although we understand what it *does*, it is far more difficult to conceptualise what it actually *is*. The very term, coined in the scientific sense by Thomas Young in 1802, is borrowed from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, where *ἐνέργεια* denotes ‘a species of metaphor which calls up a mental picture of something in action’.¹¹⁷ In the post-Latin rhetorical sense, ‘*energia*’ continued to maintain connotations of ‘vigour of style’, ‘force of expression’, power, efficacy, operation, and strength. The metaphor itself maintains its kinetic connotations, yet, until the early twentieth century, it would continue to be used to describe aesthetic qualities. A concept fundamental to our understanding of modern physics is inextricable from metaphor. It is not only the basis for many conceptual metaphors, but may also only be defined through conceptual metaphor itself.

To attempt a unified, internally-consistent definition is thus to enter a metaphorical hall of mirrors. Energy, as a modern physicist would describe it, is a unit of work. As a unit of work, however, energy itself is merely outlined by this working definition. In educational terms, attempts at an interdisciplinary understanding of the concept usually fall short, often to

¹¹⁷ Both definitions sourced from the *OED* entry on ‘energy’. T. Young *Syllabus Course Lect. Nat. Philos.* I. ix. 18 ‘The product of the mass of a body into the square of its velocity may properly be termed its energy.’

the point of nonsense.¹¹⁸ Rachel Lancor's study of the understanding of energy had students break down their own understanding of energy as a concept into a series of analogies, and from their responses she subsequently identified six common conceptual metaphors for energy, in which it is conceptualised as a substance.

The six metaphors were as follows: energy was represented as (1) 'a substance that can be accounted for'; (2) 'a substance that can flow'; (3) 'a substance that can be carried'; (4) 'a substance that can change forms'; (5) 'a substance that can be lost'; and (6) 'a substance that can be an ingredient, a product, or stored in some way.'¹¹⁹ Whereas it is 'widely accepted that energy is not actually a substance, it is virtually impossible to discuss energy without referring to it as a tangible quantity.'¹²⁰ Benedikt W. Harrer concurs, stating that the substance-based metaphor is important to our understanding of the concept, and also provides an important conceptual frame in which to think about energy's dynamic and metamorphic qualities. 'An important implication of this metaphor is the understanding that while the form, or appearance, of a substance (or substance-like quantity such as energy) can change, the substance itself (energy) remains unaltered.'¹²¹ Thus, a 'perfect' analogy for energy would render it in tangible,

¹¹⁸ Zurcher, U. 'Human Food Consumption: A Primer on Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics for College Physics', *European Journal of Physics*, 29 (2008), 1183–1190.

¹¹⁹ Rachel A. Lancor, 'The Many Metaphors of Energy: Using Analogies as a Formative Assessment Tool', *Journal of College Science Teaching*, 42:3 (January/February 2013), pp. 38-45.

¹²⁰ Rachel A. Lancor, 'Using Metaphor Theory to Examine Conceptions of Energy in Biology, Chemistry, and Physics', *Science and Education*, 23:6 (September 2012), p. 19.

¹²¹ Benedikt W. Harrer, 'On the Origin of Energy: Metaphors and Manifestations as Resources for Conceptualizing and Measuring the Invisible, Imponderable', *American*

material terms, while also highlighting its abstract, intangible nature. The more closely we attempt to define it, the more metaphorical we need to be.

Freud needed to cross between the biologically and physically-tangible body, on the one hand, and the abstract ideational content of the mental landscape, on the other. His psychic ‘I’ must navigate the social constructions of the outer world, and in attempting to square these circles the metaphor of energy-as-substance, in several of its six forms, becomes very appealing. Freud’s theories attempt to bridge conceptual gaps, and the metamorphic nature of energy serves as a perfect conceptual template. Freud’s structural models of the psyche, whether one considers the topographical or the dynamic variants, also represent an abstract concept only accessible through further abstraction. The structural metaphor for energy cannot entirely encapsulate what energy is, yet ‘metaphorising’ parts of its function allows us to achieve a better understanding of the whole. Freud’s models do much the same thing: he provides us with a method with which to locate the ‘I’, and understand its formation through working definition, paring down his understanding through ever-changing conceptual models. Much as with energy, the physical aspects are there, from the primordial urges and drives, to the observable physical symptoms of neurosis. Freud delves into the ‘self’ as product of both physical and mental forces. A mental ‘force’ is itself an energy metaphor, and thus it requires a conceptual framework which may ease the navigation between the two conceptual fields. To render tangible the intangible is to use a metaphor that highlights the movement across the two: in short, it is to employ *ἐνέργεια*. Having examined energy as metaphor we now turn to the development of the terminology which Freud employs. Specifically, we shall discuss how

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Freud's rejection of a positivistic outlook is also a rejection of the linguistic register of physical science, which will bring us first to Helmholtz.

3.3 Helmholtz

If, even today, we struggle to find a universally-acceptable way of depicting energy, one can only imagine the job of the nineteenth century, when many of its parameters were still being discovered and defined. Much like his peers; Young, Faraday, Joule, Colding and Mayer, the German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-94) attempted to prove the universality of this vague force, describing it as *Arbeitskraft* ('work force'). This description served to emphasise the aspect by which we now, in the main, conceptualise energy, that is, as a unit of work. Researchers into energy during the first half of the nineteenth century may loosely be divided into two opposing camps: (a) those who believed energy to be a universal force shifting between its various forms, and (b) those who denied its transient or transferable properties.¹²² Helmholtz's thought is very much in the former category.

Yet the notion of *Arbeitskraft* would only emphasise one aspect of this conceptually difficult, dynamic force. As an attempt to solve both the conceptual problem of identifying the nature of the 'object', as well as the semantic problem of definition, 'work-force' remained an inelegant solution, because it merely implied what energy could achieve mechanically, and also

¹²² 'At least 12 scientists were simultaneously working on the problem of energy conservation in the first half of the nineteenth century, 15 According to Kuhn, some of them (Carnot, Séguin, Holtzmann, Hirn) were convinced that heat and mechanical work could be transformed into each other. Others (Mohr, Grove, Faraday, Liebig) had already argued that the world could be described in terms of a unified force, which is manifested in various forms.' Benedikt W. Harrer, 'On the Origin of Energy', Section I (a).

understated its conservational and transformative properties (or effects). Something more was needed to express energy's different properties in its different manifest forms. As Benedikt Harrer summarises it:

While Mayer identified individual forms like motion, 'gravity,' 'heat,' 'electricity,' etc., Helmholtz categorized the phenomena associated with Mayer's forms into the two main energy forms '*lebendige Kraft*' ('living force,' which we call kinetic energy today) and '*Spannkraft*' ('tension,' or potential energy). This distinction into two basic forms of energy is still accepted in physics today: one that is manifest in an object's motion and another one which depends on the configuration of the constituents of a system and can manifest itself in various ways. (Harrer, 'On the Origin of Energy', Section III (a))

Lebendige Kraft remains an interesting term for what we now term kinetic energy, used instead of *Arbeitskraft*, with its motor implications. It is a term borrowed from Gottfried Leibniz,¹²³ which is akin to Thomas Young's description of energy as 'a living or ascending force'.¹²⁴ The term 'Kinetic' introduces a conceptual dynamic of motility versus latency as we define different, discrete aspects of the same universal force. 'Living' complicates the issue still further, which is why the term no longer defines the concept, but it does raise some significant semantic connotations.

Helmholtz's *Arbeitskraft*, in its application to biology, was designed to demystify the notion of energy, especially in its application to biological systems, opposing the competing

¹²³ See Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, p. 171.

¹²⁴ Thomas Young, *A Course of Lectures on Natural Philosophy and the Mechanical Arts* vol. I, (London: Joseph Johnson, 1807), p. 44.

concept of vitalism. Helmholtz's understanding of energy was one of universal applicability; whereas the vitalists maintained that living organisms are differentiated from inanimate objects through a living 'spark', which may constitute the soul. Synonymous with 'vital', describing kinetic energy as a 'living' force certainly raises the possibility of vitalist misinterpretation. Although the term carries metaphysical connotations that physicists would want to avoid, such as granting an impersonal, universal force a distinctly biological form of terminology, one can, at least, understand Helmholtz's viewpoint in its selection. As the concept may only be defined through its aspects, one can appreciate Helmholtz's attempts to conceptualise biology in terms of physics, in order to render the concept cross-disciplinary.

Although *Lebendige Kraft* does not necessarily define the concept, Helmholtz, a polymath working in the fields of physiology, psychology and physics, attempts to bridge the gap between those fields through emphasis of the 'living' aspect of the work force as it is brought into motor function. The contemporary opposition to the universality of energy as a force represented a belief in a dualism between mind and body, rather than engaging with the organism as a whole, because the term 'living force' allows for the reader to conceptualise this abstract physical force relative to themselves as an organism. Just as thinkers such as Helmholtz redefined thermodynamics through universality, such universality would, in turn, have universal consequences. Fascinated by the interaction between physical stimuli and human perception, and building on the work of Galvani, Helmholtz would return to physiology via physics in his study of nerve transmission.

Helmholtz's work on thermodynamics posited that, as energy may not be created or destroyed, the total amount of energy in any given system remains constant, but that the amount of energy may change in any given *part* of a system. If it does, that energy must reappear in another part of the system. He sought to prove this through a demonstration that neurotransmission was not constant, but time-dependent. Specifically, that an electrical signal

passes through the nerves at a rate of 24.6 to 38.4 metres per second. Instead of thinking of neurotransmission purely in terms of electricity as an abstract concept, Helmholtz had his contemporaries specifically conceptualise it in terms of a flow of current.

Ernst von Brücke stood alongside Helmholtz in his attack on vitalism, denying that the ‘spark’ of energy was exclusive to living subjects, and asserting that living beings, like inanimate objects, were subject to the universal laws of energy conservation. It is here that we return to Freud, who studied under Brücke between 1877-83, and who later described his former professor as the tutor who had the greatest impact on him.¹²⁵ The energy-based economic principles forming the backbone of Freud’s psychoanalysis are essentially an extension of this law of conservation of energy. Where we read terms in Freud’s work such as ‘freely displaceable’ versus ‘bound’ energy¹²⁶, terms lifted directly from Helmholtz¹²⁷, we read an extension of this principle of energy beyond the biological, in an attempt to bridge a further gap between the physical organ capable of producing thought, and the abstract representational space of thought itself, and the conscious ‘self’ constructed through it.

This working description of the origin of the energy-based economic model is simplified, thus far not taking into account Joseph Breuer’s attempts to locate a mental form of potential energy in the form of ‘nervous tension’, ‘intercerebral tonic excitation’ and ‘quiescent

¹²⁵ Peter Gay, *Freud: A Life for Our Time*, (London and New York: W. W. Norton and co., 1988), p. 106.

¹²⁶ Freud, ‘Two Principles of Mental Functioning’, *On Metapsychology*, p. 39.

¹²⁷ As noted by Laplanche and Pontalis, from Helmholtz’s work on the second law of thermodynamics – i.e. that the entropy of any isolated system always increases. *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, p. 172.

energy', as Laplanche and Pontalis summarise it: 'just as a reservoir contains a certain quantity of potential energy by virtue of the fact that it holds back the water, so 'the whole immense network [of nerve fibres] forms a single reservoir of "nervous tension."' However, as they note, there are problems with such a relationship.¹²⁸ Suffice it to say, at the risk of oversimplification, that just as the naturalists, such as Helmholtz and Brücke, clarified the relationship between the biological and the physical, so Freud, and the movement to which he belonged became characterised by Eugen Bleuler's term 'depth psychology', which used the same principles to unify the physical, the biological and the mental.¹²⁹

Freud's departure from this field may be examined in similar terms as the naturalists' departure from vitalism. True to the spirit of positivism, Helmholtz and Brücke rationalised biological energy according to a universal principle of physics, rather than relying upon the inherent exceptionalism represented by those who saw life as somehow divorced from the fundamental principles surrounding it, or at the very least could not fathom how energy may change forms without altering its own fundamental nature. The school of positivistic experimental psychology was characterised by Helmholtz's student and successor, Wilhelm Wundt, who insisted that subjectivity and introspection be downplayed, or at the very least understood through highly objective, quantifiable means.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Laplanche and Pontalis, p. 171. Interestingly, they accuse Breuer's theory of disregarding the second law of thermodynamics, from which Freud borrows his own modified terminology.

¹²⁹ Eugen Bleuler, 'History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', 1914, quoted in Freud, 'The Unconscious', *On Metapsychology*, p. 176.

¹³⁰ 'He accepted from Lockean empiricism the notion of a world of private experience, which becomes manifest to its possessor through the medium of an "inner sense," analogous to the outer senses that give us experience of the external world. But then he raised a question Locke had not raised. Can the experiences conveyed by the inner sense form the basis of a mental

Wundt rejected the notion of an unconscious, focussing instead on the observable experiences and ‘impressions’ gained by the subject. Wundt’s laboratory is usually credited as the first ever established for collaborative psychological experimentation.¹³¹ It stood for a focus on understanding the surface, whereas Freud and Pierre Janet, a fellow rebel from positivism and coiner of the term ‘subconscious’, instead made introspection the key focus of their theories, creating a psychology of depth. Freud took concepts and terminology relating to physical space, and used them to elaborate on a mental, conceptual space. ‘Depth’ itself grants a spatial metaphor to an abstract concept. Using metaphors of energy as substance, he took something abstract, and conceptually-impossible to define adequately, and rendered it tangible through an examination of its material effects. Along this route he progressed to an examination of the ‘depth’ of the mind. Freud elaborated on the economic theory of mind, perceiving mental energy to be transferrable between different states of ‘depth’ and through their relative energy levels:

By the differentiation of fore-conscious and unconscious ideas, we are led on to leave the field of classification and to form an opinion about the functional and dynamical relations in psychical actions. We have found a *fore-conscious activity*

science just as the experiences of the outer senses form the basis of physical science? The answer was a decided no, because science, unlike everyday experience, involves a systematic re-ordering of sensory information in terms of a synthesis expressed in mathematical terms.’ Kurt Danziger, *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 19.

¹³¹ ‘The birth date of modern psychology is usually placed toward the end of 1879 when Wilhelm Wundt designated some space at the University of Leipzig to be used for the conduct of psychological experiments.’ Danziger, p. 17.

passing into consciousness with no difficulty, and an *unconscious activity* which remains so and seems to be cut off from consciousness.

... It is by no means impossible for a product of unconscious activity to pierce into consciousness, but a certain amount of exertion is needed for this task. When we try to do it in ourselves, we become aware of a distinct feeling of *repulsion* which must be overcome, and when we produce it in a patient we get the most unquestionable signs of what we call *resistance* to it. So we learn that the unconscious idea is excluded from consciousness by living forces which oppose themselves to its reception, while they do not object to other ideas, the fore-conscious ones.¹³²

Here, we see Freud using metaphors of energy as a substance to support the idea of an energy-based theory. A non-substantial concept is thus conceived of as a substance, in order to render another non-substantial concept as a substance. To return to Rachel Lancor's six common metaphors of energy, we have a substance that can flow and be carried – 'a *fore-conscious activity* passing into consciousness with no difficulty' – and as such, one that can change forms – between the generative idea, the unconscious impulse, the fore-conscious activity and the thoughts of the conscious. It can be 'an ingredient, a product, or stored in some way'; the 'charge' of the initial impulse is stored through its lack of cathexis – if the unconscious impulse does not achieve the necessary level of energy to 'penetrate' into consciousness, it is thus stored. The entire model is one of accountability and loss: through the basic first law of thermodynamics, that energy may not be created or destroyed, Freud has thus created a model

¹³² Freud, 'A Note on the Unconscious', *On Metapsychology*, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 54.

whereby he can track impulses back to an initial, generative idea, usually one formed in childhood development, rather than treating each action, impulse, and thought as separate. Thus, with the need to mentally ‘balance the books’ the metaphor of energy overlaps with another conceptual metaphor, that of economics.

The metaphor at work here is mixed, though, especially with regard to resistance. It is notable that the concept of resistance in physics was often conceived of through a hydraulic model – a flow of water impeded and dissipated through the material qualities of its medium. Freud’s ‘resistance’ here is one of counter-current, with a non-energy-based metaphor of ‘penetration’, used to denote how an unconscious idea may change states and be rendered consciously. ‘Penetration’ carries very different implications to that of overcoming dissipation: there are elements of force and intrusion, not to mention a potential sexual element.

Interestingly, it was during this period of Freud’s work that the electron was discovered (in 1897), and the hydraulic metaphor for the ‘flow’ of current was proven to be limited. The Fermi-Dirac statistics of 1926, and Arnold Sommerfeld’s theory of Free electrons of 1927, proved that the charge and movement of electrons under current was not, in fact, uniform. Much as Freud had to requalify and update his mental topographies, so too did physicists have to update their own metaphors. Such a problematising of that particular substance-based metaphor is useful when one considers how Freud conceives of the way unconscious energies manifest themselves in alternate forms, to be specific, through the often displaced or distorted content of dreams. However, this may also be something of a stretch, thus highlighting how an applied metaphor’s usefulness is limited, as we shall elaborate further.

The phrase the ‘living forces’, which ‘exclude...the unconscious idea’ in the English language text of the Freudian passage from ‘A Note on the Unconscious’ above is a direct translation of ‘*lebendige Kräfte*’, and is thus reminiscent of Helmholtz’s terminology. However, instead of kinetic energy, Freud required a term to conceptualise the abstract-

motivational force in the same way as the force of motion. ‘Living forces’ is by no means an attempt at finalised terminology. For that, Freud devised *Trieb* (‘drive’, which Strachey et al render as ‘instinct’) and *Beziehung* (‘cathexis’ in Strachey), which attempt to convey an internalised dynamic not only characteristic of, but of the same nature as, the force which drives the physical human body. Unlike the dualists and vitalists, who attempt, and ultimately fail to locate a physical, somatic bridging-point for their energies, Freud never really locates the somatic point of contact, and moves away from notions of nervous energy to a more abstracted model as his theory develops, as we shall discuss in the next section. However, when we consider psychological ‘depth’ in terms of energy levels between semi-permeable systems, we do so through the spatialised language of ideas, fragmented into psycho-energetic impulses.

The movement between fore-conscious and conscious activity, the need for unconscious activity to ‘pierce’ into conscious thought, and the counter-force of repulsion, together create a specifically dynamic model, in which we do not conceive of the mind through a static concept, but through its movement. The term ‘dynamic’ is highly important to Freud, and is used in many different contexts to highlight this important distinction within his theory. The psychical movement described by Freud above constitutes the ‘dynamic’ part of the ‘functional and dynamical relations’. With regards to Freud’s hypotheses, it is always important to note the imperfect binaries.

A case-in-point is the *Heimlich/Unheimlich* distinction made in *The Uncanny*, where one may often be found reflected within the other. In this case, Freud makes use of the terms ‘functional’ (meaning the conscious activity), versus ‘dynamical’ (meaning the inner, unconscious workings which constitute the ‘deeper’ part of the mind). But ‘dynamic’ itself is a term which denotes another conception of kinetic energy: According to John Tyndall, ‘[a]s

potential energy disappears, dynamic energy comes into play.’¹³³ Instead of using the word ‘living’, the potential for movement or action is conveyed through the term ‘dynamic’, a term which Freud would use a lot to denote that the moving parts were key to establishing the concept as a whole. Freud’s models of the mind often fell into imperfect binaries, established through metaphorical movement such as the ‘piercing’ mentioned by Freud when he notes that ‘a certain amount of exertion is needed for this task’.

One such imperfect binary, for example, is that of the pleasure principle and the reality principle which is ‘inter-pierced’ or ‘inter-penetrated’ or ‘mediated’ through a relationship between energy states. Another example is ‘latency’ versus ‘motor discharge’ a dominant binary in Freud’s later discourse.¹³⁴ This binary is a key aspect of Freud’s dream theory, designating the process whereby a dream is always a fulfilment of a wish, but indicating that the wish itself is not always made obvious to the dreamer, due to repression. In response to how the ‘disagreeable’ content of the dream effectively derails the idea of wish fulfilment (for example, the dream in which an aunt imagines the death of her own nephew), Freud turns to the concept of distortion. Distortion is an effect of the discrepancy between the ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ content of the dream – the unconscious impulse versus the repressive censorship of the ego.

As Freud notes, ‘It is only necessary to take notice of the fact that my theory is not based on a consideration of the manifest content of dreams but refers to the thoughts which are shown by the work of interpretation to lie behind dreams. We must make a contrast between the *manifest* and *latent* content of dreams.’ (*TIoD*, p. 160) Ostensibly, a difficult problem is

¹³³ John Tyndall, Heat v. 138 (see *OED* reference on ‘Energy’).

¹³⁴ See ‘Two Principles of Mental Functioning’, *On Metapsychology*, pp. 37-38.

navigated through an exploration of the abstract relationship detailed above: of energy able to be converted from latency – the unconscious – into activity – and the active discharge of the energy in the conscious. As will be discussed in the next section, where Freud takes the metaphorical path, many of his contemporaries would explore the link between energy and the mind on a more physical level.

3.4 Means & Ends of Metaphor

The influence of Helmholtz and Charcot had a macabre recombination during World War I, during which the grim potential of electricity was realised in the reconditioning of traumatised soldiers. The method of '*torpillage*' ('torpedoing') developed by Clovis Vincent (1879-1947), a student of former Charcot-pupil Joseph Babinski, involved the application of a painful galvanic current to soldiers believed to be suffering from hysteria, in order to 'persuade' them to return to stability, and thus fighting duty. Vincent's methods were labelled as a form of torture by his patients in 1916, and were discontinued, but not before Vincent labelled his accusers as simulators, which was then a capital offence. Vincent's own treatments may have ceased, but his methods found successors, and were not confined to the French portion of the trenches.

Vincent's successor in the use of this electro-methodology, Gustave Roussy (1874-1947), was, according to Julien Bogousslavsky 'using an adapted method of faridisation coupled with a 'moral treatment', the 'moral treatment' being a regimen of physical exercise, isolation, and 'moral support'. The 'faridisation' was, of course, the application of electrical current for the same ends of 'persuasion'. Roussy quarrelled with Clovis Vincent over the

invention of ‘*torpillage*’, and with his own patients as to whether his methods constituted a form of cruel and unusual punishment.¹³⁵ As Bogousslavsky notes:

The faradic current initially was weak, but in order to maximise his successes, Roussy soon increased its intensity, also placing the electrodes in sensitive parts of the body, such as the scrotum or the foot sole.

...After a military trial, he had to temper his patriotic therapeutic enthusiasm, and electrotherapy was quickly abandoned during the first months of 1918.

In Roussy’s experiments, we see a practice that places the physician’s needs, and theoretical interpretations, above the needs of his patients. In Freudian terms, it may be described as the overpowering of the ‘I’ (the ‘ego’) by the ‘Ideal I’ (the ego-ideal), as the reality principle is subsumed by the need to remain true to the idealised theoretical construct forming the appreciation of an ideal reality. Details that do not conform are thus discounted – Vincent’s patients were labelled ‘simulators’ rather than the sufferers from genuine neurological trauma – the premise under which he was treating them. In this case, the theoretical constructs that Bogousslavsky notes are those of ‘patriotism’ and the emphasis on a ‘morality’ to the treatment, ‘with even particularly aggressive methods justified by a re-emphasis of the concept of a ‘weakness of the will.’ (p. 156) Such concepts are very much an application of nineteenth century values to a twentieth century problem, where the technology outstrips its theoretical application.

¹³⁵ Details from Julien Bogousslavsky, ‘Hysteria after Charcot: Back to the Future’, in *Following Charcot: A Forgotten History of Neurology and Psychiatry, Frontiers of Neurology and Neuroscience*, 29, ed. Julien Bogousslavsky, (Montreux: Karger, 2011), pp. 155-6.

Where, at his worst, Freud may be accused of ideal-I theoretical imposition, at his best, he is a far more nuanced thinker than those attempting to eradicate ‘weakness’ through a system of punishment and moral correction. His conception of morality is a lot better suited to the period than his electrocuting contemporaries. See, for example, *The Interpretation of Dreams* for his pithy commentary on morality in dreams, and on the content of the dreams of those who would apply a moral sense to immoral acts via the dream work: ‘We could only hope for their sake that they would have no such reprehensible dreams of their own to upset their firm belief in their own moral character.’¹³⁶ Within this period of the development of psychology, it is relatively easy to paint a picture of performative brutality, and the misapplication of theoretical values.¹³⁷ Freud himself was not exempt from this strand of psychotherapy, testifying in defence of fellow future Nobel prize winner Julius Wagner-Jauregg for similar practices. And in his relationships to Sandor Ferenczi and Wilhelm Fliess, Freud would, at times, defend invasive procedures rooted in psycho-biological conjecture. But the metaphorical charge of his mental models, and the subsequent adaptation of the interpretive ‘talking cure’ is in stark contrast to the invasive use of electrical force by his contemporaries.

As Cornelius Borck comments, developments in the United States included the more literal application of energy to the problem of the mind, and eroded the line between subtlety and abject brutality. On Wilder Penfield’s (1891-1976) application of direct current to eradicate supposedly problematic neurons, Borck writes:

¹³⁶ Freud, *TloD*, p. 96

¹³⁷ See Chapter 4.6 for an analysis of a depiction of experimental psychology in the fiction of the period.

Electroshock therapy boomed throughout the years while Penfield was exploring human brains with electric stimulation during epilepsy surgery. McGill was the world's centre of brain stimulation in the hands of Wilder Penfield while Donald Ewen Cameron experimented next door, in psychiatry, with brain washing. The difference between the most subtle and brutal approaches seems merely to be a question of voltage.¹³⁸

Wilder Penfield exemplified the somatic approach to the study of the mind. Where Freud was concerned with the delineation of the still-unlocatable self, Penfield's neurobiological studies took very different lessons from Helmholtz et al. His most famous experiment, now described as the 'Montréal Procedure' for its development at McGill in the 1950s, together with Herbert Jasper (1906-1999), saw Penfield attempt to create sensory 'maps' of neural stimulation in the brain produced from inserted electrical probes. The maps were then used to locate and burn away nerve cells in the brain from which epileptic seizures originated, with directly applied current. Borck's comparison with the development of brainwashing techniques in the psychiatric wing of the same institution highlights the darker theoretical side of experimental psychology, much as the applications of Vincent et al had demonstrated the same propensity for brutality. Value-judgement aside, the connection between the two stems from a somatically-based theory of mind, in the case of the First World War psychiatrists, and a somatic approach to a treatment of hysteria, from which the propensity for electrode-attachment developed.

Interestingly, Penfield's experiments into the neurobiology of epileptic conditions yielded results which are still used today. Although the majority of cases – around 70% - are

¹³⁸ Cornelius Borck, 'Media, Technology and the Electric Unconscious in the 20th Century', *L'Ère électrique – The Electric Age*, ed. Oliver Asselin et al., (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), p. 34.

now treated medically through the ingestion of prescription drugs, the response when those treatments prove ineffective remains neurosurgical.¹³⁹ Affected neurons are located via a much-developed electroencephalograph, and either removed completely, via resection, or disconnected. The other main approach remains electrical: vagus nerve stimulation, or its more recent variant, deep brain stimulation, relies on electrical stimulation via a form of ‘pacemaker’. The supporters of a somatic cause of hysteria, such as Babinski and Joseph Capgras (1873-1950), gained a posthumous victory.¹⁴⁰ Freud’s own theories connecting hysteria and epilepsy, and subsequent treatment through analysis of the unconscious cause, would become a subject of much contention.¹⁴¹ However, Freud’s approach also avoids the potential for brutality and fetishism of method, as he attempts to understand metaphorical relationships in metaphorical terms.

To return to the era of Wilhelm Wundt and the development of this somatic trend in experimental psychology; Kurt Danziger comments on the potential for the nature of the process of discovery, and the scientific character of the equipment used, to usurp the object of discovery:

¹³⁹ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/epilepsy/treatment/> accessed 15/01/19.

¹⁴⁰ Both Babinski and Capgras recognised mental factors in the production of hysteria. However, they did favour the somatic, reflected through their treatment methodology. See Bogousslavsky, p. 156.

¹⁴¹ For example, Freud’s essay, ‘Dostoyevsky and Parricide’ (1928), an introduction to a 1928 edition of *The Brothers Karamazov*, which linked the author’s reported seizures with gambling and a feeling of guilt over the death of his father, does not consider the somatic diagnosis of epilepsy. See Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 590.

[P]sychology was not alone during this period in showing a tendency for practical technology to usurp the name of science. In physical science the practical expert was frequently to be found in a preeminent role and the goals of scientific research were often equated with the goals of engineering. Given the prestige of physical science, analogous developments in psychology must have seemed highly legitimate.’ (Kurt Danziger, *Constructing the Subject*, p. 128)

In Danziger’s view, engineering itself is presented as a valid metaphorical goal. The experimental psychologists are thus tempted to enter too much into the field of metaphorical space – the vehicular space of engineering – and hence risk losing sight of the space of the tenor, the study of the mind.

The scientific ‘Ideal-I’ of this scenario is the nineteenth century pioneering polymath psychologist, a ‘practical expert’ able to grant positivistic weight to their theories through demonstrable experimentation – a practicality which also hinged on the performativity of self-representation as master of the physical. Freud’s discomfort with overly positivistic practices, and his turn towards the unseen and physically unlocatable through a series of overlapping models detailing relationships between psychical systems certainly owes a great deal to such practices – his working models essentially having to fulfil the same problems of representation. Wilder Penfield’s experiments mapped neurons; Freud moved away from the physical to map the unconscious. Freud’s models do not, however, express the same reliance upon an apparatus, the narrative of the case study fulfilling the requirements to elaborate upon the non-narratable elements of the case. Freud may be accused of a substitution of fetishes, the metaphorical for the physical. These accusations may not be altogether groundless, given the nature of scientific representation in the era. Yet Freud’s understanding of abstract consideration remained more dynamic than the overly simplistic, brutal treatment that the soldiers in the care of Vincent and

Roussy received. However, as we shall explore in the following section, metaphorical covalence is characterised by its own strict limitations.¹⁴²

These limitations bring to mind Fritz Kahn's (1888-1968) once-popular anatomical posters, collected in *Der Leben des Menschen* ('The Life of Man'), which illustrate the use of visual metaphor in order to educate on the body, but also represent the cutting-edge technology of the day.¹⁴³ Although the metaphor was extremely apt at the time, its usage also demonstrates how the valency of a metaphor may change with time and context. In Kahn's diagrams, biological systems were represented through technology, such as the mind as a radio communications office, with small, intricately detailed workers tirelessly receiving and filing electronic messages from wireless communication.¹⁴⁴ The concept was not entirely unique at the time, and representing mind and body through compartmentalised personification remains popular.

However, in Kahn's interwar Germany of the 1920s, technology remained the dominant talking point, and so served as the perfect metaphorical base for visual representation as discoveries progressed in both fields – medicine and technology – at an exponential rate. *Der Mensch als Industriepalast* (*Man as Industrial Palace*, usually translated as *Industrial Man*) was a commonly reproduced poster in which the mental and digestive systems of the human body were depicted as a kind of factory, replete with Kahn's signature detailed observations on manufacturing technology of the day. Instead of a detailed journey into hell with

¹⁴² Covalence: 'A form of valence in which electrons are shared between participating atoms. The number of electrons that a particular atom can share (and therefore the number of covalent bonds it can form). See OED entry.

¹⁴³ Fritz Kahn, *Der Leben Des Menschen*, (Stuttgart: Kosmos, 1926)

¹⁴⁴ https://www.nlm.nih.gov/dreamanatomy/da_g_IV-A-02.html accessed 15/01/19

Hieronymus Bosch, or the intricate chaos of a Heath-Robinson illustration, we are treated to an imaginative technological tableau of compartmentalised organisation in which each interlinked process supports the whole.¹⁴⁵ However, the technological nature of pieces such as that also represent a double-edged sword; within the metaphorical representation is also the means of its limitation. Cornelius Borck comments on the double-edged nature of Kahn's metaphorical images, that the radio vehicle for the mind's tenor was the most advanced technology available to the German public at the time. 'A regular radio service [had] existed for no more than six years', he notes, 'but precisely because of its newness the radio served so well as explanatory framework.' Thus, cutting -edge research into the function of the brain requires a similarly cutting-edge metaphor in order to demonstrate it. However, Borck continues:

Only the newest electric technology would throw fresh light on so complicated a structure as the human brain, the implicit argument was. This was true of brain research in the 1920s as it is today. Looked back upon from the distance of some eighty years, however, it obviously adds a certain datedness to Kahn's images. When brain theories indulge in avant-garde technology their inescapable fate appears to be that they will become outdated all the sooner. (*Cornelius Borck, Media, Technology, and the Electric Unconsciousness*, p. 39)

Borck's article emphasises the means and ends of metaphor, in this case the time-dependent nature of the technological metaphor serving to both engage, delineate and limit its scope. His

¹⁴⁵ This is also true of Christianity. See 1 Corinthians 12: 12-23, where the body is used, inversely to this example, as a metaphor for the church: 'Just as a body, though one, has many parts, but all its many parts form one body, so it is with Christ.'

logic is reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson's work on the limitations of metaphor. Metaphor may be an important tool in human cognition, allowing for the delineation of abstract concepts, but it is the delineation of the vehicle that makes it a rendition of an aspect of the whole, rather than the whole itself. A case in point is the metaphor of mind as machine.

As Lakoff and Johnson point out, everyday language is replete with metaphors conceptualising the mind as a mechanical device. We speak of mental 'processes', 'grinding out' solutions, 'operating at full capacity', and 'running out of steam', which all contribute to the ontological metaphor 'MIND IS A MACHINE'.¹⁴⁶ The 'mind' is an abstract concept stemming from the physical object of the brain, and thus itself represents a metaphorical overlap between fields. As such, 'mind', or its various iterations, such as 'psyche' have been used as conceptual terms with varying levels of discomfort, particularly within cognitive science. It is therefore no surprise that in order to 'ground' it, to use another energy-based spatial metaphor, the preferred conceptual metaphor focusses on a vehicle whose abstract/physical relationship is more highly documentable, not to mention, as with Fritz-Kahn's illustrations, representationally modern.

Proponents of strong AI, such as J. R. Searle, conceptualise the mind's cognition and processing of information in terms of data. Searle, however, challenges the notion of pure data-processing; the difference, for him, lies between the machine's compilation of data versus the mind's ability to comprehend it, and draw alternate inferences. The mind is not, fundamentally, a machine – or, as he put it, not a 'Chinese room'. He states 'that is why strong AI has little to

¹⁴⁶ Lakoff and Johnson, 'The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System', p. 197.

tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.’¹⁴⁷ For Searle, an unconscious entity cannot ‘process’ the data in the same way that a conscious one can, in that they cannot ‘know’ what they are processing. It is just data, relative to nothing. Recent research into artificial intelligence has largely disproven this hypothesis; the field of artificial imagination is, broadly speaking, devoted to the concept of imagination and cognition without consciousness.¹⁴⁸

Machine-learning utilising this model is used in the development of facial-recognition software, the proof-of-concept largely lying in its inverse: that a system may now indistinguishably generate a recognisable human face. Simply put, this system does not, ‘remember’ a face, or even generate a Frankenstein-esque recombination of features. Instead, they ‘learn’, using a Generative Adversarial Network, how a face ‘works’, by creating a low-resolution image, an ‘outline’, and then adding greater and greater detail at greater resolutions. One input plays the ‘generator’, another the ‘discriminator’ – relatively similar to Freud’s model of drive and resistance. Thus, each layer contextualises data in order to create further data, generator and discriminator training their side of the neural network to develop a system

¹⁴⁷ John. R. Searle, ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’, *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 3:3 (1980), 417-457 (p. 417).

¹⁴⁸ Not strictly true. See Igor Aleksander, *How to Build a Mind: Toward Machines with Imagination*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) This may be too broad a description for a field which trades on highly clinical specifics in order to generate a functional system; Aleksander’s argument was that ‘consciousness’ is too vague and misunderstood a term, and may thus *never* apply to A.I. without a more specific understanding of its parameters.

of rules as to what constitutes an accurate subject, in this case a ‘face’.¹⁴⁹ Deep learning is still not true machine imagination, but it is nonetheless a functional model towards it.

Machine imagination, if it continues along this path of evolution and surpasses the limitations of the deep learning model, will thus erase Searle’s partition between a ‘mind’ and ‘Strong AI’. However, this stage in its creation does, at least share a similar logical point to where Searle seems to agree with Lakoff and Johnson, stemming from the imperfection of comprehension, and the need to relativise data in order to understand it. Photorealistic images are generated, in the above example of GAN, by deliberately evolving a comprehension of a blurry, low-resolution image. For our purposes, this itself serves as a metaphor for our interpretation of the function of metaphor.

A purely conceptual basis within metaphor relies on overlapping, often conflicting concepts within a gestalt in order to highlight multiple aspects of the target concept with a view to aiding comprehension. Comprehension thus relies on data processing, in that information is required of both the tenor and the vehicle, in order to ascertain how one is like the other and aid the vehicle in demonstrating that relationship. However, that information is valid only for that relationship, thus, a more complex metaphor is able to highlight multiple aspects of the same relationship in order to fulfil a broader conceptual role. For example, Lakoff and Johnson examine phrases such as ‘he shot down all of my arguments’ and ‘his criticisms were right on target’ as governed by the more complex conceptual metaphor ‘RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS

¹⁴⁹ See the website <https://thispersondoesnotexist.com>, which generates photorealistic faces based on the GAN model, invented by Goodfellow et al. in 2014, and developed by Karras et al. in 2018. An explanation for the process can be found here: <https://www.lyrn.ai/2018/12/26/a-style-based-generator-architecture-for-generative-adversarial-networks/> Both sites accessed 21/10/19.

WAR’. (*Metaphors We Live By*, p. 4) War and argument are two concepts, yet we are able to speak of them spatially, conceptualising them through a spatial description of their oppositional factor – one may win or lose, advance or retreat etc. Thus, overlapping further conceptual metaphors onto this structure, i.e. to ‘shoot down’ an argument reconceptualises this spatial dimension along the lines of a broader governing conceptual metaphor, i.e. that this oppositional dialogue is like a war. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson declare that

it is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things – verbal discourse and armed conflict – and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. (p. 5)

Such is the gestalt, which may consist of partial, competing, and overlapping concepts.¹⁵⁰ According to Lakoff and Johnson, we must be aware of the limitations of our current metaphorical basis if we are to avoid forming inadequate conclusions. For example, ‘THE MIND IS A MACHINE’ has caused many studies, in the past, to have their basis in metaphor, which may lead to incorrect assumptions. They write that:

THE MIND IS A COMPUTER metaphor gives rise to the associated metaphor of MENTAL PROCESSES. When the MENTAL PROCESS metaphor is taken seriously, it becomes reasonable to ask whether certain processing occurs serially or in parallel-since those are the only alternatives in this metaphor. Like any

¹⁵⁰ Lakoff and Johnson, ‘The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System’, pp. 198-201.

metaphor, the MENTAL PROCESS metaphor will highlight certain aspects of mental activity and hide others. (Lakoff and Johnson, *TMSotHCS*, p. 207)

For Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is intrinsic to mental process, however, factual reasoning should not be sacrificed to fit into a metaphorical model. Thus, they summarise:

If Cognitive Science is to be concerned with human understanding in its full richness, and not merely with those phenomena that fit the MIND IS A MACHINE metaphor, then it may have to sacrifice metaphorical consistency in the service of fuller understanding. The moral: Cognitive Science needs to be aware of its metaphors, to be concerned with what they hide, and to be open to alternative metaphors-even if they are inconsistent with the current favourites. (p. 208)

It is thus important to recognise when a metaphor is no longer fit for purpose, or to recognise the validity of competing metaphors in order to gain a better understanding of their target. For all of their similarities, the mind is not a machine. To treat it as such is to lose an understanding of other aspects of its functionality.

One may accuse Freud, in his eventual rejection of Charcot's hypnotism, of substituting one performative technique of imposition for another, more subtle, variant. However, it is important to consider the nature and implications of that subtlety. While Freud would advocate, and maintain a relatively problematic relationship to figures who would attempt to apply a battering ram to the somatic in order to understand the mental, the development of his psychical models and methodology of 'the talking cure' would understand the metaphorical implications of his subject matter far more readily than many of the scientific peers he would criticise for failing to move beyond simple positivism.

3.5 The Development of the Energy Metaphor

Freud's career is thus one in which he moves from trading in unlocatable specifics to understanding the nature of metaphorical relationships in his concept of the psyche. His *Project for a Scientific Psychology* contains many themes which would be explored in his later works, such as the energetic equation of his economic principle, however, it is marked by a specificity which disappears from the later works. Although the text would raise what, for Freud, would become lynchpin theories, they are presented in a manner designed to highlight their positivistic, 'scientific' credentials. The text, as a result, is difficult and convoluted, a confusing mass of symbols to the lay reader. Neurons are categorised according to type, as follows: (1) 'Permeable Neurones': the ones which offer no resistance. They are designated by the symbol Φ , which is the Greek capital letter phi, having the sound 'p' in English. (2) 'Impermeable Neurones': Ψ – representing a 'contact barrier', and thus retention'.¹⁵¹ (3) 'Perceptual neurones': ' ω ' – or 'W Neurones', as they are later called, relating to the Perceptual Conscious System. (p. 355) The text is littered with enigmatic 'Q's and 'Q η 's denoting quantity; a conceptual forbear of Freudian 'cathexis'. Importantly, in this abortive exercise, Freud attempts to specifically locate the ego as a neural type, something which he later regretted. He writes:

With our hypothesis of "wishful attraction" and of a tendency to repression we have in fact already touched upon a state of Ψ which has not yet been discussed. For both these processes indicate that an organization has been formed in Ψ whose presence interferes with the passage [of quantities] if that passage occurred for the first time in a particular manner [i.e., if it was accompanied by satisfaction or pain].

This organization is called the "ego". It can easily be pictured if we consider that

¹⁵¹ Both Freud, *Project, Origins*, p. 360.

the constantly repeated reception of endogenous quantities (Q~) in certain neurones (of the nucleus) and the consequent facilitating effects of that repeated reception will produce a group of neurones which retains a constant cathexis and which thus constitutes the vehicle for the store of quantity required by the secondary function.

(p. 384)

The impermeable Ψ renders the text itself impermeable. Even with one's ready reckoner, it is difficult for symbol to match meaning in the given sentence structures. Here, in an argument promoting quantifiability of psychic energy, Freud's own text resists complete definition. The passage details the formation of the ego through cathexis, discharge and resistance, yet that is difficult to fathom. One detail which may be gleaned in the maelstrom is that the 'I' ('ego') is formed through a constant cathexis, a topic which was revisited a quarter of a century on, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, but using a markedly different style and focus. Where above, Freud locates the 'ego' somatically, as a type of constantly cathected neuron,¹⁵² his psychoanalytical work abandoned the positivistic need to somatically locate. Freud's later models, in having to objectify the 'self' and explain this substantial non-substance formed of somatic and abstract parts, continue to rely on mechanical terminology. For example, here, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud embraces the metaphor of mind as machine:

...another occasion of the release of unpleasure, which occurs with no less regularity, is to be found in the conflicts and dissensions that take place in the mental apparatus while the ego is passing through its development into more highly composite organisations. Almost all of the energy with which the apparatus is filled

¹⁵² Reflecting the views of 'cerebral anatomists' such as Meynert, which represented the dominant view of the mind in the 1890s. See the footnote to the *Project*, p. 360.

arises from its innate instinctual impulses. (Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle',
On Metapsychology, p. 279)

Regarding the conflicts between drive and repression, and their complementary principles of pleasure and unpleasure, Freud's analogy of the developing mind here sees it as an 'apparatus'. The 'apparatus' serves as an analogy for the site of the same conflicting forces in the *Project*, which are no less analogical in their nature, even for their symbolic specificity.

Freud uses this analogy to introduce an updated model of the mind in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'. He rebalances the 'pleasure principle' with the competing concept of the 'death drive', accounting for a drive which does not satisfy the theory of a constant unconscious drive towards pleasure. He presents the model of mind initially as a model, a physical object to be examined in terms of its functionality, much as one would view energy as substance through its functional properties. The ego, the 'I', is demonstrating similar substance-based properties: it is 'passing through its development', demonstrating a transfer via a developmental 'flow', all the while changing its properties to a higher level of complexity. That drive towards development, much as in the basic drive/repression model, is also shown to be formed against a counter current, the 'conflicts and dissensions' present in the developmental stages, such as the formation of the Oedipus complex through metaphorical castration.

Yet, Freud's mechanical analogy builds upon more fictive metaphors, which present their content in terms of narrative. An example is the famous analogy of the 'two Mandarins' from the *Interpretation of Dreams*. Writing on the nature of distortion in dreams, a distinction is introduced between 'manifest' and 'latent', which designates the disguising process whereby disturbing content is smuggled past the scrutinising censorship of the 'I'. The ego in this case is presented as a zealous editor, whom the unconscious must find a way to smuggle content past in order to placate its need for satisfaction. Freud writes:

According to the strength and sensitiveness of the censorship, he finds himself compelled either merely to refrain from certain forms of attack, or speak in allusions in place of direct references, or he must conceal his objectionable pronouncement beneath some apparently innocent disguise: for instance, he may describe a dispute between two Mandarins in the Middle Kingdom, when the people he really has in mind are officials in his own country. The stricter the censorship, the more far-reaching will be the disguise and the more ingenious too may be the means employed for putting the reader on the scent of the true meaning. (*TloD*, p. 167)

Here, instead of mechanism, we find ourselves treated to the metaphor of the unconscious, in its later function of the id, as a seditious author or playwright. What would become the superego stands guard against dissident thoughts towards pleasure that would upset the balance formed through the reality principle, which dictates that people no longer be beings of pure desire – as in the infantile ‘oral’ phase – but must observe themselves, and their desires, as acceptable to others. Thus, the stage is set for the dreamer, the ‘Two Mandarins in the Middle Kingdom’ an allegorical play representing deeper desires edited to pass censorship. The natural comparison to Freud’s use of ‘Mandarins’ is the ‘Emperor’s New Clothes’ in its own various guises, itself an innately satirical tale, particularly in Hans Christian Andersen’s version, which focuses on the courtly pride and vanity of the nude monarch. To use a theatre analogy instead, the ‘Middle Kingdom’ may just as easily be restaged as the *Merchant’s Venice* or *Macbeth’s Scotland*. The visual representation of censor-approved allegorical content strengthens the comparison, given the orientalist imagery of the analogy.

The metaphorical censorship here is strikingly different to that performed by the ‘apparatus’ above. Instead of an analogy which betrays its own limitations through an over-

reliance on the mechanical – mind as machine – we find aspects of the self personified. Aspects of the unconscious are depicted consciously. The psychic processes in question are depicted as selective; making conscious choices to include or omit material. Instead of being depicted in terms of ‘raw’ process, which is a metaphor which itself fails to account for the construction of the self, we instead see the introspective self constructed through a narrative. Neither analogy is complete, in that neither can be completely correct, but both are equally true in Freudian thought.

However, Freud warns against the view of a conscious unconscious. In *The Unconscious*, he warns us that ‘(t)he process of deduction – applied to our person despite inner resistance – leads not to the discovery of an unconscious, but, strictly speaking, to the postulation of another, second consciousness within us.’¹⁵³ Freud questions that deductive reasoning; among the reasons for Freud’s rebuttal of this seemingly logical conclusion is that:

some of these latent processes have characteristics and peculiarities that appear alien, even incredible to us, and stand in complete contrast to the known attributes of consciousness. We have good reason, then, to revise our deduction regarding our own person: we have within us not a second consciousness, but psychic acts that are devoid of consciousness. (*The Unconscious*, pp. 53-4)

To see conscious activity in unconscious processes is thus a deductive leap in the wrong direction. Rather than pure cognition, Freud argues that there exists an ‘alien’ portion of our psychical processes, that which renders us ‘strangers to ourselves’. His argument for the existence of the unconscious is the inexplicable nature of those fragments of it that enter the

¹⁵³ Freud, *The Unconscious*, trans. Graham Frankland (London, Penguin, 2005), p. 53.

conscious space. Of note is the fact that such processes are still rendered in terms of latency and activity – much as the term chosen here is ‘processes’. ‘Activity’ links back to the separation of ‘motor’ drive from latent in ‘A Note on the Unconscious’.

Returning to that essay, we find further details on how consciousness may not be seen as multipartite or ‘split’. Freud references the work of a Dr Azam, whose psychiatric case notes on the treatment of ‘Félida X’ constitute what may possibly be the first case of split or alternating personality to be examined in detail. Azam’s diagnosis was that the consciousness itself was divided between two different personalities. Freud’s rebuttal was that this constituted a misapplication of the term ‘consciousness’, and that a split consciousness was not possible. He writes:

I venture to urge against this theory that it is a gratuitous assumption, based on the abuse of the word ‘conscious’. We have no right to extend the meaning of the word so far as to make it include a consciousness of which its owner is himself not aware. If philosophers find difficulty in accepting the existence of unconscious ideas, the existence of the unconscious consciousness seems to me even more objectionable. The cases described as splitting of consciousness, like Dr Azam’s, might better be denoted as shifting of consciousness – that function – or whatever it be – oscillating between two different psychical complexes which become conscious and unconscious in alternation. Freud, ‘A Note on the Unconscious’, *On Metapsychology*, 53-4)

Freud thus conclusively rejects the notion of multiple ‘consciousness-es’ in favour of one consciousness which those ‘alien’ psychical processes are causing to shift. More interesting still is Freud’s language when he explains how this ‘shift’ takes place. The ‘alternation’ between consciousness and unconsciousness taking place here is couched in the terminology

of electrical energy: ‘oscillation’. Thus, the practical, electronic language of Helmholtz’s laboratory once more finds its way into Freud’s discourse. In addition to the charge of cathexis and the subsequent discharge of that ideogenic energy, we may now add the possibility of oscillation between the conscious and unconscious. The ‘moving parts’ of the psyche are described in the same terms as an electrical motor. A dynamo is driven by a constant oscillation between positive and negative magnetic poles, and energy is generated by the turning force generated by the constant repulsion. Here, the mind both is and is not a machine.

So, Freud’s metaphor of oscillation resonates with both of the metaphorical structures above, that is, mind as machine, versus mind as abstract conceptual space – one in which the ‘Two Mandarins’ may be used as a conscious analogy for a non-conscious process. The ‘oscillations’, and the dynamo-like process involved in his conception of MPD use the language of energy and ‘apparatus’, while its alternation also satisfies that of Bruno Bettelheim’s less rigid Freud, the one who is the explicator of man’s ‘soul’.¹⁵⁴ This is one point where the two ‘Freuds’ seem to synchronise, so that the oscillation between the positivistic and the fictive metaphors may provide Freud’s written work with its own motor drive.

In the construction of the self, that oscillation may be seen in the relationship between subject and object. As Freud notes of the introspective strangeness of psychoanalysis, it is difficult to negotiate a self not accessible to our conscious thoughts. Thus, ‘all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained as by

¹⁵⁴ Bruno Bettelheim, *Freud and Man’s Soul*, (Richmond, Surrey: Chatto and Windus/Hogarth Press, 1983).

a mental life ascribed to this other person.’¹⁵⁵ Having attained the concept of other as object, and later, understanding other as independent subject, it is difficult to see the self as object, or other subject. Yet, if one is to pursue psychoanalysis to the end of its rendering us as ‘strangers to ourselves’, that is exactly what we have to do. We must thus ‘oscillate’ between understanding ourselves as both subject and object, that is, as self and other.

As Peter Brooks points out, Freud rationalises this discrepancy through narrative. In a similar vein to Jerome Bruner’s ‘narrative fact’, in which portions of non-narratable existence are emphasised through a regulating narrative in order to make a legal case, so does Freud provide a temporary narrative through which that alienating introspection may take place without rendering the subject entirely alien to themselves as other. For Brooks, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* is thus both narrative and meta-narrative, a blueprint for how narrative functions. He writes:

As a dynamic-energetic model of narrative plot, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* gives an image of how the non-narratable existence is stimulated into a condition of narratability, to enter a state of deviance and detour (ambition, quest, the pose of a mask) in which it is maintained for a certain time, through an at least minimally complex extravagance, before returning to the quiescence of the non-narratable.

(Peter Brooks, *Reading for the Plot*, p. 108)

In establishing Freud’s narrative drive as a temporary state, a fluctuation amidst the otherwise non-narratable experience of the subject, meaning is thus made temporary, and becomes an

¹⁵⁵ Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, *The Unconscious*, p. 171.

entity that can only be gained through an understanding that it is located in-between these specified non-narrative states.

One could argue that the difficulties encountered in reading Freud, for instance, where he makes mistakes, or where he is less than clear, may be to do with dissonance, as opposed to resonance. In the examples used above, he may be seen to stray too far into either the positivistic realm of the mechanical, or to imply conscious operation in a non-conscious system. In terms of subject and object, Freud highlights the importance of both in the developmental stage, and, at his best, understands how those roles are interchangeable, especially in the relationship between analyst and patient. However, those roles may become dissonant. For example, Freud is commonly criticised for his objectification and narrow viewpoint on women, he also derides a number of predominantly masculinist viewpoints. In his lecture on 'The Psychology of Women', for instance, Freud attacks the identification of the 'active' with masculinity and the 'passive' with femininity; '[i]t seems [to him] to serve no good purpose and [provide] no new information.' Instead, he says, 'we must take care not to underestimate social conventions which also force women into passive situations.'¹⁵⁶ It would be going too far to claim that this is therefore a feminist text, but it at least identifies problems with trying to understand woman-as-subject from a purely male perspective. Yet this is the same Freud who also writes 'The Taboo of Virginity' (or 'Virginity as Taboo') (1918), turning to anthropology – an analogy likewise easily dated - in order to understand woman-as-object, which does not necessarily resonate with the modern reader.¹⁵⁷ Freud is at his best when he

¹⁵⁶ Freud, 'The Psychology of Women', *NIL*, pp. 144-174 (p. 148).

¹⁵⁷ Freud, 'The Taboo of Virginity', *On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works* (1918 [17]), reprint, ed. Angela Richards, trans. James Strachey, (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 261-284.

understands the valency of subject and object, and at his worst when he over-indulges a part of that schema, rather than the whole. A greater understanding of Freud, then, comes from an understanding of the metaphorical basis of his thought. As subject and object, we are our own tenor and vehicle, and self-understanding arrives only through an appreciation of the incompleteness of both. We are thus always *in-between* both concepts. We must also understand the limitations of the metaphor, or of *this* metaphor, as it seeks to achieve its ends.

Chapter 4 Freud and Arthur Conan Doyle

4.1 The Paradox of Rationality in the Study of the Irrational

This chapter argues that Freud (1856-1939) can profitably be read in tandem with the work of his near contemporary Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930). The grounds for this juxtaposition are that they have in common several major areas of correspondence. Both have an acute susceptibility to an ‘anxiety’ about the overlaps and reciprocities between rational and speculative modes of thought. Both their lives span the period of accelerating technological and scientific development between the eighteen fifties and the nineteen thirties, both began their careers as medical practitioners, and neither fits easily into the paradigm of their subsequently-elected primary profession (as novelist and theoretical psychologist, respectively). Both were formative figures in the construction of narratives of modernity, and each had an eclectic acquaintance with the work of the other. Consequently, the thesis has suggested an *affinity* of interests between them, rather than offering a narrative of sustained mutual influence. Hence, reading them in tandem is a valid and illuminating way of better understanding the growth of key aspects of modernity. So this thesis now sets up a metaphorical ‘dialogue’ between the two authors which highlights their attempts to synthesise the usually-opposed modes of logic and rational inquiry on the one hand, and speculative and more abstract thought on the other. The energies and metaphors that make material for Doyle’s science fiction and ghost stories are also major generative factors for Freud. Demonstrating the operation of invisible forces (magnetism, electricity, radio waves, phobias, psychic disturbances, psychological compulsions, thought transmission, dream symbolism, and repression) requires a fusion of rationality and counter-rationality, and this notion has been one of the major through-running ideas of the thesis.

Of course, Doyle's legacy and reputation is entirely literary, whereas Freud continues to straddle the two spheres of the literary and the scientific. It is the attempted separation of the two in Doyle's work that remains intriguing, because the creator of the seemingly ultimate rationalist Sherlock Holmes also became a disciple of the irrational, a convert to Spiritualism, and a figure who would put his own powers of deduction to the test in the séance room. It is easy to see Doyle merely as the con-artist's dupe and a scientific dilettante, whereas critics regard the modernist era as one of scepticism. Doyle's position within that framework is that of a flawed yet rational questioner, rather than a man of blind faith. Douglas Kerr's biography notes that: '[O]n the whole Conan Doyle was not a man who was comfortable with uncertainties.'¹⁵⁸ Kevin Mills follows up with the point that 'laying to rest the uncertainties that the ghost story (mostly) depends upon is a feature of Doyle's attempts at the genre and, to some degree, limits their effectiveness.' He continues:

it might appear that Holmes's penchant for disabusing the superstitious and the terrified by offering rational explanations for apparently supernatural or weird occurrences is not really very far removed from Doyle's own commitment to investigation, a commitment that never waned despite his, at times naïve, trust in mediums and fairy-spotters' (Mills, p. 126)

Doyle's issue with uncertainty extends to his science fiction. 'The American's Tale' (1879) and 'The Los Amigos Fiasco' (1892) can be seen as types of the cautionary tale in which a

¹⁵⁸ Douglas Kerr, *Conan Doyle: Writing, Profession, and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 84. Quoted in Kevin Mills, 'Conan Doyle's Sceptical Readers', *The Routledge Handbook to the Ghost Story*, ed. Scott Brewster and Luke Thurston, (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 124-134 (p. 127).

character is presented as having mastered the irrational or fantastical aspects of their own narrative.¹⁵⁹ In ‘The American’s Tale’ the real killer of Joe ‘Alabama’ Hawkins is not the British Tom Scott, with whom he was seen arguing in a saloon the night before he disappeared, but one of the giant Venus flytraps of Flytrap Gulf, where Hawkins had been lying in wait to ambush Scott and pay off his grudge. Just as the posse is about to lynch Scott, one of the flytraps disgorges the remains of its victim. In ‘The Los Amigos Fiasco’, an early experiment into supposedly ‘humane’ methods of execution by electrocution, is derailed by a warning that increasing the voltage may actually *grant* life to the victim.

These characters could not be mistaken for people, and they seem to know that they are just counters being moved about in order to set up a stylised narrative mechanism. Where an application of high voltage direct current would surely end life in our world, in science-fiction the Frankenstein motif is operative, so that in ‘Los Amigos’, it really does restore the youth of the condemned man. The cautionary characters thus elevate themselves above the ‘stupidity’ of their rivals, who only really grasp one aspect of their own narrative – which is the temporary suspension of the laws of common-sense normality. For the purposes of the fiction which defines them, the ‘rational’ is on-hold for the duration. This resonates with Freud’s approach, where the world is ‘fictivised’, so that (for instance) it is not possible to come up with a random number, and where there can be no ‘slips of the tongue’, only ‘Freudian slips’ which are imbued with dramas of concealed wishes and disowned anxieties.

¹⁵⁹ All of Arthur Conan Doyle’s science fiction used in this thesis is taken from *The Very Best Science Fiction of Arthur Conan Doyle*, (Carbondale and Edwardsville (IL): University of Illinois Press, 1983). ‘The American’s Tale’ maybe found on pp. 3-9, ‘The Los Amigos Fiasco’ pp. 10-16. Henceforth, tales will be introduced with their title and date of original publication, the collected work denoted by *Best Science Fiction*.

Freud's relationship to both rational science and the irrationality of his discipline can be understood through the controversial exploration of the relationship between the mind and the body, and the metaphor of the 'ghost in the machine' as portrayed in the work of the Hungarian-British writer Arthur Koestler (1905-1983). Koestler produced a cognitive-linguistic model rather than a psychoanalytical one, and thus one which would not recognise the 'unconscious mind' as the direct source of a non-conscious impulse. Yet Koestler's work derides the reductive tendencies in a purely observation-based scientific approach. In his sights was behaviourism, a school of thought which attempted to remove the unconscious from psychological discussion and instead focus on the subject as an organism, that is, as a product whose being is constantly made up of loops of stimulus and response.

Koestler's own attitude is encapsulated in the remark that 'one cannot use a stethoscope on a slot machine.'¹⁶⁰ He means by this that reducing the mind to a machine renders the subject purely mechanical, and ignores the 'ghost' (the something Other) that always resides in the organic body. For him, the 'cherished ambition' of the behaviourist – 'the measurement of behaviour by quantitative methods, and the control of the behaviour by manipulating stimuli' (p. 8), derides behaviourism as a confusion of the means with the ends in any form of investigation into the nature of thought and being. The behaviourist reliance upon experimental apparatus is presented as self-defeating and fetishistic, or as Koestler so acerbically writes:

Pavlov counted the number of drops which his dogs salivated through their artificial fistulae, and distilled them into a philosophy of man; Professors Skinner,

¹⁶⁰ Arthur Koestler, *The Ghost in the Machine*, (London: Hutchinson and co., 1967), p. xii. The term itself may be accredited to Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976).

Hull and their followers took an equally heroic short cut from the rat in the box to the human condition. (p. 10)

This attack on overly-prescriptive, quantitative approaches to the mind would definitely find some favour with the subjective, empirically problematic Freudian approach, yet Freud himself remained convinced about the inevitability of science's ultimate conquest of the unknown – for him, the 'ghost' would inevitably be busted as knowledge of the mechanisms increased.

In a comparative discussion of Freud's aesthetic, it is easy to separate his theories into binaries: consciousness versus unconscious, ego versus id, fantasy versus reality. However, much as we are urged to exercise caution with Arthur Conan Doyle's work, so too must we take care when traversing Freud's concepts. We must address the problems that arise when speaking of the aesthetics of binary and conquest in the creation of Freud's narrative persona in a similar manner to what is required when we discuss Arthur Conan Doyle's characters. Although Freud's topographical (and later, structural) models have a tripartite structure (e.g. preconscious, conscious, unconscious, and ego, superego, id), these structures as a whole are situated between reality and the unconscious.

4.2 Rationality and the 'Other World'

The interaction between science, fiction and the occult found its niche in the nineteenth century. From the point of view of the science of the electrical age, the language and terminology were often drawn from one side to the other of the scientific/occultist dichotomy. As Sarah Bissell puts it:

The commentators writing about such developments often drew on fictive and even supernatural language in conveying the intricacies of these new fields. It is little wonder that 'the supernatural' during the nineteenth century, for many, was 'no

alternative or other world, but rather an image, annex, or extension of the imposing, ceaselessly volatile real world of the nineteenth century.¹⁶¹ Ghosts were just one facet of an intriguing invisible realm being interrogated and categorized by the Victorians.¹⁶²

Bissell's arguments concur with those of Alison Winter, for whom the language of mesmerism fits easily upon the popular perception of rapid scientific, industrial and colonial expansion:

However, people chose to characterize and to value the new 'might and power' drawing them into the new state, the language of visions, mental forces, dreams and somnambulism provided a medium to express it.¹⁶³

In keeping with the colonialism of the age, the 'might and power' dominating the language of scientific life understandably finds a kindred spirit in pseudoscience, as phrenology, mesmerism and spiritualism inhabit the same debates as those surrounding electricity and photography. Through a conquest of rationality, modernity brought with it the need to conquer the irrational, to render material the immaterial.

The speculative fiction of the era would thus have a rapidly increasing number of tools at its disposal with which to generate plot and intrigue. Realist fiction has to operate under the misdirecting screen of 'all is true' through plausibility. A 'world' which does not exist in reality, populated by characters who do not exist in reality, is created as a close facsimile of

¹⁶¹ Quoting Steven Connor's 'Afterword' in Brown, Burdett and Thuschwell (eds.), *The Victorian Supernatural*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 258-279 (p. 258).

¹⁶² Sarah Bissell, 'The Ghost Story and Science', *The Routledge Handbook to the Ghost Story*, pp. 40-9 (p. 41).

¹⁶³ Alison Winter, *Mesmerized: The Powers of the Mind in Victorian Britain*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 19.

reality. In its speculation in an age of rapid scientific and technological expansion, the science fiction of the period would often rely on more aggressive tactics. Edgar Allan Poe had his tales on mesmerism published in journals devoted to speculative science, such as the *London Popular Review of Modern Science* and *The American Phrenological Journal*. Poe's submissions to such journals are usually considered to be a literary hoax intended to ridicule speculative thinkers, due in no small part to Poe's own scathing rebuke to the spiritualists and mesmerists who appeared to read his submissions as true accounts. Anthony Enns offers a different insight: Poe may have taken pleasure in his ridicule of people who prefer easy belief over genuine investigation, but Enns reads Poe's works on mesmerism and clairvoyance as metaphysical musings in their own right, prescient of electronic communication rather than taking his work as a form of spiritualism.¹⁶⁴

Three quarters of a century later, Doyle's own short stories would not be so bold in their claims, but would often resort to the formula of having the tales appear as fragmentary accounts or recovered diary entries, usually bookended by notes from further fictitious readers to convey an air of scientific veracity. Where Doyle plays with the uncertain, he often does so from a point of certainty which influences the structure of the text. Thus, the *Terror of Blue John Gap* (1910) has an account given by a Dr James Hardcastle, writing to a similarly fictitious 'Seaton'.¹⁶⁵ His tale of 'terror', in which he is the protagonist, already informs the reader that the character actually died in South Kensington in 1908, as noted by the unnamed discoverer of the narrative among his possessions before the tale is even told.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, the

¹⁶⁴ Anthony Enns, 'Mesmerism and the Electric Age: From Poe to Edison', *Victorian Literary Mesmerism*, ed. Willis and Wynne, (Amsterdam and New York: Rodolpi, 2006), pp. 61-83.

¹⁶⁵ Doyle, *Best Science Fiction*, pp. 70-84

¹⁶⁶ Doyle, 'The Terror of Blue John Gap', *Best Science Fiction*, p. 70.

‘Horror of the Heights’ (1913) is presented as a fragmentary diary entry, using medical evidence from a third party in presenting the tale. This is intended to corroborate the fate of its author. Even Doyle’s famous Sherlock Holmes stories, although designed to render plausible and mundane the briefly implausible, nevertheless reach us through the narratological screen of a baffled medical man.

However, it is important to draw a distinction between Doyle’s works of fiction and his investigations into mediumship. Speculative content is usually used as a plot device, a means towards an end, rather than as an end in itself. Doyle’s ‘The Great Keinplatz Experiment’ (1894) purports to offer material proof of mediumship, but descends into farce,¹⁶⁷ and ‘John Barrington Cowles’ (1884) depicts a young man ruined by a mesmeric *femme fatale* in a Victorian gothic tale for which mesmerism is an extension of the manipulative mesmerist’s dangerous femininity.¹⁶⁸ A decade later, in 1894, ‘The Parasite’ exhibited similar memes and themes, as a young scientist is subjugated by the will of a dangerous female mesmerist.¹⁶⁹

Doyle’s ‘Selecting a Ghost: The Ghosts of Goresthorpe Grange’ (1883) is more a tale to mock the follies of the nouveau riche through a caricature of an upwardly-mobile shopkeeper who buys himself an estate, only to be disappointed that it is not haunted, and therefore will not grant him the necessary status.¹⁷⁰ The protagonist, a Mr. Silas D’Odd, unwittingly invites

¹⁶⁷ Doyle, *Best Science Fiction*, pp. 17-30

¹⁶⁸ Doyle, *The Best Supernatural Tales of Arthur Conan Doyle*, ed. Peter Haining, (London: Foulsham, 1987), pp. 84-103. Henceforth, story titles shall appear with title and date, and the collected work abbreviated to *Supernatural Tales*.

¹⁶⁹ See Catherine Wynne, ‘Arthur Conan Doyle’s Domestic Desires: Mesmerism, Mediumship, and *Femmes Fatales*’, in Wynne and Willis, *Victorian Literary Mesmerism*, pp. 223-243. *The Parasite* appears in Doyle, *Supernatural Tales*, pp. 172-206.

¹⁷⁰ *Supernatural Tales*, pp. 42-57.

a burglar, ‘The Nottingham Crackster’, into his house in the guise of a medium, a Mr. Abraham. The thief proceeds to drug D’Odd and relieve him of his valuables while he is convinced that he is in a spiritualist trance. The title of the piece originally belonged to a very different tale, however. ‘The Haunting of Goresthorpe Grange’, was an unpublished tale believed to have been written in 1877, only seeing the light of day in 2000, and was subtitled ‘A True Story’. The earnestness of ‘A True Story’ contrasts with the farcical, and sceptical tale that would bear a similar title.

‘Selecting a Ghost’ was published alongside what is arguably Arthur Conan Doyle’s most famous tale of the supernatural, ‘The Captain of the *Polestar*’ (1883).¹⁷¹ It is a fairly typical ghost story, delivered, as is customary with Doyle, as a fragmented ‘found’ narrative, ‘an extract from the singular journal of John McAlister Ray, student of medicine’. (*Supernatural Tales*, p. 30) The tale takes the standard, double-edged approach to the haunting. The Captain exhibits signs of heavy stress, resulting in violently irrational behaviour; the narrative therefore leaves open the question of whether the ghost is a product of the Captain’s mind, or whether, conversely, the Captain’s mental state is due to the haunting. Doyle is willing to leave the tale open, given how the narrative of the ship’s doctor has a medical man’s scepticism worn away in the arctic isolation, to the point at which he too is willing to entertain the notion that he may have seen a ghost, when the apparition manifests itself at the end of the tale.

Doyle’s science fiction, meanwhile, is more akin to that of Jules Verne. A tale written months before the outbreak of the First World War, *Danger!* (1914) issues a stark warning to those convinced of the superiority of the British Navy in the face of the threat of submarines

¹⁷¹ *Supernatural Tales*, pp. 22-41.

from the fictitious Norland.¹⁷² The tale, prescient of the danger of the German U-Boats, is similar to Verne's critical blows through tales such as *Robur The Conqueror*, in which the titular antagonist demonstrates the superiority of his aerodyne flying machine over the dirigibles of his complacent competitors. Robur uses his position of power as a soapbox to criticise the follies of the nations of the world. We thus return to the 'might and power' of the age, here demonstrated through science fiction's ability to mirror and predict, but also demonstrating a conservative, materialist strand to the speculation.

Similarly, Freud writes on mysticism and the occult, but with an eye towards logic rather than belief. He uses the occult as a means to discuss rational inquiry in the modernist age. Discussing the possibility of dreams containing potentially telepathic content, Freud writes, in something of a Holmesian style:

The simplest explanation is not always the right one, truth is very often not simple, but one must act with the greatest caution before committing oneself to such a far-reaching assumption. (Freud, 'Dreams and Telepathy', *NIL*, p. 56)

Of course, the simplest explanation, in this case, is the possibility of telepathy. Although Freud is willing to entertain the thought that telepathy might exist, his overall argument uses the occult as a vehicle to target intellectual prejudice, rather than this being an instance of the father

¹⁷² Doyle, *Best Science Fiction*, pp. 119-143. 'Danger' was certainly not alone in a genre of 'military warnings'. See Saki (Hector Hugh Munroe), *When William Came*, (London: John Lane, 1913), a speculative novel set after the then-hypothetical war between The British Empire and Germany, in which Britain is conquered due to a lack of naval provision for the North Sea.

of psychoanalysis carrying his lantern even deeper into the field of the irrational. As Freud begins his argument:

Mysticism – Occultism – what is meant by these terms? Do not imagine that I shall attempt to provide you with a clear definition of such hazy concepts. In a general and vague way we all know what we mean by the terms. They refer to a kind of ‘other world’ which lies beyond the clear world, with its inexorable laws, which science has built up for us. (Freud, *NIL*, p. 45)

Freud returns us to a state in-between metaphorical ‘worlds’, the rational, ‘clear world, with its inexorable laws’, and the murky ‘other world’ of the occult, with its resistance to definition. The reported clarity of the rational is defined by science, whereas Freud deliberately refuses to define the ‘hazy concepts’ of the other, establishing a clear binary between the two established by their conceptual opposition. Clarity and obscurity are thus combined with a science and occult dichotomy, to create the relevant conceptual field necessary to insert his arguments into. That insertion happens along a ‘narrow path’ (p. 45) between the two polarised frontiers, a metaphor Freud ostensibly uses in place of the true target of the article, scientific prejudice. As he writes:

Prejudices are very often useful and justified, but sometimes they are erroneous and harmful, and one never knows when they will be one or the other. The history of Science is full of hasty examples which should warn us against too hasty a condemnation. For a long time it was thought to be an absurd thesis that the stones which we now call meteorites should have reached the earth from outer space, or that mountains, the rocks of which contain remains of shells, should once have formed the bed of the sea. After all, not so very different a fate befell our psychoanalysis itself, when it brought forward the discovery of the unconscious. We

analysts, therefore, have special reason to be cautious in making use of intellectual arguments in the rejection of new theories, and we must recognise that such arguments will not enable us to overcome feelings of aversion, doubt and uncertainty.’ (pp. 47-48)

Having explained the rationale and apparent conceptual value behind prejudice – a position which may be jarring to the modern reader – Freud continues his argument with examples from which a theoretical leap had subsequently become the concrete foundation for contemporary theoretical thought. He deploys physically hard concrete examples, such as ‘mountains’ and ‘meteorites’. Freud attempts to prove his understanding that the analyst is, first and foremost, a person, and that a person is subject to forces beyond rationality – i.e. feelings of aversion, doubt, and uncertainty in the face of a conceptually ‘pure’ intellectual argument. However, having granted prejudice a cursory defence, he ultimately proves his own position superior, through being more scientific, than would have been the case if he had used a simple dismissal based on pure observation and consequent rejection alone. Freud having deftly set the field to his own advantage, ‘our psycho-analysis’ is thus granted a key position between the dichotomised concepts above, that of a science whose practitioners were unafraid to make conceptual leaps and was thereby able to thwart prejudice in the name of a truer science.

Arthur Conan Doyle’s tracts on spiritualism, *The New Revelation* (1918) and *The Vital Message* (1919) contain a similar appeal to a more balanced and enlightened approach to the world of the occult. He too proposes that science may indeed one day conquer and demystify the spiritual world, thus ‘normalising’ the occult. His argument attempts to walk a similarly narrow path, between science and religion. In addition to a clarion call to defend modern

spiritualism from blanket scientific prejudice, Doyle takes aim at organised religion.¹⁷³ He ascribes to religious stagnation the horrific metaphor of life leaving a cadaver, so that what is left is merely a mummified corpse. With regards to his arguments for the reinvigoration of the religious approach, he suggests that ‘in them may be found the signs of how the dry bones may be stirred, and how the mummy may be quickened with the breath of life.’¹⁷⁴ Doyle wants to believe, and that desire is prevalent throughout this tract:

The movement which is destined to bring vitality to the dead and cold religions has been called ‘Modern Spiritualism.’ The ‘modern’ is good, since the thing in itself, in one form or another, is as old as history, and has always, however obscured by forms, been the red central glow in the depths of all religious ideas, permeating the bible from end to end. But the word ‘Spiritualism’ has been so befouled by wicked charlatans, and so cheapened by many a sad incident, that one could almost wish that some such term as ‘psychic religion’ would clear the subject of old prejudices, just as mesmerism, after many years of obloquy, was rapidly accepted when its name was changed to hypnotism. (*The Vital Message*, p. 43)

Doyle here wishes for a more neutral, socially-acceptable terminology to distinguish what he sees as an acceptable religious position from an act of fraud. He adds the qualifier ‘modern’ to distinguish the acts which he has witnessed and found to have rational merit from those ‘befouled by wicked charlatans’. His line is thus drawn to separate an age of inquiry from an

¹⁷³ A regular target for Doyle. See Andrew Lycett, *Conan Doyle: The Man Who Created Sherlock Holmes*, (London: Phoenix, 2008), p. 102.

¹⁷⁴ Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Vital Message*, (London and New York, Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), pp. 36-37.

age of obfuscation, characterising the movement as distinctly modern relative to the inquiry and scepticism defining the modernity of the period. The process of bringing a deliberately obscured practice into the 'light' of rationality has, for Doyle, already begun, and he seeks to register that change through the distinction of modernity.

However, in making such a distinction, Doyle's argument also hinges on the perception of a timelessness to spiritualism, a 'red central glow in the depths of all religious ideas, permeating the bible from end to end.' Thus, his distinctly modern spiritualism, or 'psychic religion' is an attempt to examine something that has always been there, but from a position sceptical of dogmatism. Anton Mesmer's 'animal magnetism', benefitting here from the modern acceptable rebranding to 'hypnotism', is used as an example of the divorce of the practical from its performative and disreputable connotations.

In attempting to gain credibility for his arguments, Doyle maintains a similar rationale to Freud, in holding that future scientific endeavour will unify the rational and irrational into one scientifically credible set of phenomena. Ultimately, Doyle aims to unite religion and science, through a unified understanding of the material and immaterial. As in the case of his mummy metaphor for the church, we are asked to make a leap of imagination and faith. Writing on the 'warm adhesion and fierce opposition' faced by the modern spiritualist movement from its inception, Doyle turns his critical eye to science, arguing that 'the science of the day was also rooted in materialism, and discarded all its own very excellent axioms when it was faced by an entirely new and unexpected proposition.' (*The Vital Message*, p. 51) Doyle's argument here is strikingly reminiscent of Freud's tract against intellectual prejudice, and he continues this passage in a similar vein, chastising the totemic heroes of scientific thought - Faraday, Darwin, and Huxley - for showing the same prejudicial dogmatism when they attacked religion. Yet, if we are to make that leap, then materiality, through proof, will surely follow. Doyle writes:

Perfected Spiritualism, however, will probably bear about the same relation to the Spiritualism of 1850 as a modern locomotive [does] to the boiling kettle which heralded the era of steam. It will end by being rather the proof and basis of all religions than a religion itself. We already have too many religions – but too few proofs. (Doyle, *The Vital Message*, p. 44)

Doyle's message of hope for the future of modern spiritualism, or 'Perfected Spiritualism' assures us that the proof is there, and he links it, metaphorically, to the age of steam which laid the material and infrastructural foundations for the era in which Doyle was writing. He ultimately finds comfort, however, in certainty. Much like Freud, whose faith largely lies in the 'clear world', so too does Doyle maintain faith that the seemingly-irrational will one day come to be regarded as rational through proof. Both arguments, Doyle's and Freud's, have a ring of nineteenth century innovation and intellectual conquest about them, as the hazy world of the mystic is brought into focus through an 'invasion' of its territory by the rational. We may understand more of that 'other world' through the overlapping, and subsequent entry of the scientific rules or laws for understanding our own material world, granting normalisation to the para-normal, and allowing a 'naturalness' to the supernatural. Doyle's argument, then, cannot completely shake off the trappings of scientific materialism.

To return to Freud, and his potential defence of the existence of the 'other world'; given his history of dabbling with the same techniques used in the performances of Anton Mesmer, it is necessary for Freud to distance his consulting room from the séance:

Unfortunately, we come up against considerations which are highly unfavourable to our laudable intentions. The observations on which our judgements must depend have to be made under conditions which render our powers of perception insecure, and which blunt our faculty of attention; the phenomena take place in the dark or

after a faint glimmer of a red light after long periods of fruitless waiting. We are told that even our sceptical – that is to say, our critical – attitude may well prevent the hoped-for phenomena from manifesting themselves. The situation which thus arises is simply a caricature of the conditions under which scientific investigations happen. (Freud, ‘Dreams and Telepathy’, *NIL*, p. 50)

Freud finds a glimmer of the ‘clear world’ in the occult, asserting ‘that in occultism there is a core of facts which have hitherto not been recognised, and round which fraud and phantasy have woven a veil which is hard to penetrate’ (*NIL*, p. 51). However, he finds the conditions by which it is easy for ‘fraud and phantasy’ to hijack an investigation to be risible. Not only is this a vague ‘other world’, but the investigations themselves are vague, a parody of science’s attempts to clarify and demystify. To suspend disbelief and enter wholeheartedly into the territory of the irrational is thus to allow oneself to fall prey to another, directing psyche invested in trickery and obfuscation. Doyle, however, rejects the notion that the technique is innately fraudulent:

The unhappy outburst of roguery was helped, no doubt, by the need for darkness claimed by the early experimenters – a claim which is by no means essential, since the greatest of all mediums, D. D. Home, was able by the exceptional strength of his powers to dispense with it. At the same time, the fact that darkness rather than light, and dryness rather than moisture, are helpful to good results has been abundantly manifested, and points to the physical laws which underlie the phenomena. The observation made long afterwards that wireless telegraphy, another etheric force, acts twice as well by night as by day, may corroborate the general conclusions of the early spiritualists, while their assertion that the least

harmful light is the red light has a suggestive analogy in the experience of the photographer. (Doyle, *The Vital Message*, pp. 49-50)

The wireless telegraphy that served as the hypothetical basis for Helmholtz's scientific rationalisation of nerve transmission here takes on its less material, invisible aspect as an 'etheric force'.¹⁷⁵ Instead of the driving force of material progress, electricity is thus rebranded, and granted a potential beyond its motor function. Having proven that human beings possess an electrical current, and with the law of conservation of energy declaring that energy cannot be created or destroyed, it is not too great a leap of logic to ascribe electrical properties to paranormal phenomena, and inversely, paranormal explanations to electrical phenomena. So too is photography, then a tangible and increasingly-common practice, made to prove the potential logical basis for reduced or red lighting for the séance room. These observations point 'towards the physical laws which underlie the phenomena'; enlightened sceptics may find themselves 'duped' through a desire to provide a rational, tangible hypothesis based on criteria abstracted from observed phenomena.¹⁷⁶

In addition to fiction, and his work on spiritualism, Doyle wrote prolifically on the subject of photography. In his collected *Essays on Photography*, one such correspondence, 'A New Scientific Subject' (1883), would find him vigorously lambasting a fellow thinker's scientific credentials in a letter to *The British Journal of Photography*:

¹⁷⁵ See Chapter 3.3, with its summary of Helmholtz's study of neurotransmission, and the argument between vitalists and those separating the terminology of 'living energy' from the energy which gives us life.

¹⁷⁶ Interference from the ionosphere also really does hamper medium-wave communication, so that longer distances are only achievable at night.

Mr Warner begins by the pretty broad assertion that “all bodies – especially such as are magnets, crystals, man [!], and even the light of the sun and heavenly bodies – are polarised.” There may be some arguments as to how far such bodies may be polarised – though I believe that in physics the term is only applicable to light – but the use of the present tense and the offhanded looseness of the remark makes the sentence sound more like an extract from a nightmare of Professor Tyndall’s than a sober scientific statement...

...Mr Warner then runs off upon another tack, and we might quote the bard that “this is a more beautiful song than the other.” He tells us that scientific men have discovered a force in all living things that they have named “Od”. What scientific men? At the risk of being flippant I should submit that it is very odd that such a force should be mentioned in no text-book of science.”¹⁷⁷

Here, we find a Doyle who urges scientific caution in his volatile attack on a photographer claiming to have photographed an energy field, the aforementioned ‘Od’, emanating from all things. Instead of a defender of the unknown, we have an attack mounted from a position of logical superiority, challenging the logical fallacy of an appeal to absent authority (‘What scientific men?’) and decrying the empirical basis for the theory. Doyle’s attack, it must be said, is itself guilty of at least one fallacy, namely a reliance upon style over substance in both senses of the term, attacking the ‘present tense and the offhanded looseness of the remark’, lambasting it as ‘an extract from a nightmare of Professor Tyndall’s [rather] than a sober scientific statement.’ A further logical breakdown is certainly possible, but for now, we must

¹⁷⁷ Arthur Conan Doyle, *Essays on Photography: The Unknown Conan Doyle*, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1982), p. 84-5.

take a step back and ask ourselves, why would the writer of the above passage be willing to raise the bar for Daniel Dunglas Home?

Doyle, by invitation of the Society for Psychical Research, was involved in debunking hauntings.¹⁷⁸ His most enduring creation, Sherlock Holmes, would most certainly have launched an investigation similar to those performed by Doyle's contemporary and lead Society investigator, Frank Podmore, or even to the account given by Robert Browning, who simply seized the ghostly apparition presented to him at one of Home's séances, allegedly finding it to be Home's foot.¹⁷⁹ The spiritualist experiments detailed in his chapter in *The Vital Message*, 'The Great Argument', would probably be ridiculed by his own creation. Yet the creator finds the dubious techniques of Home to be worth defending in his tract on spiritualism.

As part of his biographical exploration of the paradoxical character of Doyle, Andrew Lycett examines this passage, and *The British Journal of Photography*, as an early crucible blending art and science, giving rise to these arguments which entertain imaginative leaps of logic based on scientific phenomena. Lycett is himself keen to remain sceptical of Doyle's wholehearted belief, especially where fiction meets fascination in Doyle's earlier work, such as the references and debate over spiritualism in 'The Captain of the *Polestar*' (1899). He remarks that such a fascination should not be taken at face-value, and that it 'did not mean he believed in spiritualism or was anything other than a sceptic applying his reason to matters he

¹⁷⁸ See Catherine Wynne, pp. 223-4, and the origin of Doyle's novel *The Parasite* in an investigation conducted by Frank Podmore and Sydney Scott for the Society for Psychical Research. Doyle was invited to attend due to his research into mediumship, but more importantly, due to his medical background and authorship of the deductive Sherlock Holmes.

¹⁷⁹ See John Casey, *After Lives: A Guide to Heaven, Hell and Purgatory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 373.

did not understand.’ (Lycett, p. 101) *The Vital Message* certainly reads as such, yet, much as with the above passage, it cannot discard its own vitriol against preferred targets while supporting dubious others. Doyle applies his reason, yet his scepticism, and his aggressive desire for certainty in the face of the uncertain, is similar to the ‘rage to cure’ that Freud exhibited. That is what grants Doyle the strength of conviction to publish a tract such as *The Vital Message*.

Doyle’s convictions, and, to a certain extent, Freud’s directed pragmatism are echoed by Thomas Edison’s relationship to science, as he advertised a machine that would supposedly surpass rationality. A convinced sceptic who, in 1910, criticised blind faith, insisting that ‘all there has been, all there ever will be, can or will, soon or late, be explained along material lines.’¹⁸⁰ In 1920, he described spiritualism, and ‘the methods and apparatus commonly used and discussed’ as ‘a lot of scientific nonsense’, ‘childish contraptions which seem so silly to the scientist.’ In a further interview with the magazine later that year, Edison claimed that he ‘cannot conceive of such a thing as a spirit... I cannot be party to the belief that spirits exist and can be seen to tilt tables and rap and do other things of a similar unimportant nature. The whole thing is so absurd.’¹⁸¹ Yet that was also the issue in which Edison advertised his infamous ‘valve’, a phonograph for speaking to the dead.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Enns, ‘Mesmerism and the Electric Age: From Poe to Edison’, *Victorian Literary Mesmerism*, ed. Martin Wills and Catherine Wynn, (Amsterdam, Editions Rodolpi, 2006), p. 77.

¹⁸¹ All examples taken from Enns, pp. 77-8.

¹⁸² Edison’s gift for self-promotion did not end there. He would even use the death of one of his workers to advertise the development of this phonograph.

Rather than the vagueness of the spirit, Edison's 'faith' lay instead in a semi-vitalistic theory of power, particles and metamorphosis. Like Freud's modernised classicism, Edison's take on life after death draws as much from Epicurus as it does from contemporary studies into the metamorphosis of butterflies and dissections of the brain. He believed his 'director particles' existed in the 'fold of Broca', a region of the brain he claimed to have been discovered, and corroborated, by 'eighty two remarkable operations upon the brain.'¹⁸³ Edison's idea of 'director particles' dwelling within a specific region of the brain is not too dissimilar to Freud's own early biologically-couched theory of Φ - and Ψ - neurones in his *Project*.

However, Freud admits in the *Project* that there is still a gap of knowledge between theorising as to the existence of these mental functions and their precise physical location. His return to its key ideas in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* has Freud engage in 'speculation, often far-fetched speculation' as to the physical nature of his psychodynamic model. He writes that 'we have merely adopted the views on localisation held by cerebral anatomy.' However, he notes that 'Cerebral anatomy has no need to consider why... consciousness should be lodged in the surface of the brain... Perhaps we shall be more successful in accounting for this situation in the case of our system *Pcpt.-Cs.*' (Freud, *BtPP*, p. 295) The Perceptual-Conscious system, then not locatable by anatomical means, thus provides the answers that physical corroboration cannot. Physical neurobiology is a proof, a means to an end, but not the ultimate corroboration.

In seeking to disprove the notion of the soul, Edison himself had participated in the speculative scepticism which would continue to intertwine the rational and irrational in the push for progress, the conquest of the uncertain, and the need for unified explanations based

¹⁸³ Quoted in Enns, 'Mesmerism', p. 81.

on the rapidly changing science of the day. Edison's 'fold of Broca', the 'director particles' responsible for personality, is about as unscientific as phrenology or mesmerism, and contains a hint of both in its conception. These factors render it odd and ridiculous to the modern reader. That oddness – or 'Od'ness, as the case may be – demonstrates, even in its most aggressively material design, its own fictive nature. Even though rigid materialist belief is responsible for its creation, Edison's 'director particles' cross into the in-between territory which germinates fiction. In a way, Edison's 'director particles' register in a similar way to Freud's 'immortal germ plasm.' There is something outlandish in the concept, which dates it as a product of its time. More importantly, it gives evidence of a fictive, irrational side to the rational thought of the period.

4.3 Doyle's 'The Great Keinplatz Experiment' (1894)

Doyle's work may seem to be more Jungian than Freudian. Mysticism aside, even his science fiction appears captivated by some of the concepts that Jung would explore. The past-life regression of 'Through the Veil' (1911), and Maggie Brown's flashbacks to the violent past of Hadrian's Wall on her visit to a dig site, may certainly invite the use of Jungian terminology such as notions of the collective unconscious or racial memory to define, the concept Doyle was attempting to explore in these texts.¹⁸⁴ This kind of thing has been described by Terrence Dawson as 'Instant Jung', which he defines as the 'tendency to reduce a complex subject to a series of sometimes intriguing, but often pompous and always infuriating generalisations.'¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Doyle, *Best Science Fiction*, pp. 85-89.

¹⁸⁵ Terrence Dawson, 'Literary Criticism and Analytical Psychology', *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, ed. Polly Young-Eisendrath, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 269-298 (p. 270).

‘The Great Keinplatz Experiment’ is a parody of the showmanship of experimental psychology, as the archetypically-cantankerous and aging German scientist, Professor von Baumgarten, exchanges bodies with his youthful student Fritz von Hartmann in a farcical experiment to prove the existence of the spirit by using mesmerism to have it migrate from the body.¹⁸⁶ However, the idea of expanding the conception of one’s own consciousness beyond the body to a more ‘cosmic’ level remains Jungian territory, admittedly in relation to the work of Aldous Huxley and his experimentation with psychoactive narcotics in *The Doors of Perception*.¹⁸⁷ The Keinplatz experiment itself is presented as a pre-Jungian foray into a universalised consciousness, attended by both esteemed men of science – a ‘galaxy of talent’ – and by proponents of a more mystical outlook, described as ‘several great lights of the Spiritualistic body’ who ‘had also come a long distance to be present, as had a Swedenborgian minister’ (Doyle, *Best Sci-Fi*, p. 21). It naturally ends up going awry. The experiment is a success in that a spirit does exist, and does indeed leave the body under the mesmeric conditions of the experiment, but von Baumgarten is turned into a laughing-stock when he begins to exhibit the rowdy mannerisms of the debauched von Hartmann. The focus of the story is thus shifted from the performative pseudoscience of the experiment to the ensuing caper. However, instead of viewing the experiment as an enabling device for a subsequent comedy of manners, it is important to note the nature of the experiment itself, and the implications present in the revelation of von Baumgarten’s previous, off-page career.

¹⁸⁶ Keinplatz, of course, meaning ‘no place’, to emphasise the parodic element, rather than attempt to portray the narrative with any degree of credibility.

¹⁸⁷ Aldous Huxley, *The Doors of Perception, and Heaven and Hell*, (Hammersmith: Harper Collins, 1994).

Like its denoted audience, the Keinplatz experiment itself is an amalgam of the scientific and spiritual. Or more precisely, it is an attempt to pull the spiritual into the level of rational scientific discourse, to map its vague contours with the trappings of a ‘scientific’ experiment of a type prevalent in the age. As well as being a plot device, the experiment serves as the locus of possibility, constituting the transformative factor present in any work of science fiction which may render the impossible briefly probable-seeming, or, at least, plausible. In this case, the impossible, or improbable factor, depending on one’s point of view, is the nature of the ‘spirit’, and its ability to migrate from the body. The enabling vehicle, the experiment itself, contains just enough ‘science’, or, at least, just enough of the language thereof. Essentially, the personality switch is presented as a form of hypnosis, which at the time had turned from being merely a stage attraction to becoming a genuinely experimented-upon medical procedure – which Doyle comments on as he compares hypnotism and spiritualism in *The Vital Message* (p. 43).

Thus, we have three factors to contend with: first, the ‘rational’ – presented in parodic form as the experiment gone awry; secondly, the performative – ever present when dealing with ‘mesmerism’, with its eponymous connotations of stage-trickery; and thirdly the spiritual – here we are not dealing with pure individual consciousness, but with the migratory characteristics of the ‘spirit’. The implied central tension of the novel is that of the forced prince-and-pauper farce of assumed identity, with the young man carousing in the respected professor’s body and attempting to further his own designs on the professor’s daughter, while his elder is seen as presumptuous by his peers for daring not to display the correct honorifics while inhabiting the student’s body. However, that is far weaker than the tripartite central tension of the experiment itself. The enabling plot device lends its name to the piece. In order for the experiment to set up the contingent comedy of manners it must also render credible the externally incredible, whilst at the same time being intriguing enough to lure a reader.

The three constructive, yet conflicting factors identified above (the ‘rational’, the ‘performative’ and the ‘spiritual’) are never directly presented to the reader as distinct entities: instead of a more scientific approach, prising each element apart and analysing its causes and effects, the ‘experiment’, takes a fictive approach and blends all three. For example, having been asked to act as the Professor’s guinea-pig, von Hartmann catalogues the Professor’s previous experiments upon him:

Am I to be paid always thus? Did I not stand two hours upon a glass insulator while you poured electricity into my body? Have you not stimulated my phrenic nerves, beside ruining my digestion with a galvanic current round my stomach? Four and thirty times have you mesmerised me, and what have I got from all this? Nothing. And now you wish to take my soul out, as you would take the works from a watch. It is more than flesh and blood can stand. (*Best Science Fiction*, p. 20)

The scene is set for the reader by reference to real experiments into psychology and neurobiology. Thus, the ‘energy’ of the field provided in the form of electricity refers to experiments such as those of Helmholtz, and the mystery element and the element of performativity are similar to what happens in therapeutic hypnotism. Meanwhile these performative demonstrations of therapy by such figures such as Charcot are linked to their theatrical roots, such as the demonstrations of ‘animal magnetism’ of Anton Mesmer. The narrative ‘energy’ here is chiefly that of the sense of intrigue conjured by outlandish experiments, but it also lies in the comedy of escalation – as seen in the transition from galvanic currents to the literal removal of the soul, and in the bathetic normalisation of ‘four and thirty times have you mesmerised me’.

Through brief reference, these experiments serve as examples of both the ‘performative’ and the ‘rational’; they reference recognised but intriguing experiments which

appeared to breach the boundary between rational and sensational. To normalise them in favour of the ‘great’ experiment thus raises the stakes, as experiments on the nervous system and the unconscious are traded for one which appears not only to push scientific boundaries, but also to pose a fundamental question about the nature of the humanity: whether it is primarily organic or primarily ‘spiritual’, evoking the debates of Helmholtz and Brücke with the vitalists.¹⁸⁸

In addition to the three elements of performativity, spirituality and rationality, there is a fourth element, which is the antithesis to the Professor’s speculative approach, that is, von Hartmann himself. This experimentation takes its toll on the human subject. Although he has motivation for stating ‘it is more than flesh and blood can stand’, his desired *quid pro quo* is a chance at the Professor’s daughter, so he is prepared to suffer in order to achieve his goal. Nonetheless, von Hartmann defines a factor crucial to the field that the Professor has hitherto left unconsidered, which is its organic, biological component. He seeks the soul, yet forgets the human, or ‘flesh and blood’ element. Although the tale is a comedy, and therefore plays with, but ultimately rejects, its more serious implications, the experiment-gone-awry may have seemed more consequential had Doyle decided on a darker tale. The dichotomies that it explores, between science and humanity, and spirit and body, may be found, to darker purpose, in other ‘mad scientist’ tales of science fiction, such as Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* (1818) and H.G. Wells’ *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896).¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ See Chapter 3.3 for details.

¹⁸⁹ *Frankenstein*, New Edition, ed. Margaret Turner, (Oxford: MacMillan, 2005), and *The Island of Dr Moreau*, reprint, (London: Penguin, 2005)

Thus far, Doyle's re-combination of the spiritual and scientific make for a decidedly Jungian flavour, yet the case for a Freudian reading is also strong. The tripartite structure of the experiment (rationality, spirituality, performativity), and the anxiety and ultimate inseparability between its component parts, make for a more fragmented text than a simple role-reversal comedic narrative might suggest. We might cite Freud, with his multi-faceted approach to the structure of mind, and his 'dualistic' approach to drive as he criticises Jung in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*:

Our views from the very first have been dualistic, and to-day they have been even more definitely dualistic than before – now that we describe the opposition as being, not between ego-instincts and sexual instincts but between life instincts and death instincts. Jung's libido theory is on the contrary monistic; the fact that he has called his one instinctual force 'libido' is bound to cause confusion, but need not affect us otherwise. We suspect that instincts other than the libidinal self-preservative ones operate in the ego, and it ought to be possible for us to point to them. (Freud, *BtPP*, *On Metapsychology*, p. 326)

So, Freud nonetheless strongly establishes his point of departure from the work of his protégée. Where Jung apparently sees everything as stemming from one essential drive, so that his terminology is described by Freud as vague and inadequate, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud alters the terms by introducing conflicting drives stemming from the organic and abstract forces making up the psyche. Once more, he chooses to divide rather than unify those forces, and develops a theory which introduces conflicting but constitutive drives of life and death. Freud himself admits that this theory is incomplete, but maintains that it was formed out of necessity to fill an indeterminate gap within psychoanalysis. *The Interpretation of Dreams* sought a unified theory of wish fulfilment, whereas *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* proposes

what might be called a unified theory of division. Remove the parodic elements of Professor von Baumgarten, replacing the spirituality and farcical nature of the experimentation, and one may locate a simplified version of Freud's performance.

Naturally, any designs on spirituality that Freud may have had were to reduce it, to understand the narratives of myth as products of the psyche. Where Jung sets out to rationalise the soul, Freud would instead compartmentalise, de-mystify, and ultimately downgrade the concept. However, as Paul Ricoeur notes, the symbology of Freud's theory of sublimation, operates at a level in which the physical is never exempt from the metaphysical:

Between satisfaction and suppression, the way of sublimation opens up, but this way is also difficult. Yet it is because man can no longer be an animal and is not divine that he enters into this situation from which he cannot extricate himself.¹⁹⁰

Ultimately, humanity is left between two worlds: we possess all the desires and drives of our animalistic heritage yet cannot hope to attain them due to the self-consciousness and social responsibility given to us through our higher mental functions. Those higher mental functions do not make them 'divine', they only make us able to conceive of divinity, as a distant goal, or as the notional 'highest' state of being. Hence the idea of sublimation, viewed as the means to traverse temporarily between both spheres, so that the desires of organic nature are abstracted and made acceptable to the organic being with its paradoxical designs on the divine. The divine may not necessarily exist, for Freud, yet it plays an important role in situating human consciousness within an increasingly epic dichotomy. This Freud echoes the 'eternal struggle

¹⁹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, 'Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture, trans. Willis Domingo, *The Conflict of Interpretations*, reprint, ed. Don Ihde, (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 119-156 (p. 153).

between Eros and Thanatos' observed by Koestler, where the 'apex recedes with each step towards it, until it dissolves into the clouds of mythos' (Koestler, *TGitM*, p. 35).

4.4 'The Horror of the Heights' (1913)

In this tale, an airman, Joyce-Armstrong, finds himself locked in a struggle between the seemingly rational and the unknown, driven through a compulsion to take to the skies through the mechanical means of his aeroplane. It is relatively simple to read 'The Horror of the Heights' as a narrative of trauma and repetition. Joyce-Armstrong, a 'retiring man of dark moods', described as a brilliant but eccentric aeronaut, desires to prove an outlandish theory that there are, in fact, 'jungles of the upper air'. (p. 106) The deaths of two other aeronauts who undertook to climb above thirty thousand feet cause this theory to take a morbid note, as Joyce-Armstrong is suitably affected. He is thus described:

Captain Dangerfield, who knew him better than anyone, says that there were times when his eccentricity threatened to develop into something more serious. His habit of carrying a shot-gun with him in his aeroplane was one manifestation of it. Another was the morbid effect which the fall of Lieutenant Myrtle had upon his mind. Myrtle, who was attempting the height record, fell from an altitude of something over thirty thousand feet. Horrible to narrate, his head was entirely obliterated, though his body and limbs preserved their configuration.' (Doyle, *Best Science Fiction*, pp. 106-7)

Lt. Myrtle's death, along with the death of Mr Hay Connor, whose coroner's report claimed that he had died of 'heart disease', becomes a point of obsession for Joyce-Armstrong. He believes the testimony of the man that found Hay Connor, Venables, that he had 'died of fright', claiming that his last word was 'monstrous'. Joyce Armstrong's response:

They could make nothing of it at the inquest. But I could make something of it.

Monsters! That was the last word of poor Harry Hay Connor. And he did die of fright, just as Venables thought.’ (p. 108)

The airmen’s’ deaths prompt Joyce-Armstrong not only to form the theory that there are, indeed, ‘jungles of the upper air, and there are worse things than tigers that inhabit them.’ (p. 108), so Conan Doyle deliberately blurs the line between unconceived truth-seeker and obsessive hysteric. This passage could be read either as an indictment of the closed-minded, or as the obsessive self-flagellation of a mind in post-trauma. To return to a higher narratological layer, that of the narrator, we find an objective account of the form his obsession took:

At every gathering of airmen, Joyce-Armstrong, according to Dangerfield, would ask, with an enigmatic smile ‘and where, pray, is Myrtle’s head.’ (p. 107)

One could conceive of that ‘enigmatic’ smile as ghoulish, as Joyce-Armstrong, his mind full of the ‘morbid effect’ of the fall of Lt. Myrtle, feels compelled to ask the question at every gathering of airmen. Instead of the railing against and questioning of authority that Joyce-Connor presents in his account, we see a slightly shifted narrative, where Joyce-Armstrong is compelled to question by repeatedly inflicting his morbidity upon the gatherings he attends.¹⁹¹

Repetition and compulsion continue to develop into a key theme in the tale, as Joyce-Armstrong finds his obsession taking him up to explore for himself those ‘jungles of the air’. Having somehow surmised the location of one such ‘jungle’ above Wiltshire, he takes off in

¹⁹¹ A similar range of superstitions and quasi-scientific fears about ‘the sound barrier’ were prevalent within the British air industry in the late 1940s. See David Lean’s 1952 film *The Sound Barrier*, written by Terrence Rattigan, (London Film Productions, 1952) and also James Hamilton-Paterson’s 2011 book *Empire of the Clouds*, (London: Faber and Faber, 2011).

order to satisfy his morbid curiosity. The climb to thirty thousand feet is accurately described as having to be achieved by spiralling into the air – the small engine would cause the plane to stall if too steep a climb was attempted. However, having to travel in literal circles also emphasises the obsessive nature of the exercise. Yet, conversely, Joyce-Armstrong feels at his most free when enacting the upward spiral of flight. He is, as it were, representative of mankind's position between the mundane and the divine. His compulsion to fly, and his having found himself caught in between worlds, resonates with W.B. Yeats' poem 'An Irish Airman Foresees His Death', and the momentary freedom and joy felt in the act of flying ultimately counteracts the anxiety of impending death.¹⁹²

Yeats' unnamed airman, fighting a war not his own, post Easter-Rising, and in the apparent foreknowledge that he is to die in his aeroplane, finds a momentary solace amidst the chaos of war through the very act of flying. Yeats' Airman spurns the dominant narratives of nationalism and patriotic duty; he instead develops a more nuanced nihilism – 'no likely end could bring them loss/ nor leave them happier than before' he claims of his fellow countrymen. As a distinctly Irish airman, he finds himself already between two worlds, or two national narratives: The Crown versus that of the emerging nation of Ireland from under it. He fights for neither. Instead of the cheated narrator of Wilfred Owen's 'Dulce Et Decorum Est', driven to fight, and consequently left to die by a socially-constructed sense of duty, the Irish Airman sees the thin veneer of such constructs as 'law', 'duty', 'public men', and 'cheering crowds',

¹⁹² W. B. Yeats, *The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats*, reprint, ed. Richard J. Finneran, (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 135. All subsequent references from this poem and page.

and chooses to fight in full knowledge of their ephemerality.¹⁹³ Caught between nations, between opposing sides, and between the heavens and the earth both literally and figuratively, Yeats' poem illustrates the need to self-locate in an age of turmoil and doubt. Its most enigmatic line, 'a lonely impulse of delight', may stem from that need to self-locate, to temporarily control one's circumstances amidst the 'tumult' of conflicting forces beyond our control.

Both the Irish Airman's, and Joyce-Armstrong's predicament are reminiscent of Freud's observation of the child's fort/da game in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. (*On Metapsychology*, pp. 283-7) Freud's observation of the child's game of there-and-gone, throwing his toy over the edge of the cot and having it returned to him via a pull of the string to a joyful exclamation of 'da!' ('there'), leads to his (Freud's) subsequent inference that the toy acted as a mother surrogate, as the child sought to reconcile himself to the displeasure of his temporary abandonment by her with the anticipated pleasure of her subsequent return. '[H]er departure had to be enacted as a necessary preliminary to her joyful return', Freud writes. (p. 285) In forming a unified theory governed by the principles of pleasure and balance, Freud had thus to answer why the child would intentionally subject itself to the 'gone' part of the game. Where the child courts trauma by exercising control over its temporary abandonment, reducing the potentially traumatic experience to the level of a game, he exercises control over the trauma through repetition – because he knows that he can bring the mother-surrogate back at any time.

In the game of gone/there, Joyce-Armstrong too courts danger to exercise control over his trauma, after a fashion. Freud's analysis of the child's actions is that 'at the outset, he was

¹⁹³ Wilfred Owen, 'Dulce et Decorum Est', *Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen*, 23rd edition, (New York: Chatto and Windus, 1963), pp. 55-6.

in a passive situation – he was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it as a game, unpleasurable though it was, he took an active part.’ (*BiPP*, p. 285) So Joyce-Armstrong’s morbid repetition of ‘and where, pray, is Myrtle’s head?’ evokes the same displeasure as the toy’s ‘gone’ state in the child’s game. Yet, through the act of repetition, Joyce-Armstrong may, at least, seem to exercise a form of control over the narrative, and the traumatic and unexplained nature of the aeronauts’ deaths. His decision to fly, and to repeat the very process which ended the lives of his fellow airmen, much like the Irish Airman’s decision to fight a war he had no personal stake in, constitutes a similar ‘lonely impulse of delight’, in this case the ability to control, locate and ultimately reveal a troubling unknown.

As with Ricoeur’s commentary on sublimation, Joyce-Armstrong understands that he is caught in-between the base and the divine, but cannot help but reach upwards in order to render the intangible momentarily tangible, as represented by his literal journey upwards. Of course, what Joyce-Armstrong finds up there is by no means divine, and is indeed ‘the jungle of the air’ of his theory, complete with its apex predator, the monstrous ‘parachute-beast’, which nearly proves his unmaking, and is inferred to have been his killer when he again returns to the skies. Readers must ask themselves why Joyce-Armstrong would return after having himself experienced such trauma first-hand.

The tale, in a fashion fairly typical of Doyle, is delivered in the form of a ‘found narrative’, i.e. an incomplete journal named ‘the Joyce-Armstrong fragment’. Its discovery frames the narrative, as it is recovered not after the aeronaut’s initial foray into the heights, but after his second attempt. Through his own ‘tumult in the clouds’, Joyce Armstrong may be said to have foreseen his death, yet may only find himself fulfilled through repetition of the encounter, and subsequent verification of its reality. In short, in placing himself between two worlds, he desires to bring one to the level of the other, the irrational to be mapped out by the laws of the rational, albeit briefly. So, Joyce-Armstrong seeks to map out the unknown, to

acknowledge the unmapped and alien, and thus give to the irrational a rational, familiarised component. His goal is broadly in line with positivistic science, and close to what Freud figuratively attempts with the mind. Doyle enforces this binary by using the terminology of both the scientific world of the aeroplane and the ‘abstract’ world of the mythical creatures of the air. First, the aeroplane:

The engine is a ten-cylinder rotary Robur working up to one hundred and seventy-five. It has all the modern improvements – enclosed fuselage, high-curved landing skids, brakes, gyroscopic steadiers, and three speeds, worked by an alteration of the angle of the planes upon the Venetian-blind principle. (Doyle, ‘The Horror of the Heights’, *Best Sci-Fi*, p. 214)

The language of the aeroplane is grounded in a fabricated, fairly imaginative science, its contours formed in clean lines of concise language. Yet that science is inseparable from science fiction. The name of the plane, Veroner, and its engine, ‘Robur’, for example, reference Jules Verne and the titular antagonist of his tale ‘Robur the Conqueror’. Robur designs a futuristic gyrodyne aircraft to ridicule the limitations of the dirigible built by the foremost pioneers of flight, the Weldon Institute, a design built to ‘conquer the skies’. Given that ‘The Horror of the Heights’ is set a decade from the time of writing, Joyce Armstrong’s Veroner monoplane sports a number of technological advances to relate it, albeit distantly, to Robur’s Albatross. Mechanically speaking, Doyle’s Veroner monoplane is more fiction than fact. The ‘Venetian-blind principle’ is nonsense, being something more to do with the spread of the feathers on a bird’s wing during flight than with the wing of an aircraft, and is probably a substitute for a mis-remembered Bernoulli’s principle on the aerofoil shape of a wing. Nonetheless it sounds confidently defined, and points towards an advanced design.

There is prescience to the monoplane structure - biplanes being far more common at the time of writing, and far slower and less efficient than the monoplane design which superseded it – and to the alarm-bell linked to the nose of the plane which would predate the stall-alarm set on every modern aeroplane from the nineteen thirties onward. Yet, those ‘gyroscopic steadiers’ and ‘high-curved landing skids’ shape a device, a scientific-sounding pocket of rationality in which the aeronaut may begin his apotheosis into the irrational above. And irrationally is how it is presented, with all of the concise language and sentence structure being confined to the flying machine when it is still on the ground below. But when it takes off, readers find themselves amidst the vague, indecisive, blurry imagery of the jungle of the air. ‘Joyce-Armstrong’ writes:

The air in front of me had lost its crystal clearness. It was full of long, ragged wisps of something which I can only compare to cigarette smoke. It hung about in wreaths and coils, turning and twisting slowly in the sunlight. As the monoplane shot through it, I was aware of a faint taste of oil upon my lips, and there was a greasy scum upon the woodwork of the machine. Some infinitely fine organic matter appeared to be suspended in the atmosphere. There was no life there. It was inchoate and diffuse, extending for many square acres and then fringing off into the void. No, it was not life. But might it be the remains of life? (p. 115)

In order to maintain the defamiliarization, Doyle deliberately chooses a vague landscape of the air, and shapeless creatures with which to populate it. The lowest trophic layer resemble jellyfish, one of their predators a snakelike creature, with the apex predator being the monstrous ‘parachute beast.’ The jellyfish-like creatures, at least, have an analogous example to aid the imagination. The snakelike creature resembles a trail of smoke. However, ‘fashioned of some transparent, jelly-like substance’, (p. 115) the most dangerous creature is also the least defined.

Resembling a portentous storm-cloud, as it gains on Joyce Armstrong, 'it kept changing its colour from a very light mauve to a dark, angry purple so thick that it cast a shadow as it drifted between my monoplane and the sun.' (p. 115) The only clearly defined aspect about it is the most threatening, its beak, 'a solid white projection as curved and cruel as the beak of a vulture'. (p. 115) The similarities to a bird of prey include how it makes its attack, hovering over Joyce-Armstrong's plane, but that is where the comparisons end. (p. 116) Although the imagination may conjure a large bird, or a variation on a manta ray, Doyle's monster seems more akin to a dirigible:

On the upper curve of its huge body were three great projections which I can only describe as enormous bubbles, and I was convinced as I looked at them that they were charged with some extremely light gas which served to buoy up the misshapen and semi-solid mass in the rarefied air. (pp. 115-6)

Doyle's imagination here either returns to the technical, in that the beast thus resembles a twisted creation of hot-air balloons, or towards the naturalistic, in that the parachute beast's gas bubbles are also reminiscent of the 'float' of *Physalia Physalis*, the Portuguese man-o'-war. Given the changing purplish hue, *Physalia Physalis*'s shades of purple and blue make for a decent imaginative basis, especially given that the creature's distinctly alien method of propulsion, 'done so swiftly that it was not easy to follow – was to throw out a long, glutinous streamer in front of it, which in turn seemed to draw forward the rest of the writhing body.' (p. 116)

Whether the creature is indeed the imaginative mutant offspring of a bird of prey, a manta ray, a dirigible and a man-o'-war is moot. The description gives the reader conflicting frames of reference as we attempt to conceptualise the creature, and thus gives it boundaries. Its multipartite conceptual existence makes it monstrous, as we forever have to shift any

attempt to visualise the creature through multiple forms. Comparisons to the siphonophore, and to other jellyfish creatures, grant the creature an alien, indeterminate quality, the shapelessness of which is emphasised by Joyce Armstrong, as ‘so elastic and gelatinous was it that never for two successive minutes was it the same shape, and yet each change made it more threatening and loathsome than the last.’ (p. 116) Like many of Doyle’s monsters, the creature remains undefined in order to increase its ‘horror’ aspect. For example, the prehistoric monster dwelling in the depths in ‘The Terror of Blue John Gap’, also rendered in a fragmentary account:

Of its nature and frame I could form no concept, save that it was both light-footed and gigantic. The combat between my reason, which told me that such things could not be, and my senses, which told me that they were, raged within me.’ (Doyle, *Best Science Fiction*, pp. 76-7)

The horror is there precisely because, through lack of definition, we cannot ourselves exercise a form of mental control over it. The ‘Terror of Blue John Gap’ frightens Dr James Hardcastle, not only because it is a large toothy monster, but also because it presents him with a fundamental impossibility. The rational doctor must thus contend with the irrational, and, unable to bridge the gap himself, the experience breaks him. He must cling to the only remaining rational elements, the facts as they happened, warning the reader that ‘neither your belief nor your incredulity can alter them’, much as one would defend the apparition in a séance. As neither narrative has a cautionary figure to at least warn the protagonist, both must issue the warnings themselves, and both become pioneering explorers, in keeping with the spirit of the age, as they enter the unknown.

Thus far, we have only covered two of the aspects of the anxious science fiction text mentioned above, that is, control and rationality. The third, performativity, is maintained by Joyce-Armstrong himself. As the protagonist of the text, his voice is there to be analysed, but

he also takes up the analyst's role of having to cross into the world of the unknown, to map it out, rationalise it, and re-present it. Dr Hardcastle rationalises the monster as a creature of prehistory, Joyce-Armstrong seeks to rationalise the 'jungles of the air.'

However, much as Hardcastle, or indeed, Captain Craigie of the *Polestar*, may be inferred to be writing from a position of madness, so too may Joyce Armstrong. A clue to an alternative reading is found in the evidence 'that Joyce-Armstrong is known to have suffered from intermittent fever,' evidence corroborated from blood found on the pages of his account 'by the Home Office Experts.' (p. 106) We find ourselves, as readers, in the position of analyst, determining the nature of the illness. Is the malaria, which could produce hallucinations, the real source of the parachute-beast? Such a conclusion may be a red herring, a false flag leading to an incorrect diagnosis. Joyce-Armstrong may find himself physically entering the unknown in order to be certain about something that conventional wisdom dictates is not there; in order to read him, we must too enter into uncertain territory.

Both Sigmund Freud and Arthur Conan Doyle, then, present us with texts that map out the anxiety of being in-between worlds, the rational and the irrational. As an author of fiction, Doyle is able to make these 'worlds' more explicit, rendering any metaphorical content as a read reality, such as the 'jungles of the air' in 'The Horror of the Heights'. Freud's approach, rendering a reality through case studies supplemented by theoretical guidance, provides us with windows into the world of the irrational, and with the means to conceive of it, map it, and thus gain an element of control and balance over it.

As readers of Freud, and, hopefully, therefore as Freudian readers, we are asked to place ourselves in the position of Joyce-Armstrong. We find ourselves between two conflicting irrationalities, the external and the internal, and find the mediator, consciousness, to be deceptive at best in our search for the rational self. Freud's work on the paradoxical, idiosyncratic human subject continues to intrigue, as it is itself a paradoxical, idiosyncratic

study created itself by a paradoxical, idiosyncratic human subject. The moments when we find the text reading against itself, redirecting readers, and presenting them with more than one 'Freud' to both guide them and be analysed by, demonstrate Freud at his most human, but also at his most cautious.

Doyle is a likewise paradoxical devotee of science with leanings towards the supernatural, who writes very cautious texts. The texts are ultimately those of conquest, in Doyle's case, sometimes literal, as with 'Danger!', but generally of human scientific endeavour. Doyle's caution arrives in the form of caveats, the scientific conqueror is often a Faustian over-reacher, and the unknown usually holds an element of danger, which may only be surpassed, if at all, through a knowledge of the irrationalities inherent in the text and the characters within it. Freud too, asks his reader to determine the nature of the narrative, giving far more clues and explanations than many of his successors, far more, for example, than are found in Jacques Lacan's consciously labyrinthine texts, yet still having it within him to exercise caution in the determination of narrative.

To describe Freud's work as a study of the irrational itself warrants a warning. Else Frenkel-Brunswick's defence of methodological ambiguity in psychoanalysis finds a psychoanalysis 'so overwhelmed by its epoch-making discovery of the role of irrational forces that the explicit exploration of reasoning processes was temporarily obscured, even though it was reason and not the irrational that held the top spot so far as the evaluative attitude of psychoanalysis is concerned.'¹⁹⁴ She argues instead that Freud may be seen to remain too concerned with the irrational to warrant comparison with the 'rationalists' such as Max Weber

¹⁹⁴ Else Frenkel-Brunswick, 'Meaning of Psychoanalytic Concepts and Confirmation of Psychoanalytic Theories', *The Scientific Monthly*, 79:5 (November 1954), pp. 293-300 (p. 299).

or Emile Durkheim – providing the caveat that they, too, saw rational psychological structures evolving from anthropological irrationality – yet Freud, above all, is ultimately concerned with reason:

Freud... has been criticised for having given too much prominence to the irrational, while in fact his hope is the overcoming of the irrational in a society built on reason. Freud neglected to explore reason directly and challenged the potency of reason in guiding human conduct. But in his evaluations of the goals of human development he has an exalted esteem for reason, and his understanding of the vicissitudes of unreason has sharpened his grasp for the fundamental nature of reason; in this more crucial respect he is a believer in reason in the best sense of the word.’ (pp. 299-300)

And thus, we return to Ricoeur’s emphasis on Freud as the ‘exegete who discovers the logic of the illogical kingdom.’ Freud’s esteem for reason may not so easily be seen as ‘exalted’, but nonetheless Logos is there, ‘whose voice is weak but indefatigable’, and thus the ultimate goal of the exercise.

Yet, special attention must be paid not only to what is illuminated, but also to *how* it is illuminated. We see conquest and adventure within Freud’s work precisely because he exists as a figure mapping those narratives onto his theoretical structures. The act of illumination, and thus the position of the illuminator, is as important to the piece as what is revealed. Freud’s goal was to train analysts in his mode of thinking - his ‘talking cure’ is one which requires as much introspection as perspective. Thus, the position of the analyst relative to the analysand, and vice versa, are important points to consider in the process of determining the cure. What is thus revealed by reading Freud alongside science fiction, and specifically that of Arthur Conan Doyle, is how he engages with rationalities, irrationalities, and those methods of enquiry which

promise the one, but deliver the other. Instead, he creates texts which have us walk a fine line in-between. We observe Freud in his different guises, amid his different narratives, and have to determine just what kind of story we are in.

4.5 ‘The Captain of the *Polestar*’ (1883)

It is important to recognise the distinction between Arthur Conan Doyle’s fiction and his writing on science and spiritualism. That an investigator and defender of the possibility of the supernatural should turn his hand to ghost stories is, to borrow a term from the genre in which Doyle is best recognised, a red-herring. It is hardly a coincidence, but also hardly the definitive factor. There are points at which Doyle’s speculative fiction betrays a speculative mind, and his experiences with séances and other supposedly supernatural events would certainly prove useful in writing his own ghost stories. However, as we have explored throughout the chapter, there is much anxiety and a need to control within Doyle’s work, and the level of contrivance surrounding the element of mystery within his tales demonstrates this as much as the speculative elements.

The contrivance becomes clear when supernatural themes cross over into his detective stories. Some Sherlock Holmes stories; ‘The Hound of the Baskervilles’ (1901), ‘The Adventure of the Devil’s Foot’ (1910) ‘The Adventure of the Creeping Man’ (1923), and ‘The Adventure of the Sussex Vampire’ (1924) all have characters within the work, Watson, and thus supposedly the reader, speculating as to the supernatural origin of the mystery, only for it to be disproven by the rationalistic Holmes. With true Scooby-Doo logic, the ‘Hound of the Baskervilles’ is just a dog, a creation of the villain to mislead.¹⁹⁵ Thus, Doyle’s usage of the

¹⁹⁵ Doyle, *The Hound of the Baskervilles*, reprint, ed. W. W. Robson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) It is interesting that Holmes’ more supernatural mysteries appear after

supernatural is more akin to a deconstruction of the gothic, and is similar to that identified in Freud's usage in Section 4.2, in other words, it is a tool taken from the world of the irrational to reinforce the rationality of the piece.

But what of Doyle's tales which specifically deal with the supernatural? In addition to his science fiction, Doyle's ghost stories also contain the key themes of anxiety and control that we have explored throughout this chapter, and thus provide useful points of intersection with Freud's work. 'The Captain of the *Polestar*' is an early, pre-Holmes ghost story written as a series of journal entries of a young medical student, John M'Alister Ray, doctor aboard a whaling ship, as he contends with its dangerously irrational Captain Craigie, with a potential haunting, and with the very real possibility of never returning alive from the increasingly ice-locked Arctic waters. It is for the reader to determine which of these factors is the key to the Doctor's narrative, and generates the others as necessary effects in the tale.

The story's source material is drawn from Doyle's own experiences at the age of twenty as ship's surgeon aboard an Arctic whaler in 1880, when he too was a trainee doctor. It is thus fitting that many of the passages within the work attempt to convey the silence and isolation of the Arctic, and, in doing so, seem less contrived than the short story's plot. Just as Freud fluctuates between accurate self-representation and self-idealisation, in a paradigm constructed of what we have termed Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud, so the relative levels of honesty and contrivance in this tale present the reader with a similar dynamic. Like Henry James' later novella, *The Turn of the Screw* (1898) the tale is ambiguous, as the ghost that haunts the *Polestar* may or may not exist. As in James' story, the mounting tension and ambiguity of the

the detective himself returns from his 'death' at Reichenbach Falls in 'The Final Problem', suggesting that market forces play a bigger role in the introduction of gothic elements than does a predilection for the preternatural.

tale is generated through the presentation of the events through multiple narratological layers. 'The Captain of the *Polestar*' is, like 'The Horror of the Heights', presented as a 'found' narrative, as it concludes with an account of the Doctor's father, testifying to the veracity of the piece and the reliable character of its author.

Thus, the tale is a tale of anxiety – one in which the 'solution', or the lack of one, itself betrays an anxiety on the part of the narrator. In presenting the ambiguous tale, Doyle betrays his own anxiety. The ambiguity of the tale functions to a relative point, he controls the text, attempts to reduce any type of confusion as to its meaning, even when the meaning is supposed to be unclear, and the final revelation supposedly chilling. However instead of offering an analysis of the Captain, as the tale purports to do, when the reader breaks the control of the text and begins to read it multi-directionally, the narrator necessarily becomes as much a subject of study as the Captain.

Doyle is effectively presenting a 'self', a narrating character within a story that is categorically not himself, in order to perform a function, relative to a fictionalised 'patient' – that is, Captain Craigie. The Doctor functions in this regard as Freud's 'Analyst' self, a presenter and guide of the case study, who formulates its conclusions based on the evidence provided. However, like Freud's ersatz textual self, the Doctor's logic may be read as both the analyst and the patient. The Doctor himself appears to exhibit symptoms as he catalogues those of others. His depictions of the symptoms of the Captain are as much objectified projection as they are an analysis of a subject. In analysing the themes of the tale; i.e. control, mirroring, identification and desire, we must thus ask, is this is a tale of ambiguity at all? Or is the tale more ambiguous than we give it credit for?

Doyle's tale displays the hallmarks that we have discussed so far, namely, the need to control the text, and an obvious discomfort with uncertainty, even within a tale whose very premise is driven by uncertainty itself. His narrative arrives in the familiar style of the

fragmentary journal; it has the status of a ‘found object’, which is presumably an attempt at readerly immersion. Like Joyce-Armstrong’s narrative in ‘The Horror of the Heights’, the plot is thus ‘windowed’, as we peer into it through multiple refractive lenses. In addition to an externalised facet of the text appearing to independently verify the text, there are also points of control within the text itself. For example, Doyle’s penchant for transparent foreshadowing is evident when the Doctor first confronts the Captain on the ship’s course as the nights are beginning to lengthen. In response the Captain asserts his affinities with ‘the other world’ rather than this one:

‘[w]ell, I suppose the men are paid for risking their lives, and as for myself it matters little for me, for I have more to bind me to the other world than to this one. I confess that I am sorry for you, though ... you said that you were engaged, did you not?’

“Yes, I answered, snapping the spring of the locket which hung from my watch-chain, and holding up the little vignette of Flora.

“Curse you!” He yelled, springing out of his seat, with his very beard bristling with passion. “What is your happiness to me? What have I to do with her that you must dangle her photograph before my eyes?” (Doyle, ‘The Captain of the *Polestar*’, *Supernatural Tales*, p. 24)

The Captain has, in his first encounter with the narrator, given the gist of his story. His ‘I have more to bind me to the other world than to this one’, is a hint at the captain’s evident death-wish, and the desire for re-union with a dead fiancée that provokes it. The lines that follow clarify the cause of the Captain’s over-reaction to such a degree that all mystery is dissipated. One does not need to be Sherlock Holmes to follow this clue.

Later, having promised that his journal should be ‘as a psychological study... some record of Captain Nicholas Craigie’ (p. 24), the doctor proclaims of the Captain’s erratic moods, that ‘some great sorrow must have overtaken him and blighted his whole life. Perhaps I should be the same if I lost my Flora – God knows! I think that if it were not for her I should care very little whether the wind blew from the north or south to-morrow.’ (p. 25) Doyle’s diegesis, through the voice of the doctor, erases any kind of mystery, other than whether the ghost is ‘real’ or not. Following the ‘ghost-is-real’ line of logic, before any haunting has actually taken place, our first thought should be that it is somehow linked to the Captain’s ‘great sorrow’, which is strongly implied to be the loss of a figure similar to the Doctor’s ‘Flora’. The haunting itself, however, does not take precedence, and instead, the Captain’s motivation is made nearly explicit before the ghost story has even really begun. The attempt at ambiguity here is to emphasise how easily that the haunting may thus be as much a trick of the Captain’s mind as a supernatural entity affecting the crew. Given the story’s clear predecessor, *Moby Dick*, a reader familiar with that novel should certainly be alert to the Captain’s pursuit of whales as a displacement activity that only he has apparently seen, “There are fish to the north of us. How dare you shake your head, sir, when I tell you I saw them blowing from the masthead?” (p. 24) The crew have every right to be despondent, the Captain’s process is not that of the meticulous deduction a whaler-captain would have had to have made, based on weather, current, time of year, and recent known sightings. He has seen whales that nobody else has, and that must be good enough for the crew. Thus, he is very much an Ahab figure driving his crew to danger in pursuit of his own symbolic goal. However, the narrator tells us what the mystery is before we have a chance to actually experience the mystery.

The same is true of the depiction of the Captain himself. For example, descriptions often begin or end with speculation. The Doctor’s account, initially chronicling the journey itself, becomes ‘a psychological study [in which he] shall attempt to leave some record of

Captain Craigie.’ However, the passage which immediately follows this declaration of intent is a physical description, itself prefaced by a generalisation: ‘A man’s outer case generally gives some indication of the soul within.’ (p. 24, more on this subject in Chapter 5) A later entry begins with ‘my deliberate opinion is that we are commanded by a madman.’ (p. 28) Within this entry, the Narrator engages in dialogue with the Captain, during which the Captain himself ‘suggested lunacy and not mere eccentricity as the secret of his conduct.’ (p. 28) His self-diagnosis of ‘madness’ is made when he declares: “I say, Doc, don’t let the steward in! He’ll think I’m mad!” The penultimate paragraph to this entry ends with the Doctor declaring that ‘[h]e has not the air of a guilty man, but of one who has had terrible usage at the hands of fortune, and who should be regarded as a martyr rather than a criminal.’ (p. 30)

Each of these three points is designed to not only emphasise the Captain’s erratic behaviour, but to guide the reader towards an inevitable conclusion. The second point, the Captain’s own declaration that the steward would ‘think [him] mad’ is arguably the most mimetic, in that we are able to witness the Captain performing an erratic act, rather than having to accept on trust that the ship is ‘commanded by a madman.’ There are almost pantomime levels of denial in his statement, but at the very least, it is a statement in which the Captain is able to perform his role. The other two are more diegetic than mimetic, in the sense that we are merely told about them rather than being shown them in dramatized form: The first point, that the narrator believes the ship to be ‘commanded by a madman’, foreshadows the second, by laying the groundwork of expectation for further erratic behaviour from the Captain which would ultimately prove his madness. On that score, the reader is not disappointed, in a passage in which the Captain sees things which are not there, and talks to himself while still in conversation with the Doctor when his vision goes uncorroborated. (p. 29) The third point, that the Captain ‘has not the air of a guilty man’ takes the Captain’s ‘madness’ as a given, but attempts to preclude analysis by already making an ‘indication of the soul within’, as suggested

by the Doctor's sweeping statement on assessing his character by means of his physical characteristics.

Although this is a tale of ambiguity, the Doctor, and therefore Doyle, does not want Captain Craigie to be misrepresented, or potentially misunderstood as a character. In crafting the narrative, and thus the narrator, John M'Alister Ray, Doyle's hand is too firmly on the tiller. That is not to say that the tale is completely devoid of mystery. For example, the Doctor calls into question Captain Craigie's very identity:

The unanimous opinion seems to be that he is not a Scotchman, and that his name is an assumed one. Mr. Milne thinks that he has devoted himself to whaling simply for the reason that it is the most dangerous occupation which he could select, and that he courts death in every possible manner. (pp. 27-8)

Even here, as the Captain 'courts death in every possible manner', one feels a guiding hand leading us in an interpretation of the mysterious Captain, who may or may not be named 'Craigie'. Once more, Doyle renders the implicit explicit, especially given that we are already party to the potential motivation for the Captain's death-wish. This element is proven by the captain possessing a mysterious scar, 'a puckered wound in the side of his neck which he used to endeavour to conceal with his cravat.' (p. 28)

The assumed identity and concealed scar – in a tale where appearances may apparently reflect the soul within – and even the death-wish are all elements which make for a mysterious character. One could imagine them used for the description of the villain of a Holmes story. However, Doyle usually finds a way to attempt to enhance the mystery by an exclamation. For example, when the narrator transcribes Mr. Manson's account of the ghost: 'I don't know what it was. It wasn't a bear anyway. It was tall and white and straight, and if it wasn't a man or a woman, I'll stake my Davy it was something worse.' (p. 27) Manson, through the pen of the

narrator, attempts to enhance the uncertain element – that the apparition could not have been a bear – by having it be ‘something worse’. Presumably ‘worse’ means ‘more dangerous’ than a bear, but there is confusion as to whether it is ‘worse’ than a ‘man or a woman’. To a lesser extent, this echoes the exclamations Ray makes at the end of an entry in which the ice closes in around the ship: ‘God help us if it blocks that narrow pass which is our only road to safety!’

Of course, Doyle is attempting to maintain the veil of realism within the tale. Ray’s exclamations are an attempt to inject some character into the ‘non-participant’, or heterodiegetic, position of the narrator. Clearly, Doyle felt as though the true mystery of the tale may only be experienced by contemporary readers if they are able to put themselves in the place of the narrator. Although Ray’s exclamations would therefore be a tool for tension-building, Doyle’s attempt at realism sometimes diffuses the tension through digression. For example, the narrator takes a break from the impending doom of frozen starvation, the haunting, and his questioning of the sanity of the Captain, and subsequently of his own, to talk about how the crew take Sunday service. The entry following ‘God help us, I say again!’ (p. 30) documents how they apparently do so in an inversely ecumenical fashion, attending an Anglican service for a crew of Catholics and Presbyterians. (p. 31) Again, one sees an air of an attempt at credibility from a writer who had actually undergone a journey such as this, using potential realism as a tool to provoke immersion in the reader.

All of this would suggest that Doyle’s narrator countermands the parameters of the genre. To a large extent, this is true. However, the irony is that the greater mystery lies not in the narrative of the Captain, but that of the narrator. That mystery arises not in Doyle’s attempts towards immersion, but at the point in which the story departs from it. Like the diary fragments in ‘The Horror of the Heights’ and ‘The Terror of Blue John Gap’, the Doctor’s tale concludes with an afterword, re-establishing it as a ‘found’ document, and thus linking with the premise that it is ‘an extract from the journal of John M’Alister Ray, student of medicine’ from the

beginning of the story. (pp. 23, 40-1)) The afterword is not from Ray himself, or from an unconnected third party, but from the Doctor's father.

The familiar element of diegetic control is plain to see, as the Doctor vouches for the character of his son, and thus the veracity of the piece:

That everything occurred exactly as he describes it I have the fullest confidence, and, indeed, the most positive certainty, for I know him to be a strong-nerved and unimaginative man, with the strictest regard for veracity. Still, the story is, on the face of it, so vague and so improbable that I was long opposed to its publication.
(pp. 40-1)

To establish the relative merit of truth in the story, Doyle thus takes a double-edged approach with the perspective-shift to the father. He is there to confirm that 'all is true', but he confirms that by casting doubt on the piece, calling it 'vague and so improbable'. However, the son is *so* 'unimaginative' that he wouldn't have been able to make it up, so he is, by default, as it were, honest. Hence, any falsehood in his narrative would be out of character, and so the 'vague and improbable' details *must* be true. However, the vague and improbable detail here is not the admissions the father makes, but the omission. Arguably, what happened to the Doctor is the greater mystery of the work. If he is still alive, why is he not managing the publication of the narrative himself? Is it because he was driven 'mad' by the events of the voyage? Or did he never return from the trip, in which case, why is the father using the present tense about him ('I know him to be a strong-nerved and unimaginative man')? The eventual death of Captain Craigie on the ice may fall, broadly, into two categories of explanation: 'the ghost is real', or, the Captain truly is mad, and the witnessing of the ghost is some kind of mass hysteria, or at least is a joint hysteria on the part of the narrator and the Captain?

In his afterword, the father attempts to re-assert the veracity of the piece by taking a different tack. He did not know this Captain Craigie, but his decision to publish the statement by his having ‘had independent testimony upon the subject which throws a new light upon it’. The father continues to explain that he had received independent verification from:

an old college chum of mine, now practising at Saltash, in Devonshire. Upon my telling him of this experience of my son's, he declared to me that he was familiar with the man, and proceeded, to my no small surprise, to give me a description of him, which tallied remarkably well with that given in the journal, except that he depicted him as a younger man. According to his account, he had been engaged to a young lady of singular beauty residing upon the Cornish coast. During his absence at sea his betrothed had died under circumstances of peculiar horror. (p. 41)

There is an ambiguity here about the pronouns – ‘the man’ whom the old College chum remembered is presumably Captain Craigie, as the figure ‘tallied remarkably well with that given in the journal’. However, the confusion highlights both the tale’s ability to be ambiguous, i.e. the mirroring of Doctor and Captain, but also its restriction of its own potential. Given that we are to presume that this is Craigie that the father addresses, any suspense about the character is immediately cut away. Initially a man of mystery potentially under an assumed name, the Captain is demystified by the narrator’s father having a friend who knew of him, including an age-appropriate physical description. We are not really surprised by the final statement, that the alleged Captain’s ‘betrothed had died under circumstances of peculiar horror’. By this point, it is relatively easy to speculate as much. Far more surprising is that Doyle does not furnish us with the details of the narrator himself. It is as though that particular narrative part had served its purpose, following which the tale must proceed to the ‘independent verification’

section. Although Doyle is heavy-handed in guiding us towards the ‘ideal’, it is actually a lot more interesting to consider the tale as imperfect, and subsequently re-evaluate who the ‘psychological study’ is really about. The obfuscation of the narrator may actually bury the lede (that is, the theme or gist of the story). The Doctor makes for the better patient.

This realisation returns us to the analysis of the ‘two Freuds’, and the entry into the situation of psychoanalysis. Analysts have to understand their own position relative to the analysand – that they are both a subject and object in the paradigm. They must understand and control their subjectivity within the analysis, while also understanding that they are objects for the analysand, who manipulates the concept of the analyst into idealised and debased forms through transference and resistance. One may also apply a similar metaphor of ‘energy’ and ‘oscillation’ to the reading of this tale, as it is driven by seemingly self-contradictory states. Both these concepts - the Freudian transference and the energy-force of the piece itself, are notable in the Doctor’s interactions with the Captain. Although the Doctor’s record should serve as a ‘psychological study’ of the Captain, it actually demonstrates less of a study, and more of a continuum of the situation of analysis. The Doctor betrays the symptom while attempting to ascribe a symptom to both the captain and the crew.

Take, for instance, the ‘oscillation’ of tension within the ‘Sunday service’ example. The entry is one in which the narrator claims that the ship has, as he had feared, become surrounded by ice, and thus trapped. It finishes with a ‘glorious sunset, which made the great ice fields look like a lake of blood.’ (p. 31) The tension is diffused, returns, and is finally rejected again but one may just as easily argue that the narrator is attempting to diffuse his own tension through mundane activity. The uplifting adjective of a ‘glorious’ sunset contrasts with its negative symbolic effect upon the text. It is as though he hides in the complacency of idiom, unable to face his potential fate.

Although Ray, as a man of science, eschews superstition, he treats the crew's religion with almost anthropological interest. He may exclaim to God, and partake of Sunday service himself, but his approach to observation is one of detachment, similar to his declaration that '[i]t is strange that superstition should have obtained mastery over this hard-headed and practical race' (pp. 25-6) Ray here demonstrates a further oscillation, between objectivity and subjectivity. His rationalist persona presents the desire of an objective position, to almost *be* a ghost, an alternate figure to the crew around him. The entry concludes with the statement that '[i]f it will blow twenty-four hours from the north all will yet be well', thus ending with tension-dispelling hope. That hope is double-edged, a means for Doyle to control his story, or the means for the narrator to attempt to elicit control over it. Akin to Freudian negation, a preclusion of analysis may also be an invitation towards it.

The factors of oscillation, and the subsequent 'motor force' of the piece are experienced in opposing binaries throughout the tale. The predominant binary is that between reality and superstition, as the narrator has to confront whether the haunting of the ship is actually happening, or is just a product of the imagination. Subsequent binaries, such as that between sanity and 'madness', and superstition and rationality, are explored through oppositional dialogue (i.e. between the Doctor and Captain), or between the Doctor attempting to rationalise two mutually exclusive positions (did he just see a ghost?). The Captain's pacing is a physical manifestation of conceptual contradiction. 'he put on that air of iron determination which I have frequently observed upon his face, and paced rapidly backwards and forwards across the narrow cabin for some minutes.' (p. 23) His 'iron determination' is to pursue whales that only he has seen to the point of danger, yet the action of 'pacing backwards and forwards' is an indeterminate action, and betrays indecision. As his mind struggles to reconcile concepts – initially the safety of the ship and the compulsion of his pursuit – he expresses the struggle kinaesthetically. In addition to physical alternation, the Captain demonstrates emotional

changeability. His response to the Doctor's challenge to his course of action is as unpredictable as his pacing would suggest:

At first I feared that I had seriously offended him, but he dispelled the idea by sitting down again, and putting his hand upon my arm with a gesture which almost amounted to a caress. There was a depth of tenderness too in his wild dark eyes which surprised me considerably. (pp. 23-4)

The kindness is evoked in deliberate and stark contrast to the captain's violent mood swings. This contrast is evoked after the Captain reveals his erratic disdain for the Doctor having a fiancée, and thus an earthly tie, after which the Doctor 'almost thought that he was about to strike me in the frenzy of his rage, but with another imprecation he dashed open the door of the cabin and rushed out upon deck.' (p. 24) The Captain's hand upon the Doctor's arm is a gesture of intimacy, but intimacy quickly turns to threat.

Later in the story, after another encounter in the Captain's cabin, in which he and the Doctor share calmer and more intimate conversation, the entry for the following day has the Doctor returning to the image of the Captain pacing to demonstrate the latter's unquiet mind over the haunting:

I can hardly believe that this is the same man who discoursed philosophy last night with the most critical acumen and coolest judgment. He is pacing backwards and forwards upon the quarterdeck like a caged tiger, stopping now and again to throw out his hands with a yearning gesture, and stare impatiently out over the ice. He keeps up a continual mutter to himself, and once he called out, "But a little time, love—but a little time!" (p. 34)

The Captain's rationalism and compassionate discourse once again gives way to the irrationality of his erratic behaviour. He paces 'like a caged tiger' rather than demonstrate the same control that he did the previous night. The 'man who discoursed philosophy' is thus contrasted with an animalistic, impulsive predator. The irrationality is highlighted by the Captain's address to an absent party, complete with an ominous implied promise.

Again, one can more than presume whom the Captain is talking to, because the portrait of the Captain's lost love seen and described in detail when the Doctor was sent down on an errand to the Captain's cabin the previous night. This seems to lock the two together in a shared obsessional situation, with each of them having seen a portrait of the other's fiancée, that is, of the person who gives them their only reason for living – a fact the Captain makes explicit through his ire that the Doctor isn't 'a man that would never be missed.' (p. 24) These are all identifiable symptoms, the doctor himself having given 'delusions' as a sign of madness when questioned on the subject by the Captain, defining the symptom: 'Seeing a thing which is not there is a delusion.' (p. 30)

However, the narrator is unaware of his own symptom. After all, he engages in 'walking up and down the quarterdeck', not depicting himself with the same dangerous erratic compulsion as the Captain, but apparently feeling the same need to enact repetitive motion. This action does arrive a few lines after the point in the narrative where the narrator declares that 'we are commanded by a madman', What follows is the re-affirmation that the journal will serve as a psychological record, except, this time, it 'will serve to justify us in case we have to put him under any sort of restraint, a step which I should only consent to as a last resource.' (p. 28) Once more, we see indecision played out through indefinite action. The declaration that the Captain is a 'madman' is a definite statement, but the Doctor chooses inaction over definite action, and thus consents to remain commanded by a 'madman'. The psychological pressure

that the Captain exhibits when pacing may be reflected in the Doctor's offhand remark about his activity, even though, causally, it is not exactly in sequence.

Granted, this is tenuous evidence. Having served aboard an Arctic-bound vessel, and in a medical capacity, Doyle would have known the importance of exercise in such a confined space and isolated position. He would have understood that exercise was essential for maintaining bodily health during such a long period of diminished activity, in addition to mental health in such a stressful and perilous situation in which the only solution is to wait, consuming valuable resources all the while. Exercise above deck would, at the very least, serve as an attempt to combat symptoms which would have been exacerbated by the rapidly lengthening nights. The tale shows this, as darkness symbolically creeps into the tale as the 'endless' days finally end, and the crew have to contend with the darkness which also threatens to bring the colder weather and take them into the ice-bound waters which they fear may trap them forever.

The darkness itself offers more compelling evidence. To reverse the direction of a 'psychological study' that the narrator proffers, and examine the Doctor as patient, we must consider the journal a psychological 'work'. The symbolism and omission of the dream-work are used by Freud to discover latent desire through manifest content. The darkness itself is the most tenable symbol of the threat the crew faces; the danger increases as the nights lengthen. The thought of death without metempsychosis is, after all, a 'long dark', and in this way the rationalist Doctor must contend with thoughts of his own mortality as much as with the spectre, which may be a projection of that conflict. The terms 'dark' and 'darkness' together appear twenty times in the story. What is striking is what they are applied to: the same language of the lengthening nights is transposed onto the Captain. He has a 'dark, handsome face' (p. 24) with 'wild dark eyes' of 'the darkest hazel.' (p. 24) A fit of anger is 'his dark hour'. (p. 25) Later, during one of the contrasting 'lighter' moments of the text, in which the Captain gives his

Ahab-like speech to the crew to bolster their resolve, the Doctor still comments upon the Captain's 'dark animated face', (p. 31) The Doctor's final encounter with the Captain is to watch as he pursues his end describing 'the loom of his tall figure through the darkness' as he leaves the ship. (p. 38) Upon leaping from the guard-rail, the Captain's pursuit renders him, to the Doctor, a 'dark figure', 'running into the darkness with outstretched hands and loving words.' (pp. 38-9)

We thus have a multidirectional symbology. The captain's darkness may be transposed symbolically onto the darkness of the lengthening nights; the danger of or to the man himself is resonant with the danger of approaching winter. However, is the darkness transposed onto him, or is his inner darkness transposed onto the symbolism of the tale? From the perspective of the young Doctor, one may also see his application of darkness onto the captain as a projection or denial of his own darkness, so that the Captain is manifesting the latent fears that the Doctor is trying (unsuccessfully?) not to 'own' within himself. The same may be said of wildness; the wildness of the Captain's eyes and his metaphorical depiction as a caged tiger is evocative of the wilderness which surrounds the ship, and threatens to consume it.

The Doctor can only be in 'analyst-mode'; he never seems to have the reflective honesty to enter 'patient-mode' in order to truly understand the nature of his own symptom. The Doctor attempts to 'diagnose' the captain, and discusses psychology with him, but he falls short of a genuine diagnosis. All he is able to state for certain is that the Captain is a 'madman', as he himself is drawn into the oppositional logic of the tale, and forced to question whether he himself is 'mad' or sane through the oppositional logic of whether the spectre haunting the ship is real or not. The affectation of fright at the unproven sighting of a ghost is the only symptom that he allows himself, and he grants himself little introspection compared to the speculations he makes about the mental health of the Captain.

The Doctor's inability to understand the symptom within himself is a counter-indicator to the psychoanalytical resonance of this tale. In addition to his diagnosis of the Captain being based on preconception, his treatment of the crew is very different to his treatment of the Captain, both medically and ideologically. He prescribes medication to ease the nerves of the 'superstitious' crew, and the Doctor's language about this treats superstition as an illness in itself: 'We have had a perfect epidemic of it this voyage, until I have felt inclined to serve out rations of sedatives and nerve-tonics with the Saturday allowance of grog.' (p. 26) The 'talking cure' is only for the Captain, as is any kind of inference of psychological complexity. For the crew, there is a cruder and more invasive treatment, something more in the mode of Freud's early use of cocaine and hypnotism. But even with the Captain, the Doctor's dialogue falls far short, for he is rarely direct with the pertinent questions. When the Doctor sees the portrait of the Captain's lost love upon visiting his cabin, he does not put the obvious question as to the Captain's psychological wellbeing, and instead 'diagnosing' only with vaguery. 'Were he a less reserved man I should make some remark upon the subject' (>) he states, unconvincingly. In his position, Freud would not forego such an opportunity. This remark, made by the Doctor, brings to mind an earlier entry, in which the opportunity to confront the Captain is presented:

"You don't think I am, do you, Doc?" he asked, as I was putting the bottle back into the after-locker. "Tell me now, as man to man, do you think that I am mad?"

"I think you have something on your mind," I answered, "which is exciting you and doing you a good deal of harm."(>)

This is about as close as the Doctor comes to confronting the Captain. He addresses the Captain's issue directly as a mental problem, but the Captain is able to adeptly change the subject by counter-pressing the Doctor on what the symptom may be, before the Doctor has a chance to interrogate *his* symptom further. Thus, a further 'oscillation' is on display, that of

control passing to-and-fro between the Doctor and the Captain, represented through the latter's ability to control a dialogue, and his deliberately sending the Doctor down to his cabin so that he can study his deceased fiancée's portrait. The Captain clearly desires intimacy, from the 'gesture which almost amounted to a caress' that he gives the Doctor in their first encounter in the tale, to a reciprocation of the Doctor's own intimate revelation during that encounter, the production of the locket. The Doctor is never at any point, able to confront himself or the Captain. Were he have been able to have understood himself, and the Captain better at their points of interaction, the tale may well have had a different ending.

The Captain's desire is pre-diagnosed, as the Doctor is told that Craigie has a death-wish before he really begins to investigate for himself. Like one of Freud's case studies, each detail subsequently proves the premise, even when it appears to contradict it. The Captain's momentary kindnesses would appear to contradict the 'madness', but it is his rapid change from a state of compassion to a state of aggression that marks him as dangerous to the reader. However, the narrator's desire is far less explicit. He clearly does not actively desire death, as the Captain does, being at an earlier stage of the malady. Explicitly, he wants a return to his fiancée, but that is the only thing that motivates his continued desire to live. However, implicitly, he appears to betray more complex desires, as the voyage becomes more and more stressful. Even though the narrator's father knows him to be 'a strong nerved and unimaginative man', the diary entries themselves contradict this. There is even a chance that the Doctor's tale could be a complete fabrication. For example, he states that:

All this disquisition upon superstition leads me up to the fact that Mr Manson, our second mate, saw a ghost last night—or, at least, says that he did, which of course is the same thing. It is quite refreshing to have some new topic of conversation after

the eternal routine of bears and whales which has served us for so many months.

(p. 26)

The ‘at least he said he did, which is the same thing’ as Mr Manson actually seeing the ghost draws no distinction between the reporting of a fact and the fact of the fact itself. Formed in what the reader must assume is sarcasm at a stage in the story before he ‘cannot doubt... Mr Manson’s story’ (p. 35), mimesis is nonetheless directly equated with diegesis. Adding to this is the narrator’s clear boredom with the routine, and the lack of conversational variation among the crew. ‘It is quite refreshing to have a new topic of conversation after the eternal routine’ implies some agitation after the endless boredom of the journey; it is thus easy to speculate that the diary entries are perhaps more ‘imaginative’ than the Doctor is given credit for.

Not only that, but the haunting opens up a channel of communication between the Doctor and the men. He expresses a genuine excitement at conversing with the Captain, and his dialogues with the men become filled with the haunting, and thus, are quoted more fully in the piece. This is not the only story in which Doyle breaks out his Scots-language transcription (See ‘Through the Veil’), but the contrast between the two registers not only adds to the linguistic ‘realism’ of the piece, but enhances the divide between the Doctor and crew, the aloof Doctor’s use of language alienates him from them and elevates him to the position of being above superstition. That is the idealised image of himself that he wishes to project. Thus, on questioning a witness to the haunting he states that ‘I spoke to Milne after breakfast, and told him that he should be above such nonsense, and that as an officer he ought to set the men a better example.’ The officer in question replies: “Mebbe aye, mebbe na, Doctor,” he said; “I didna ca’ it a ghaist. I canna’ say I preen my faith in sea-bogles an’ the like, though there’s a mony as claims to ha’ seen a’ that and waur.” (pp. 33-4) The Doctor can *only* speak confrontationally with someone he believes to be beneath him, his uncertainty manifesting

itself in aloof bravado. There is a contrast between the clipped, admonishing sentence in standard English and the First Mate's more complex and introspective admission in Scots. The inclusion of Milne's side of the dialogue, in its entirety, demonstrates a longing to communicate, to belong, and perhaps even to become more self-aware.

There is little wonder that the young Doctor seems to latch on to the language of the supernatural. The language of 'the Bogie' (p. 33) and 'ghaists' (p. 34) creeps into his narrative, and he reports far greater conversation with the crew after the haunting has made itself apparent. The 'warmth' of this dialogue stands in contrast to the cold, to the creeping darkness and to the silence of the Arctic which surrounds and pervades the ship:

My fears have been confirmed, and the thin strip of blue water has disappeared from the southward. Nothing but the great motionless ice fields around us, with their weird hummocks and fantastic pinnacles. There is a deathly silence over their wide expanse which is horrible. No lapping of the waves now, no cries of seagulls or straining of sails, but one deep universal silence in which the murmurs of the seamen, and the creak of their boots upon the white shining deck, seem discordant and out of place. (p. 30)

The silence clearly has a profound effect on the young Doctor, as it would have done on the young Doyle, as he experienced the most alien landscape the earth had to offer. Where the Captain's fundamental drive is towards death, he gets the contrast absolutely correct when he forces the diagnosis of 'life' upon the Doctor. 'I don't like to hear a young fellow, that has hardly began life, speculating about death' (p. 37), he says, contrasting himself who, in his first introduction 'has more to bind [him] to the other world'. (p. 24) In the Doctor's final conversation with him, he imposes the condition of life on the Doctor, having identified himself with the opposing condition of death. However, one may wonder to what extent the conditions

of the Captain are in turn projected onto him by the Doctor, and how the relationship between the two may be as much counter-transferential as transferential in this instance.

The Doctor is himself divided, and he expresses a need to remain aloof from the superstition of the men, but he also demonstrates a prurient need to belong, and to feel alive among them. The ‘sensible’ man of science is gradually drawn into the irrational in order to enhance the tension of the piece, so that the haunting may cause doubt in someone initially dismiss it as an ‘absurd outbreak of superstition’. His initial diagnosis points towards mass-hysteria, yet it is mass hysteria that he becomes ever keener to join as the nights close in and his hope of survival becomes less certain.

As we came up [to where the crew had sighted the Captain’s body] some wandering puff of wind caught these tiny flakes in its vortex, and they whirled up into the air, partially descended again, and then, caught once more in the current, sped rapidly away in the direction of the sea. To my eyes it seemed but a snow-drift, but many of my companions averred that it started up in the shape of a woman, stooped over the corpse and kissed it, and then hurried away across the floe. I have learned never to ridicule any man’s opinion, however strange it may seem. Sure it is that Captain Nicholas Craigie had met with no painful end, for there was a bright smile upon his blue pinched features, and his hands were still outstretched as though grasping at the strange visitor which had summoned him away into the dim world that lies beyond the grave. (p. 40)

Once more, we see the tension between a need for the Doctor to represent himself as rational, but also his desire for the irrational. ‘To my eyes it seemed but a snow-drift, but many of my companions averred that it started up in the shape of a woman’ distances the Doctor from the superstitious crew, but his experience has, it seems, irrevocably changed him – ‘I have learned

never to ridicule any man's opinion, however strange it may seem.' The Doctor denies his belief, instead ascribing it to the others, and thus Othering it. However, he is more than willing to depict the Captain as 'grasping at the strange visitor which had summoned him away into the dim world that lies beyond the grave.' This is not the language of the rationalist, but that of someone who *wants* to imagine a 'world beyond the grave', to depict it with the sensationalism that he dismisses in the others.

Although one has to be careful when discussing Doyle's Spiritualist beliefs relative to his ghost stories, there are elements of the tale which do appear to betray something of the author, rather than the character. For example, when the narrator is summoned to the Captain's quarters, to have 'a long and interesting conversation on general topics', the topics the Doctor represents are metaphysical, to do with the 'other world':

He spoke about the nature of the soul, and sketched out the views of Aristotle and Plato upon the subject in a masterly manner. He seems to have a leaning for metempsychosis and the doctrines of Pythagoras. In discussing them we touched upon modern spiritualism, and I made some joking allusion to the impostures of Slade, upon which, to my surprise, he warned me most impressively against confusing the innocent with the guilty, and argued that it would be as logical to brand Christianity as an error because Judas, who professed that religion, was a villain. (p. 33)

Is what we are experiencing here a case of Patient-Doyle? Although the discussion is essentially there to reinforce the central tension to the ghost story, i.e. whether the spectre that haunts the ship is real or a trick of the mind, the discussion seems like a digression. Some twenty-nine years before the publication of *The Vital Message*, here, we witness Doyle have his characters argue the same premise. To 'confuse the innocent with the guilty' is, in this

argument, to label every practitioner of Spiritualism a charlatan, which both the Captain here, and Doyle writing *The Vital Message*, vigorously attack as illogical.

Likewise, one must be careful when ascribing a Freudian logic to Doyle. His depictions of psychology, in both ‘The Great Keinplatz Experiment’ and this tale display an understanding of psychology more primitive than Freud’s psychoanalysis, and one seemingly uncomfortable with the level of detail Freud would apply to diagnosis. Andrew Lycett’s biography explains this discomfort; that Doyle ‘could not make the leap to more radical concepts emanating from Vienna’, that ‘the mind was the latest territory for nineteenth century rationalism to conquer. But Arthur had taken his scientific dabblings far enough with forensics and other scientific techniques.’¹⁹⁶ However, in conclusion, we have conflated four major parallels in the Doylean and Freudian handling of their textual representatives. The first is the analogical equivalence of the polarity of the Doctor’s narrative, and his dialogues with the Captain, to that of Patient- and Analyst- Freud. The second is the shifting of boundary lines within the two pairs of composites is similar; both texts exhibit an analytical bravado, while also exhibiting a vulnerability and honesty in the face of the symptom. For the Doctor, the symptom of ‘superstition’ becomes more complex and difficult to treat as he begins to understand the symptom present within himself – without ever explicitly reaching the understanding required of him to form a legitimate diagnosis. Thirdly, that the ‘anxiety’ and need to control the texts and those characteristic representations, to make sure that they are understood in the right way, contrasts with the relatively decisive position of adjudication that the reader is given upon reading the texts. Thus, fourthly, the case of ‘madness’ in Doyle’s tale does correspond to

¹⁹⁶ Lycett, pp. 280-1. Kevin Mills argues that another of Doyle’s ghost stories, ‘The Silver Mirror’, ‘could almost be read as a critique of psychoanalysis, or, at least, a riposte to it.’ See Mills, p. 131.

Freud's depictions of neurosis, in that the open-endedness allows for the deconstruction of preconceptions on the concept. In Doyle's case, although the Doctor believes himself to be depicting a case of insanity, the reader is left to question who the case-study is actually about.

Chapter 5 Freud and Sherlock Holmes

5.1 Detectives, Doubles and Duality

In Chapter 2.2, we introduced Freud's essay 'On Screen Memories', as a text in which he demonstrates the role of narrative in his work, but also in which narrative is problematised by his splitting of the self between what we called 'Analyst Freud' and 'Patient Freud'. That division is rendered through Freud 'playing' both analyst and analysand in a work in which self-analysis becomes the explication of analysis itself. But the self-division is never rendered explicit; Freud's text constantly maintains the illusion that the case study is a conversation between two parties. However, Siegfried Bernfeld's revelation that Freud and the unnamed patient are one and the same opened the text up to readings of Freud's plurality. As Hugh Haughton wrote in his introduction to 'On Screen Memories' in the 2003 Penguin collection *The Uncanny*, within the essay 'Freud plays the role of Sherlock Holmes in relation to the baffled client in order to seemingly solve a case he presents whilst expounding his developed theories on memory, imagination and the role of the unconscious.'¹⁹⁷ Haughton, commenting on Freud's literary style, observes specifically that 'Freud had noted earlier that the "case histories I write seem to read like novellas"', adding his own comment 'but this one on 'Screen Memories' reads more like a detective story.' (Ibid, p. xviii)

Developing upon this reading, a much deeper comparison between the genres reflects the themes elaborated on thus far: dualism, self-characterisation and textual dynamics. The themes of narrative and Freud's dualistic self-construction correspond to the four crucial dualistic relationships that drive the plot of many Victorian detective stories. The first is that

¹⁹⁷ Hugh Haughton, Introduction to 'On Screen Memories', Freud, *The Uncanny*, p. xvii.

between the detective and the amanuensis, the second that between the detective and the villain, the third that between the detective and the baffled client, and the fourth that between the detective and reader, who necessarily ‘visits’ or supplements the other three in the course of reading the story. In what follows we shall examine how ‘On Screen Memories’ incorporates aspects of all four of these dualities, as seen in the relationships between Holmes and Watson, Holmes and Moriarty, Holmes and the client, and Holmes and the reader.

If the obvious comparison in ‘On Screen Memories’ is with a Sherlock Holmes story, then the way in which Holmes is established as a character through the eyes of Watson is open to the same interpretation as Holmes writing himself in the dualist role of analyst and analysand. Finally, as the reader bridges the divide between their own understanding of the case and that of the detective, we shall explore another dynamic at play. A detective story is meant to be read both ‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’. In a classic detective story, each clue must foreshadow the solution to the tale, but never give it away to the reader until the detective reveals it, usually in the denouement. The solution, it is thus implied, may then be ‘read back’ onto the clues, and each clue must contribute to the creation of the solution. Thus, we shall examine this ‘oscillation’ dynamic in relation to Freud’s text, in which the case study presented is only part of the ‘story’, the reader having to read between the lines in order to remap the ‘clues’ onto their understanding of the concept.

We shall start with an overview of the dualism inherent in detective fiction. Doyle’s creation of Sherlock Holmes, whose brilliance is filtered through the lens of John Watson, is innately dualistic, in that Holmes cannot exist outside the mediatory presence of Watson. The framing device of every Holmes story is that of a retelling of the exploits of Holmes through the pen of his amanuensis, Dr Watson. Holmes is a character flawed by an overly rational approach to the world and given to addiction and melancholy, yet Watson promotes his talents to the point of idealisation. In contrast to details which mark a character out as a criminal to

Doyle's Victorian readers, Shafquat Towheed notes that egotism, bipolarity, addiction and an obsessional relationship to problem solving were all noted characteristics of genius. He quotes Cesare Lombroso's 1891 work *The Man of Genius*, edited by Havelock Ellis, an observational development from his 1876 study *L'uomo delinquente* ('The Criminal Man'), which demonstrates the interest in the psychology of one stemming from the other. Criminality was often seen as a 'condition', therefore it stood to reason that genius was likewise a 'special morbid condition.'¹⁹⁸ Although Watson, writing in retrospect, already knows the answers to the mysteries solved by Holmes, he maintains the mystery throughout the narrative and emphasises his own bafflement as Holmes keenly renders the mysterious mundane through his 'science of deduction'.

Conversely, Holmes' adversaries occupy the incongruous position of being a second double, antagonists with whom Holmes must match his wits in order to crack the case.

As Rogers notes, 'often, the opposing selves symbolise possible alliances and divisions among the categories of *id*, *ego*, and *superego*.'¹⁹⁹ If we treat the idealised Holmes as the superego – which is a stretch, considering the facets of sybaritic *id* he exhibits in his mood-swings, and penchant for cocaine and Turkish baths – and Watson as that 'poor wretch' the *ego*, then the classic Holmesian villain should logically represent the *id*. This connection is more tenuous in relation to most Holmes stories, given, for example, the awkwardness and ineptitude of villains such as Jonathan Small of *The Sign of Four*, in which the 'locked room' murder is a result more

¹⁹⁸ Lombroso, p. v, quoted in Towheed ed., *The Sign of Four*, (Peterborough: Ontario, Broadview Press, 2010), p. 159.

¹⁹⁹ Robert Rogers, *The Double in Literature*, (Detroit (MI): Wayne State University Press, 1970), p. 62.

of accident than design.²⁰⁰ However, Holmes' arch-nemesis Moriarty perfectly captures how the villain/hero doubling may represent these structures, the superego battling to control and contain the id. One may read Moriarty simply as one half of the villain/hero dichotomy, whose abilities parallel Holmes' in order to make him a more compelling antagonist, or perhaps even something beyond that. By possessing similar abilities and characteristics to Holmes, Moriarty is marked out, not only as a nemesis, but as a double. Holmes first describes him in *The Final Problem* thus:

He is a man of good birth and excellent education, endowed by Nature with a phenomenal mathematical faculty... But the man had hereditary tendencies of a most diabolical kind. A criminal strain ran in his blood, which, instead of being modified, was increased and rendered infinitely more dangerous by his extraordinary mental powers.²⁰¹

Holmes is engaged by his nemesis in ways that other criminals could not have required, in that Moriarty is not only his intellectual equal, but a figure who might easily *be* Holmes. In other words, there is a sense of 'there but for the grace of God goes Holmes' in Moriarty's condensed biography, which indicates his possessing 'good birth', an 'excellent education', and 'phenomenal mathematical faculty', features which easily apply to Holmes, who is depicted as a logician with the education to drop literary allusions from French or German texts when the

²⁰⁰ See *The Sign of Four*, p. 154, in which Small confesses that it was not his intention to have Thaddeus Sholto, the victim, killed at all.

²⁰¹ Doyle, 'The Final Problem', *Sherlock Holmes: The Major Stories, with Contemporary Critical Essays*, (Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1994), p. 216. Henceforth *The Major Stories*.

situation arises.²⁰² The difference between them lies in Moriarty's hereditary 'criminal strain', a kind of original sin which one could take no credit for not possessing. Its sensationally gothic description describes it as having 'run in his blood', his intellectualism not abating it, but amplifying it. Holmes also describes Moriarty physically:

He is extremely tall and thin, his forehead domes out in a white curve, and his two eyes are deeply sunken in his head. He is clean-shaven, pale, and ascetic-looking, retaining something of the professor in his features. His shoulders are rounded from much study, and his face protrudes forward, and is forever slowly oscillating from side to side in a curiously reptilian fashion. ('The Final Problem', *The Major Stories*, p. 218)

In addition to his great intellectual capacity, there is something dangerously prehistoric about Holmes' greatest adversary, more so even than the Neanderthal, Dr Grimesby Roylott of 'The Speckled Band'. (*The Major Stories*, p. 161) Moriarty's physical description demonstrates his capacity for manifesting the circumspection of the academic, but also for possessing the instincts of a predator. And, given Holmes' description of the 'criminal strain' running in his blood, the predatory is the dominant drive.

Let us not forget that Holmes' initial introduction into fiction is likewise reptilian. He is described to Watson prior to their first meeting with the remark that 'Holmes is a little too scientific for my tastes – it approaches to cold-bloodedness.' ('A Study in Scarlet', *Major Stories*, p. 20) In 'The Final Problem', Moriarty, the 'spider in the centre of its web' (p. 217) turns from predator to prey. Holmes becomes a 'pursuer double', which is a construction of

²⁰² For example, see *The Sign of Four*, and Holmes' quotations of Jean Paul, p. 99, and Goethe, pp. 90, 156

Mark Kanzer's to describe mirroring figures in dogged pursuit of other characters, such as Jean Valjean's pursuit by Javert in *Les Misérables* or Raskolnikov's by the Inspector in *Crime and Punishment*.²⁰³ The 'double' that Holmes pursues is what Robert Rogers would categorise as the 'diabolic double'. As he notes:

The conventional double is of course some kind of antithetical self, usually a guardian angel or tempting devil. Critics oriented towards psychology view the diabolic double, which predominates, as a character representing unconscious instinctual drives.²⁰⁴

Moriarty represents the 'diabolic double', not only in his status as the kingpin of the London criminal underworld, but also in his role as tempter. He does not directly tempt Holmes, but in serving as Holmes' double, he demonstrates the path of temptation which Holmes implicitly refuses by remaining a criminal-catcher. After all, the perfect detective must surely be able to commit the perfect crime.²⁰⁵ Where Moriarty is a creature of controlled, intellectually-honed *id*, Holmes remains a self in service to the *superego*, and so represents the *superego* seeking to curtail the drives of Moriarty's *id*. Yet, that instinct towards the side of 'good' in this instance, although couched in the terms of ending a great evil, to 'free society of [Moriarty]', is also expressed in the terms of desire. For example, Holmes '*could* not sit quiet in [his] chair, knowing that men such as Professor Moriarty were walking the streets of London unchallenged

²⁰³ Robert Rogers, *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Double in Literature*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), p. 2. Henceforth, *The Double in Literature*.

²⁰⁴ See Rogers, *The Double in Literature*, p. 62.

²⁰⁵ Which was true of Arthur Morrison's *Dorrington* stories, where the titular character is both detective and villain. Arthur Morrison, *The Dorrington Deed Box*, e-pub version via Project Gutenberg, (London: Ward, Lock and co., 2016), accessed 21/10/19.

[my italics].’ However, this challenge comes as a result not only of the desire to stop Moriarty’s schemes, but also from a desire to experience the pleasure of matching wits with a master villain. ‘If I could beat that man,’ Holmes declares, ‘I should feel that my own career had reached its summit, and I should be prepared to turn to some more placid life.’ (‘The Final Problem’, p. 216)

The duality is made more explicit in Holmes’ own psychological, and often physical descent into the criminal underworld. As an expert on criminality, he is an archetypal example of the classic detective trope of walking the fine line between the world and the underworld through an expansive knowledge of the latter. For, as Holmes says, ‘there is no one that knows the criminal world as well as I do.’ (p. 216) Even in the infamous depiction of Moriarty as the ‘Napoleon of Crime’ Doyle depicts him as Holmes’ evil antithesis:

“He is the organizer of half that is evil and nearly all that is undetected in this great city. He is a genius, a philosopher, an abstract thinker. He has a brain of the first order. He sits motionless, like a spider in the centre of its web, but that web has a thousand little radiations, and he knows well every quiver of each of them.” (p. 217)²⁰⁶

A ‘genius, a philosopher an abstract thinker’ are terms that could be used interchangeably to describe both Holmes and Moriarty. The more fascinating element of doubling here, though, is the description of Moriarty as a ‘spider at the centre of its web, but that web has a thousand

²⁰⁶ The term ‘Napoleon of Crime’ is itself the subject of literary larceny, originally applied to Count Fosco in Wilkie Collins’ *The Woman in White*, reprint, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). T. S. Eliot repeated the larceny with reference to ‘Macavity’ in *Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1953).

little radiations, and he knows well every quiver of each of them.’ Holmes’s London is also a web, as he has a flawless encyclopaedic knowledge of its streets, and uses his own network of informants, the Baker Street Irregulars, in addition to covert means such as disguise, to pass unseen through his web. Holmes explicitly identifies with Moriarty through an appreciation of his abilities, but also through his criticism of his methods.

That form of dualistic identification, then already a familiar trope of the genre, is exemplified by Holmes’ literary forbear, Edgar Allan Poe’s detective, C. Auguste Dupin. ‘The Murders on the Rue Morgue’ are solved through allegedly deductive methodology, in very similar circumstances to that in *The Sign of Four*.²⁰⁷ Both stories feature classic locked-room murders, both solutions arise from the examination of the evidence and subsequent extrapolation from the details. In the *Murders*, orange hair at the crime-scene leads to an Orangutan being identified as the culprit; in *The Sign of Four*, the actual murderer is found, through the murder ‘weapon’ is the Andamanese accomplice of the main villain, Jonathan Small, and he is presented as similarly simian. However, another of Poe’s tales, ‘The Purloined Letter’, is a story based upon dualistic identification between detective and villain.²⁰⁸ Dupin foils the scheme of a high-society blackmailer, Minister D—, who, like Moriarty, is depicted as a mathematician and an abstract philosopher, (pp. 376-7) by a literal matching of wits and a virtual synchronisation of thinking processes.

The ‘Murders on the Rue Morgue’ were presented as a case solved through a method of ‘ratiocination’, a forbear to Holmes’ ‘science of deduction’. ‘The Purloined Letter’,

²⁰⁷ Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Murders on the Rue Morgue’, *The Selected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe*, reprint, ed. G. R. Thompson, (London and New York: W. W. Norton and co., 2004), pp. 239-266. Henceforth, *Selected Writings*.

²⁰⁸ Poe, ‘The Purloined Letter’, *Selected Writings*, pp. 367-382.

however, is one which foregrounds the battle of intellects. It is not enough to deduce the methods or circumstances of the crime; one must also estimate 'the intellect with which they are engaged'. There is logic to Dupin's solution, but it is derived by understanding the Minister's logic, rather than by approaching the problem objectively. Dupin presents his solution through the analogy of the game. 'even or odd', in which a player must guess if the number of marbles in someone else's hand amount to an even or odd number, can clearly not be solved through visual evidence alone. A boy, who is considered 'lucky' among his peers, is able to derive a solution through 'an identification of the reasoner's intellect with that of his opponent.' (p.375)

Logically, the situation is impossible. Much like the science fiction stories we examined in the previous chapter; the boy's method only works because he understands the logic of the text rather than any innate external logic. The boy's 'method' is actually just method acting. He uses simulation of the external in order to attempt to perceive the internal. Where the internal world is normally restricted to an external observer, the boy simulates the external factors of his opponent's interface with the external world, in order to align his own inner world with that of his opponent. It corresponds to the similar pseudoscientific principle of external reflecting internal that has Moriarty's criminality be apparent in his predatory, reptilian demeanour.

Dualistic identification has its own meaning in a psychoanalytical context. It involves taking on an aspect or property of another, and making it one's own, transforming oneself so as to become more like the objectified other. As Freud notes of the psychological concept of identification, there is more to it than recognition and imitation. He notes that 'identification is not simple imitation but the *assimilation* on the basis of a similar aetiological pretension; it expresses a resemblance and is derived from a common element which remains in the

unconscious.’²⁰⁹ As Laplanche and Pontalis say on this point, ‘that common element is phantasy: the agoraphobic identifies unconsciously as the ‘streetwalker’, and her symptom is a defence against this identification and the sexual wish that it presupposes.’²¹⁰ They thus demonstrate how Freud uses both senses of the term ‘identification’ interchangeably. The first, identification *of* something, delineates a second subject as object through a perceived characteristic – in this case, the objectified ‘streetwalker’. The second usage, more common to psychoanalysis and prevalent in the diagnosis here, is self-identification *with* that projected object.

Holmes’ demonstrates both forms of identification with Moriarty. He first identifies him *as* a criminal kingpin, and thus antithetical to himself in his role as detective. However, he also identifies *with* him as a genius relative to crime. Or, as he says of Moriarty, ‘my horror at his crimes was lost in my admiration at his skill’ (p. 217) Identification may run both ways, an identification ‘as’ something may be a projection, the identification ‘with’ something may be an assimilation of the projected characteristics.²¹¹ Holmes may be projecting his own symptoms of ‘genius’, in its Victorian guise, in an identification of – and thus with – his nemesis. Moriarty is a character who ostensibly only appears as a villain in two Sherlock Holmes Tales, the second of which is set before ‘The Final Problem’, and Watson never actually meets him. He has very

²⁰⁹ Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 174.

²¹⁰ Laplanche and Pontalis, p. 206, developing on an example from *Origins*, pp. 181-2.

²¹¹ Freud hints at the idea in *The Ego and the Id* (1923, *S.E.* vol. XIX), in which he formulates his final theory of the development of the superego as being formed as a transformation from object-cathexis to identifications. He does not specify that this is an act of projection, however, but it would influence Melanie Klein’s concept of ‘projective identification’, in which the subject aggressively projects hated aspects of the self onto another. See Melanie Klein, ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, issue 27, 1946, pp. 99-110.

little time in which to become an *arch*-enemy, so ‘The Final Problem’ has to pick up the slack by introducing him as a villain that Holmes is both afraid of, and holds in highest estimation.²¹² Thus, where Holmes *descends* into the underworld, Moriarty is *elevated* towards his own mirror-image.

The identification may go further still. As both characters allegedly meet at Reichenbach falls, it is worth considering that Moriarty may even *be* Holmes. As each side of the paradigm approaches the middle, it is conceivable that each may be an aspect of the same self. Moriarty’s existence is corroborated in the ‘Valley of Fear’ (1914) by an independent source, ruling out a canonical dual-identity.²¹³ This does render Watson’s answer of ‘never’ to Holmes question ‘you have probably never heard of Professor Moriarty?’ in ‘The Final Problem’ inconsistent. That inconsistency gives us a pluralism when reading the text itself: a reading in which the first may be considered the more authoritative text, one in which the second glosses over the inconsistencies of the first, and one in which both texts are rendered invalid through Watson’s unreliability.

In ‘The Final Problem’, the only physical description of Moriarty, that of the paradox of a simultaneously elegant and atavistic figure above, is given by Holmes himself, and only partially verified by Watson. Moriarty never appears directly in the story; Holmes’ “ah, there is Moriarty himself,” is met only with Watson’s observation of a ‘tall man pushing his way through the crowd.’ (p. 222) Likewise, the landlord of the *Englischer Hof* at Meiringen only observed a ‘tall Englishman who came in after you had gone’ upon Watson’s return, having

²¹² Compare the fear that he demonstrates in ‘The Final Problem’ (p. 215) to his affable dismissal of the immediate threat of the brutal Dr Grimesby Roylott in ‘The Speckled Band’, (pp. 161-2).

²¹³ Accessed via Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3289> on 20/10/19

been duped into returning to the hostel on the pretence of administering to an English lady ‘in the last few stages of consumption’. (p. 226) Watson does not witness either the ‘death’ of his friend or that of the ‘Napoleon of crime’, and the only evidence that two people made the final journey towards the Reichenbach falls is two sets of footprints on the path. (p. 227)

The suspenseful constant near-missing of the arch-villain sets up a divergent reading of the text. On the one hand, the text may be taken as read, the perspective in which Holmes is correct, and allowed to hold all of the cards. However, it is precisely because Holmes holds all of the cards, and reveals precious few to Watson, that the divergent reading may be entertained. With a bit of a leap, the thus-emblematic Moriarty may be read as a ‘Hyde’ to Holmes’s ‘Jekyll’. Moriarty may represent an alter-ego of Holmes, one which gratifies the basic, predatory instinct that Holmes’s life as a criminal-catcher does not. Holmes’ pursuer persona may have finally located the id-serving Moriarty persona within himself, and sought to end his criminal potential without sacrificing his legacy. This is speculative, and based on a series of logical assumptions. The text, however, does not necessarily provide us with the parameters to ensure that its own preferred logic, that of the hero sacrificing himself to stop the villain, is the logic that the reader will necessarily follow. The psychoanalyst’s symbolic reading, of Holmes as superego, Watson as ego, and Moriarty as id, is just as probable in a heavily allegorical tale.

In Holmes’ description of Moriarty’s confrontation of him, the coolness of the language contrasts with the danger of the situation. The Holmes of ‘The Speckled Band’ affably faces down the brutish show of strength of Dr Grimesby Roylott, who bends the fire-poker in order to intimidate the detective. Watson is understandably perturbed, but Holmes simply laughs and bends it back with relatively little effort. The Holmes of ‘The Final Problem’, however, keeps a hand firmly on the revolver in his gown-pocket during the surprise appearance of Professor Moriarty. Moriarty describes Holmes’ actions to thwart him in similar terms to the ‘game’ played by Dupin and D—:

“You crossed my path on the 4th of January,’ said he. “On the 23rd you incommoded me; by the middle of February I was seriously inconvenienced by you; at the end of March I was absolutely hampered in my plans; and now, at the close of April, I find myself placed in such a position through your continual persecution that I am in possible danger of losing my liberty. The situation is becoming an impossible one.” (Doyle, ‘The Final Problem’, *Selected Writings* p. 218)

Here the danger of the situation is downplayed through Moriarty’s euphemistic use of ‘incommoded’, ‘seriously inconvenienced’ and ‘absolutely hampered’. However, unlike Roylott, whose brash obviousness renders him unable to meet Holmes in the same register, and is thus never really a viable threat, Moriarty’s register means that he is placing himself on the same terms as Holmes. He attempts the same icy cordiality as Dupin ‘D--, at Vienna once, did me an evil turn. I told him, good humouredly, I should remember.’ Having begun the tale with a quote in Latin from Seneca, the languid figure of Dupin in his library is seemingly elevated through these allusions. Similarly, instead of simply removing the threat, Moriarty is playing the game. It is not enough for him to kill Holmes out of hand. He has to defeat him on terms they would both understand. Much the same thing might be said of Holmes, with his own aloofness and his references to Goethe in *The Sign of Four*. This demonstrates yet another duality within Holmes, in this case, an Oedipal one. On the one hand, in the very first Holmes story, we find the detective chiding his literary forebear:

...in my opinion, Dupin was an inferior fellow. That trick of his of breaking in on his friend’s thoughts with an apropos remark is really very showy and superficial... he was by no means such a phenomenon as Poe seemed to imagine. (‘A Study in Scarlet’, *TMS*, p. 30)

This Oedipal duality is addressed by Martin Priestman in his guide to the genre, *Crime Fiction*, describing Holmes's remark above as exemplifying the 'Oedipal predecessor-bashing which is one of the ritual pleasures of stories of detection'. However, Holmes is also built from the same material, 'he encapsulates some of the qualities of the series form itself within a fairly loose envelope of contradictory traits.'²¹⁴ The self-contradictory nature of Holmes' in-between stories, which leap around in no real chronological order, and are thus inconsistent in Watson's retellings, speaks to the medium of the genre, according to Priestman. As he states, 'This awareness of the dance between reproducibility and uniqueness is, arguably, what makes Sherlock Holmes tick, both as a series and as a character.' (pp. 14-15) In addition to his amanuensis and nemeses, Holmes also maintains a duality with himself, in a similar fashion, perhaps, to Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud. That duality evokes an absurd tension, as Priestman intimates, between the need to conform to genre and the need to distinguish oneself within it. We must identify it 'as' the genre through thematic tropes and consistencies, and 'with' the character through their idiosyncrasies.

The texts above, 'The Purloined Letter' and 'The Final Problem', are notable for altering the balance between pursuer and pursued. In 'The Purloined Letter', the pursuit of the Minister is something of an afterthought. G—, the Prefect, is the initial pursuer, but even though his methods are thorough, he is always destined to fall short. Dupin solves the crime before the explanation of how the crime is solved. Thus, although the tale is one establishing the genre, the paradigm of the hero pursuing the villain is already altered. It is for Dupin's own amanuensis, the unnamed narrator, to act in pursuit of Dupin's logic, through a session of

²¹⁴ Martin Priestman, *Crime Fiction: From Poe to the Present*, (Plymouth: Northcote House, 1998), p. 14.

questions and answers in which Dupin's logic of identification of, and with, the Minister's logic is revealed. This reading alters the balance of doubling between the pursuer and the pursued. In 'The Final Problem,' Holmes's 'pursuit' of Moriarty is given in details provided by Holmes at the beginning of the tale. Any 'crimes' are vague and circumstantial to the tale. The real plot is Moriarty's pursuit of Holmes across Europe, who evades him at every turn, leading him to his eventual –or probable – demise at Reichenbach Falls.

Moriarty may be said to be the real 'pursuer double' in this tale. However, a thought must be spared for John Watson. He is more in pursuit of Holmes than Moriarty is, as he is taken on a whirlwind adventure with little actual knowledge of what is going on. He never really sees Moriarty, and takes Holmes' word as read. He never sees Holmes's own 'demise'. He must play the role of Holmes in an investigation into what really happened, and much like the Prefect G—, he is always destined to fall short. Although Arthur Conan Doyle's works do not appear in Rogers' analysis of *The Double in Literature*, 'The Strange Case of Doctor Jekyll and Mr Hyde' does. Rogers draws attention to the role of the lawyer, Utterson, who uncovers the facts of the strange tale, as that of a 'pursuer double'. As Utterson jokes, 'If he shall be Mr Hyde, I shall be Mr Seek.'²¹⁵ Watson mirrors Utterson's position, as a 'pursuer double' attempting to make sense of a distorted narrative with several clues too few. He is never playing the same game as Holmes or Moriarty, much as Poe's unnamed narrator, on being confronted with the puzzle of 'The Murders on the Rue Morgue', may only exclaim:

²¹⁵ See Rogers, *The Double in Literature*, pp. 93-4.

‘I could merely agree with all Paris in considering [the murders] an insoluble mystery. I saw no means by which it was possible to trace the murderer.’ (Poe, ‘The Murders on the Rue Morgue’, *Tales and Sketches*, p. 251)

In ‘agreeing with all of Paris’, the narrator places himself in the role of the reader, the final duality in the detective genre.

5.2 ‘The Science of Deduction’

Another key area of dualistic relationship is that between the detective and an assistant who also serves as an amanuensis. Watson’s role as narrator sees him largely play the part of an everyman who is always in the wake of Holmes’ genius. He serves as a pivot to the story, and as he is brought to an understanding of the crime, so too is the reader. If readers solve the mystery before it is explained to the amanuensis, they have gained a victory over the everyman-figure, enabling them to claim parity with the tale’s detective-figure. They also, when they are typically baffled by the case themselves, serve to highlight the astonishing insights of the detective. Otherwise, the harsh statement “You see, but you do not observe”, as Holmes says to Watson in ‘A Scandal in Bohemia’, applies to them as well as to Watson (*Major Stories*, p. 34).

Watson’s passive credulity enhances Holmes’ active brilliance, by contrast. In that pivotal role, he is also a focal point for both defining the roles of the tale, and, as we previously noted, for elements of role-reversal. The amanuensis exists in a state of flux, and must forever be in the process of retrospectively becoming the detective, without ever achieving the prospective insight required to *be* the detective. While Holmes pursues the clues of the case or the villain, Watson pursues Holmes’ pursuit. He narrates a Holmes story from a position of hindsight, yet is narrative-bound to leave the revelation until – usually – around the end of the

tale.²¹⁶ In establishing the cognitive space of the text, in which each clue must be consistent with the solution to the crime, the character of the detective is established through techniques which generate a cognitive distance between the detective and the reader.

As Haughton states, in the essay ‘On Screen Memories’, Freud is also ‘play[ing] the role of Sherlock Homes in relation to the baffled client’. However, as Freud plays both roles, the dynamics at work also echo those between the detective and the amanuensis. As in section 2.1 above, these dynamics too largely revolve around dualistic identification. The amanuensis has us identify the character of the detective, but also identify *with* the detective through the delay and obfuscation of the details of the case according to narrative convention. Although the dialogic split between detective and client is still an apt analogy, the comparison may be taken much further.

The method by which the dialogue between the two ‘Freuds’ in the text interact with each other, and thus with the reader, reflects those acts of identification. ‘On Screen Memories’ is the text in which Freud’s split between his two ‘selves’ is at its most explicit. It is a text in which ‘Analyst-Freud’ and ‘Patient-Freud’ move from being detectable phenomena to definite constructs which interact with each other in the text. Freud’s ‘Analyst’ character narrates the text, and is thus the controlling ‘voice’ of the text and speaks from the perspective of the ‘Ideal-I’, the superego-symbolic detective. There is, therefore, not an immediately ‘tangible’ or prosopopoeic Watson figure. Analyst-Freud cannot be astonished by his own revelations. However, the text, through its narrative qualities, and the explication of its central theory in dialogue, has each of Freud’s ‘selves’ performing roles similar to those seen in the Holmes/Watson dynamic. The ‘Patient Freud’ figure is itself a screen, and something to be

²¹⁶ Not so in *The Sign of Four*, for example.

surpassed (by the reader) if true understanding is to be achieved. Before analysing how Freud creates this ‘screen’, we shall first examine how the ‘screen’ of Watson is established in a Holmes story.

In the first Holmes story, *A Study in Scarlet*, Holmes identifies Watson as a veteran of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) without any prior introduction. “You have been in Afghanistan, I perceive,” Holmes states assuredly to the credulous Watson, who can only reply with an astonished “How on earth did you know that?” Importantly Holmes delays the answer to this mystery: “never mind” he says, ‘chuckling to himself.’ (*Major Stories*, pp. 20-1) The reader is left to dwell on this for a number of pages, until the logic of Holmes’ deduction is revealed. (p. 29). In *The Sign of Four*, Doyle’s second Holmes story, Watson must re-establish the character of Holmes. Doyle achieves this by having Holmes display not one, but two demonstrations of skill, in effect, a magician’s technique, to settle the audience’s disbelief, in which Watson is used as a narrative tool.

The similar examples in *The Sign of Four*, in which Holmes reaches an astonishing conclusion before elaborating on his method to the astounded Watson, use a similar formula of observation plus delayed methodological solution. The second, more famous example, is the commonly-used ‘pocket watch’ deduction, in which Holmes surmises that Watson’s pocket watch originally belonged to Watson’s father, who passed it onto Watson’s brother, of whom Holmes could deduce that he was “a man of untidy habits – very untidy and careless...” (*The Sign of Four*, pp. 54-5). Watson’s brother’s habits, financial status and alcoholism are all demonstrated through reasoning based on the scratches on the watch on the following pages. (pp. 55-7) The first example, however, requires a little more of a leap on the part of the reader. Holmes differentiates his ‘science of deduction’ from simple observation, and then sets out to prove it by a worked example:

Watson: "...you spoke just now of observation and deduction. Surely the one to some extent implies the other."

Holmes: "Why hardly," he answered, leaning back luxuriously in his armchair and sending up thick blue wreaths from a pipe. "For example, observation shows me that you have been to the Wigmore Street Post-Office this morning, but deduction lets me know that when there you dispatched a telegram."

Watson: "Right!" said I. "Right on both points! But I confess that I don't see how you arrived at it. It was a sudden impulse upon my part, and I have mentioned it to no one."

Holmes: "It is simplicity itself," he remarked, chuckling at my surprise – "so absurdly simple that an explanation is superfluous; and yet it may serve to define the limits of observation and of deduction. Observation tells me that you have a little reddish mould adhering to your instep. Just opposite the Wigmore Street Office they have taken up the pavement and thrown up some earth, which lies in such a way that it is difficult to avoid treading in it in entering. The earth is of this peculiar reddish tint which is found, as far as I know, nowhere else in the neighbourhood. So much is observation. The rest is deduction."

Watson: "How then, did you deduce the telegram?"

Holmes: "Why, of course I knew that you had not written a letter, since I sat opposite you all morning. I also see in your open desk there that you have a sheet of stamps and a thick bundle of postcards. What could you go into the post-office for, then, but to send a wire? Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth."

(Doyle, *The Sign of Four*, pp. 53-54.)

Holmes suggests that these conversations and deductions are commonplace to him. His languid posture and off-the-cuff remarks such as "of course" and "it is simplicity itself" imply that he

is above such problems, and is using what he sees as a simplistic example to educate and impress, terms he appears to conflate. He thus ventures beyond simple observational analysis to an informed speculation, which is proved correct by Watson's immediate feedback mechanism, establishing that Holmes is correct at each point. Holmes is thus able to set the tone of the piece and verify himself as a character up to the challenge of deciphering the clues that fall before him. As with the example of Dupin's game analogy in 'The Purloined Letter', a mystery in miniature is presented and solved with ease in order to establish the detective's deductive credentials.

In setting the tone, Holmes manipulates preconception. As George Dove notes, 'In the special reading of detective fiction ... many of those preconceptions that accompany the act of reading are the result of our experience with a strongly formulaic genre.'²¹⁷ Dove's criticism echoes the theory of Berger and Luckmann: the contextualisation in genre could be considered a form of what they describe as 'legitimation', the way in which the object justifies its place in the 'institutional order'. Berger and Luckmann's analogy of socially-constructed knowledge takes the form of the relationship of the individual to an institutional hierarchy:

First, the totality of the institutional order should make sense, concurrently, to the participants in different institutional processes... Second, the totality of the individual's life... must be made subjectively meaningful. In other words, the

²¹⁷ George N. Dove, *The Reader and the Detective Story*, (Bowling Green (OH): BGSU Popular Press, 1997), p. 167.

individual biography, in its several, successive, institutionally predefined phases, must be endowed with a meaning that makes the whole subjectively plausible.²¹⁸

The subject is self-ratified by its relationship to the institution, just as each fact is ratified by its relationship to broader knowledge. In this case, the institution is that of detective fiction, a narrative of the quest for a solution to mystery. The solution is justified by its relation to the details in the text which precede it, the clues which represent the formula of the genre. According to Dove, the preceding relationship extends beyond the single text, as the genre has become so pervasive as to represent an 'institutional order' in its own right. Holmes, too, must justify his own role within the context of the preconceptions of the genre. Representative of the relationship of the 'individual biography' to the 'institutional order', Holmes' actions must make 'the whole subjectively plausible', to both himself and to the reader, through the act of solving clues to the satisfaction of the genre. However, he must also differentiate his character and methodology from that of his predecessors and competitors, both within his textual universe, and in the competitive world of fiction.

When Holmes demonstrates his skill, he invites the reader into the business of forming and sustaining the relevant generic conventions and parameters. We thus identify Holmes *as* the detective, placing him within his defined role relative to genre. However, we also identify *with* him in our reading of the genre. The clues are there as much for us to attempt to solve as the detective. However, in order for this type of fictional detective to maintain the role, there has to be a cognitive distance between the detective and the reader. As Dove summarises it on establishing and maintaining expectations of genre in Detective Fiction:

²¹⁸ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, reprint, (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 110-111.

‘...We derive meaning from the signs on the pages, or impose meaning on them, in a complicated exchange to which Iser assigns the term rationalization, which is the result of our continuing effort to fill the gap of indeterminacy that exists between ourselves and the text; in short, meaning is born of our effort to catch up with the text.’ (Dove, p. 168)

Every fictional detective conforms to this generic model in a different way. Of ‘The Purloined Letter’, given that a lot of the action happens outside of the text, and is already known to Dupin as he recounts it, Lacan asks ‘[i]s this how we are kept in suspense?’ The text is ‘a prototype, and that since it receives its genre only from the first, it is a little too early for the author to play on a convention.’²¹⁹ However, Watson’s role as narrator places a handicap on the tale. Holmes’ deductions on Watson’s use of the post office represent a relatively stark example of the ‘gap’, as the reader is kept behind by Holmes’ prior knowledge.

Both Doyle and Freud are concerned with how to present this ‘gap of indeterminacy’, and they take great pains to ensure that the reader is always just one step behind until a certain point of revelation, and so is always in the position of searching the text for clues. Freud, however, is writing for one distinct genre (the psychoanalytic case study) while taking cues from another (detective fiction). He is able both to settle the reader into preconceptions and differentiate the deductions of his own presented self, Analyst-Freud, from the observations of his predecessors. For instance, one could consider the opening of ‘On Screen Memories’ as structurally similar to ‘The Science of Deduction’ in the way Freud sets up the register and tone of the piece to come:

²¹⁹ Jacques Lacan, ‘Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’’, *Ecrits*, reprint, trans. Bruce Fink, (London and New York, W. W. Norton and co., 2006), p. 11.

In connection with my psychoanalytic treatment (of hysteria, obsessional neurosis, etc.) I have often had to deal with the fragments of memories that have stayed with individual patients from their earliest childhood years. As I have indicated elsewhere, we must insist on the great pathogenic importance of impressions from this period of our lives. (Freud, 'On Screen Memories', p. 3)

Holmes' claim to authority is that he is 'the only unofficial consulting detective in the world' who 'examine[s] the case, as an expert, and pronounce[s] a specialist's opinion', (*The Sign of Four* pp. 50-51). By contrast, Freud, rather than beginning with the case study or argument he wishes to advance, fortifies his claims to authority on the findings of a sequence of cases. The two claims (Holmes' and Freud's) are similar, in that both 'pull rank', but Holmes asserts the uniqueness of his talent, whereas Freud sees himself as the founder of a method which can be taught and handed on to others. All the same, he 'legitimizes' his position, using a similar technique to that which Holmes uses on Watson. He begins with a short, general, worked example to entice the reader, which also distances him from his forbears:

[T]he Henris recount the story of a professor of philology, whose earliest memory, assigned to the age of three or four, was of a table set for a meal and with a bowl of ice on it. During that period the child's grandmother had died, and according to his parents her death had a shattering effect on him. Yet the professor of philology, as he now is, knows nothing of this death; all he can recall from that period is a bowl of ice. Another respondent reports, as his earliest childhood memory, an episode that took place during a walk, when he broke off a branch from a tree. He thinks he can still identify the spot where this happened. (Freud, 'On Screen Memories', p. 6)

The examples of the bowl of ice and the tree-branch are presented as examples of a ‘screen memory’, the theory in practice. Unlike Watson’s telegrams, they are clues that are not ‘solved’ until later in the text. Freud instead immediately juxtaposes them with a section on methodology, at which point we return to a familiar analogy that we examined in Chapter 2:

Since it was the *significant* components of the impression that made it objectionable, these must be absent from the memory that replaces it, and so it may well seem banal. We find it unintelligible because we would like to see the reason for its retention in its intrinsic content, when in fact it resides in the relation between this content and another, which has been suppressed. Echoing a popular phrase ... if a certain childhood experience asserts itself in the memory, this is not because it is golden, but because it is lain beside gold. (Ibid, p. 7)

The ‘bowl of ice’ and ‘tree-branch’ examples become structurally intrinsic to the argument, in that the reader, aware that they are examples of Freud’s premise, the screen memory, must determine *how* and *why* they may be considered as such. Instead, the reader is given to understand what screen memories are, namely the replacement of an emotionally-significant event with the recall of a banal contextual detail which ‘screens’ from the memory the painful event which happened during the developmental stage of the psyche. Freud, in leaving the reader to ponder at the ‘gold’ that the memory of the ice and branch has lain behind widens the gap of indeterminacy. Conversely, as Dove suggests, readers pour their intellects into that gap in order to achieve parity with the textual detective figure, as the opportunity arises for readerly introspection and exegesis.

Contrastingly, in the passage from *The Sign of Four* above, it is arguable that Watson has as much to do with setting the formula as has Holmes’ brilliance. Watson’s credulous outbursts do the work for the reader, as he voices our initial thoughts on encountering such a

mystery. Anyone wondering how Holmes performs the trick, regardless of deductive powers, should be asking how he deduced the telegram. We have to bear in mind that the reader is not in possession of all of the facts; at this point Holmes is blatantly cheating. His deduction from the presence of the stamps and postcards on the desk may only be made by prior knowledge and observation that the reader is not privy to until Holmes chooses to reveal it. The reader is tricked into attempting to solve the unsolvable. This is something of an echo of ‘The Purloined Letter’, in which, if the reader follows Dove’s logic of attempting to bridge the ‘gap of indeterminacy’, they too are tricked into attempting to solve an unsolvable case. The reasoning behind the game of ‘even or odd’ holds as much logical weight as Holmes’ reasoning of the telegram. The logic fits because it fits, the problem seems to have been constructed after the solution, which fits the in-text narrative of Watson, or Poe’s narrator, reconstructing the texts from memory.

Watson’s exclamations are themselves a form of cheating. His “Right on both points!” assuages any doubts, Holmes’ assertions are clearly correct, and his ‘science of deduction’ is therefore textually proven to be a valid methodology. To use the analogy of Holmes as a stage magician, Watson is strictly speaking Holmes’ ‘plant’, or ‘shill’ in this regard. Holmes ‘deduces’ that Watson must have been sending a telegram from the number of postcards and stamps present in Watson’s desk. Such items may have come from the post office, yet it is Holmes’ off-text experience of having observed Watson all morning, of the precise factors involved in his ‘observation’ as to Watson’s precise location and purpose, and the fact that Watson confirms all points which turns speculation into fact. This is not so much scientific method as internally-proven logic. Where Holmes claims to have made a *deduction*, supplying the characteristics of his observation after the fact, the reader had to make an *abduction* as to the facts, although they did not have enough data to make even the most tenuous of guesses in this instance. This example is given in the text entirely to prove that Holmes is astounding, that

his method works, and that there will be a ‘gap of indeterminacy’ between himself and the reader. It also, however, establishes Watson’s function as a verifier of that internal logic.

5.3 The Two Freuds as Holmes and Watson

To gain an appreciation of Freud’s own function as a bipartite literary construct in ‘On Screen Memories’, and the character of the detective as an important aspect of that construct, let us turn to Freud’s correspondence with Carl Jung. In a letter of 1909, Freud writes:

Fraulein Spielrein has admitted in her second letter that her business has to do with you... My reply was ever so wise and penetrating: I made it appear as though the most tenuous of clues had enabled me Sherlock Holmes-like to guess the situation (which of course was none too difficult after your communication) and suggested a more appropriate procedure...²²⁰

Although this is a tongue-in-cheek reference, Freud is clearly no stranger to the textual functionality of a Holmes tale. We have the clue, and the astounding revelation confirming the role of genius to the baffled onlooker. We also have the idea that, due to the preconceived notion of the tale, Holmes is ‘cheating’, or, at the very least, the narrative functions as verification of the deduction, rather than the other way around. Freud, here, admits to ‘cheating’, in that he was already in possession of the facts before making the astounding ‘deduction’. The relationship between deduction and verification in Freud’s work, as we have discussed previously (in section 1.2.2), would draw the ire of post-positivist critics, who would have seen this as an example of what is known in the field of logic as confirmation bias.

²²⁰ Freud, *The Freud Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire, trans. Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull, (London: Hogarth Press, 1974), p. 113.

Instead of couching our view of Freud in those terms, let us return to our examination of the mechanics of Freud's text as a detective story. The aspects of deduction, revelation and verification may only have been hinted at in Freud's 1909 letter, but they drive the text of 'On Screen Memories'. It is reasonable to be suspicious of a text in which the case-study is a monologue between Freud and a fabricated Freud persona, but we should examine how those mechanics interact with the aspects of Freud's texts that we have so far identified. There are various levels of honesty and artifice involved in 'laying oneself bare' in this way. Presenting oneself as an anonymous case study may also hide that honesty behind a 'screen'. In turn, this screen may be used to verify a theory that allows us to complete the picture of the dynamic between the self-constructions of 'Analyst-Freud' and 'Patient-Freud'.

The dialogic formula in 'On Screen Memories' creates a textual dynamic reminiscent of a Socratic dialogue. The solution to a problem is portrayed as the result of an interplay of argument between characters – in this case analyst and patient. The patient questions, the analyst guides. The personae are used to channel the writing of an analysis, to exemplify theory through demonstration. However, the demonstration also represents the situation of analysis, in which the facts are not always so clear. Verification and plausibility of the facts of the text reflect those of the analyst's observations in the analysis. The reader is drawn towards the conclusions of the text, but 'On Screen Memories' also maintains the detective story's 'gap of indeterminacy', the aspect which allows Freud to be both 'ever so wise and penetrating' (as Freud ironically says he is being in the 1909 letter), and, at the same time, provide a counter-current designed to thwart simplistic misconception of the act of diagnosis. Analyst-Freud certainly enjoys the narratological privilege of a Holmes or Dupin, in this instance, but the reader is never allowed to say the same.

Like the clues and solutions in a detective story, each part of the 'discussion' in 'On Screen Memories' verifies and legitimates the last, so 'Analyst-Freud' is placed on the same

pedestal of genius as Holmes. There is a degree of bafflement evident in the patient's side of the dialogue, as they work through the narrative in a similar way to how Holmes and Watson interact in a Holmes story. For instance, Freud's narrator reveals to the patient that the memory he describes – of the 'steeply sloping meadow' – is a fabrication, an example of a screen memory.²²¹ The analysis that follows takes the form of a series of questions and answers. Freud's narrator is usually speculating on a detail of the patient's narrative, following it up with a direct question. For example, when the analyst and patient discuss how elements of the screen memory interact with the patient's other memories of childhood and young adulthood, elements point towards his memories of struggling in his early career:

I would place the origin of the childhood scene we are discussing in this period of your life, when you were struggling for your daily bread – that is, if you can confirm that it was during these years that you made your first acquaintance with the alps?

'That's right. Climbing holidays were the only pleasure I allowed myself in those days. But I still don't quite understand you.' (Freud, 'On Screen Memories', *The Uncanny*, p. 14)

The 'That's right' is a more understated version of Watson's 'Right on both points!', and the following sentence ('But I still don't quite understand you.') is a confirmation of the premise established by Freud's narrator, that aspects of the screen memory were formulated in later adulthood. The question (about when the patient first became acquainted with the Alps), which strongly cues its expected answer, is framed like a Holmesian insight. It is a question of

²²¹ Freud, 'On Screen Memories', *The Uncanny*, pp. 10-11.

surprising specificity, which seems irrelevant, yet, as the questioner says and the respondent confirms, it is well reasoned and correct, just like Watson's confirmation that he has served in Afghanistan in *A Study in Scarlet*. The analyst puts the question in order to confirm his realisation that the patient's later memories have influenced his recall of the childhood scene, and the 'I still don't understand you' allows the narrator ample room to continue the trajectory of explanation. After more exposition, we arrive at another question and answer pair, this time one in which the narrator confirms the patient's own theorisation from the narrator's example:

'So it seems that I fused the two sets of fantasies about how my life might have been more comfortable; I took the 'yellow' and the 'country' bread from one, and the discarding of the flowers and the actual people from the other?'

Yes, you projected the two fantasies onto one another and turned them into a childhood memory. So the feature of the alpine flowers is, so to speak, the date-mark for its construction. I can assure you that such things are very often constructed unconsciously – almost like works of fiction. (p. 14)

The system of verification runs both ways in the dialogue, providing an assurance that the analytical situation is one constructed through an interplay between individuals. It is not enough for the analyst to provide a correct diagnosis, the patient must understand *why* it is a correct diagnosis, when it is re-applied to the narrative they initially provided through an examination of subsequently-revealed details. The narrator is as much invested in being proven correct as the patient. The narrator's confirmations of the patient's own analysis induct the patient into the logic of the analysis. That logic is itself metaphorical, in that it is framed by an 'overlap between situations', itself something of a metaphor for the overlap between Freud's personae, and the dualistic purpose of the piece both as an act of self-analysis and as an exemplary case study.

Noticeably, the narrator is never given the inverted commas of speech, which thus creates the effect of a character addressing an omniscient narrator. In each of the detective stories analysed above, the amanuensis describes himself interjecting material in the persona of any other character in the story, showing that the interplay between himself as narrator after the fact, and himself as character actively participating in the narrative. Freud does not delineate that boundary, nor is the boundary between the fictive and theoretical element of the piece easily definable. It is interesting that Freud tempts fate by comparing a case study to fiction in this essay, given the ‘overlap between situations’ which the study itself represents.

Through the function of self-verification, the double may be read as a split self. After all, as Carlo Ginzburg remarks ‘the Holmes-Watson pair, the sharp-eyed detective and the obtuse doctor, represents the splitting of a single character, one of the youthful Conan Doyle’s professors, famous for his diagnostic ability.’²²² Holmes is able to be more cold-blooded, ‘an automaton – a calculating machine’ (Doyle, *The Sign of Four*, p. 61) as described by the more human Watson, whose comparative humanity serves as a contrast to the Holmesian image of pure intellect. This relationship echoes Freud’s self-division into Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud. Analyst-Freud portrays the idealised image that Freud aspires to: calm, all-knowing, paternal. He is always one step ahead of the text. Patient-Freud, by contrast, is always one step behind. The text thus mediates the dialogue between the two, and by extension, Freud’s dialogue with the reader. In section 5.1, we saw Holmes and Moriarty as aspects of a single fragmented persona. Each aspect is also functionally symbolic. We must consider that, like Freud’s Analyst-and-Patient composite in ‘On Screen Memories’, Holmes and Watson are

²²² Carlo Ginzburg, ‘Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method’, trans. and ed. Anna Davin, *History Workshop*, 9 (Spring, 1980), 5-36, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4288283.pdf> accessed 1/10/19, p. 12.

fragmentations of the same character, each performing an antithetical role in the dialogic structure of the narrative.

Watson's astonishment at Holmes' deductions serves as catharsis – if the reader were not able to arrive at the solution, Watson represents a kindly reminder of their humanity. He is a doctor, a member of a professional class, to which the author also belonged, with no mean observational powers or experience. If *he* is perplexed, then it is fair for the reader to be perplexed too. However, he is also a stepping-stone, if one is to take the position of readers attempting to solve the case themselves rather than simply following a narrative.²²³ Ideally, the reader would either wish to become Holmes, or surpass him by arriving at the solution first. And to do so, they must understand and surpass the limitations of Watson. If Freud draws upon detective fiction, it is with this challenge in mind. As his worldview is not an immediately tangible one – as he is dealing with a 'memory' that is not really a memory – he resorts to a similar narrative device to Doyle's. Freud has no Watson to create the gap in which the reader must search. Thus, he must design his own narratological layers, fragment his persona in such a way as to force this delay, to allow his ideas to work in dialogue with himself as Holmes does with Watson. Hence, Freud introduces even his own double, his patient, like one of Holmes' clients:

This is a man of thirty-eight, with a university education, who has maintained an interest in psychological questions – though they are remote from his professional concerns – ever since I was able to relieve him of a minor phobia by means of psychoanalysis. Last year he drew my attention to his childhood memories, which had already played some part in his analysis. Having become acquainted with the

²²³ Dove states that 'the reader cannot be excluded from the definition of a tale of detection.' *The Reader and the Detective Story*, p. 1.

investigation conducted by V. and C. Henri, he gave me the following summary account of his own experience. (Freud, 'On Screen Memories', p. 9)

Freud's account is possibly less lavishly detailed than the introduction of a standard Holmesian client – this is a text still presented as a case study, where anonymity is the key to plausibility. Freud does not mention any of the client's physical characteristics, merely locating his patient within the narrative. Instead of simply being a patient, his defining characteristic is that he is already familiar with the Henris' survey. Given that autobiographical information is here presented in the form of a case study, without any hint of the analyst's personal involvement, we are to read this character as a real person.²²⁴ Thus, if anything, the lack of physical description already creates a 'gap of indeterminacy'. The lack of detail and relative speculation here both reinforces realism by presentation under the anonymity of a case study, but also serves as a distancing technique, between the reader and the immediate gratification of knowing the solution, as deliberate as Watson's. Freud here is not only his own patient, but his own amanuensis, and here he is acting in a more passive role, only revealing as much as he wants in order to entice the reader into theorisation.

It is thus relevant to compare how the description of Freud's patient has a similar function to that of the initial description of a client in a Holmes story. Mary Morstan, of *The Sign of Four*, may strike us as a particularly relevant example, given that her own narrative begins with childhood memories. Those memories link back to her physical description and to Watson's speculations. The presentation of her background reinforces and furnishes observations of her education ('sensitivity'), and the plainness of her dress: she is an unmarried orphan with no patron in London. Her position as a governess is self-reinforcing, being one of

²²⁴ 'Freud screens his own involvement'. Haughton, introduction to 'On Screen Memories', xviii.

the few positions such a character could take. It is implied that if Watson were Holmes, he would have been able to deduce this information before its revelation. But then, it would not be a revelation. To return to the argument that the *act* of illumination is as important as illumination itself in Freud's work (Section 4.4) here the *act* of revelation, and the character that performs it, are each as important as the other.

Thus, like every aspect of the clue/revelation binary in a detective story, revelation has multiple functions. Firstly, the introduction serves to build the implied authenticity of the narrative – Morstan's account of her own background is laced with external information pertinent to the case. The background to the Agra treasure, which is the main plot device of the narrative, is established through the preceding mysteries of Morstan's father's service in 'an Indian regiment'. Secondly, to challenge the reader and the protagonist to bridge the 'gap of indeterminacy', is to surpass Watson and so enter the territory of Holmes. If readers were able to discern Miss Morstan's station in life before it is made explicit, then they would be one step towards that parity. If not, the rules are established, and they are still very much in the game. Conversely, the Patient's narrative of his screen memory establishes the facts of the case in a deictic style, that is, by pointing to extra-textual facts, without actually providing specifically locatable evidence. When he reveals his 'case', which is the screen memory itself, it is described as 'almost a hallucination' (p. 11): 'I see a square, rather steeply sloping meadow, very green and lush; among the greenery there are lots of yellow flowers, clearly common dandelions. At the top end of the meadow is a farmhouse . . .' he begins (p.10). The description is deictic, in that it situates the dream relative to its dreamer.

We know that, in the dream, they are standing in a meadow, a child, with two other children, and at the top of the meadow is a farmhouse. However, the content of the dream is related to nothing else. In order to understand the dream, the analyst must understand its internal logic, and provide his own frame of reference through further detail provided by the

patient in the process of analysis. The use of the present tense, as in ‘I see a... meadow’, ‘we are picking the flowers’, ‘The little girl has the nicest bunch’, etc, offers an immediacy not available in Mary Morstan’s past-tense narrative. However, psychoanalysis, a post-cathartic method, must move beyond the re-experiencing of events. Morstan’s initial narrative, the presentation of the case, dwells in the past, her own ‘shift’, although it is never in the present tense in Watson’s account, and comes in the following chapter when she is forced to explore and confront the surreal situation she finds herself in instead of simply re-experiencing it.

In ‘On Screen Memories’, this experience is achieved in the progress of the dialogue between Patient and Analyst. The hallucinatory nature of the patient’s description of the scene, divorcing events from specific context, lays the groundwork for the analyst, and the reader, to take any information specifically presented as an invitation for analysis. The self-referential nature increases the potential for both circumspection and introspection. We already begin to analyse the yellow flowers and the black bread as we would the bowl of ice, which, if we remember, remains unsolved from the previous example. We touched on the expansion of Freud’s analysis into a series of questions and answers largely based on the two elements, the flowers and the black bread, in which the bread serves as a ‘date-stamp’ for the overlapping memory, while acting itself in a metaphorical capacity – ‘your daily bread’.

The flowers, meanwhile, emphasise the sexuality of the piece, confirmed through the patient’s introduction of a ‘marriage plot’, and his convictions about how much easier his life would have been at that time (the time of the analysis) had that marriage taken place. Thus, the objects are given their own spatial-temporal importance in the text, drawing the reader into the analysis of the specific features that Freud considers important to the establishment of the very concept of a screen memory. Freud provides us with the self-verified analysis in this instance, in which the bread and flowers may only be keystones for the retrieval of the actual psychical data. This is supported through the dialogic nature of the piece.

Keith Green's commentary on the underlying tension in our reading of the written word, that 'Language seems to be designed primarily for face-to-face interaction (that is, the canonical situation of utterance); and it is a specific capability of humans that they can mobilise discourse beyond this canonical situation and operate language free of contextual boundaries.'²²⁵ (Keith Green, 'Deixis and the Poetic Persona', p. 135). Thus, Green pragmatically reconciles the potentially contradictory concept of deixis and the play of the signifier in order to highlight the value of both in the construction of the 'poetic persona'. One might consider Freud's adopted personae very different from Green's example in terms of accountability. On the one hand, with his less positivistic and more creative, discursive style, Freud is very much the 'poetic persona'. On the other, Freud cannot perform through language play alone, and has to maintain a very different level of realism from Doyle's. However, that realism is created in ways similar to Doyle's technique, and the play with realism and deictic information holds similar narrative-building functions. Persona and narrative voice are key to the production of this realism, providing what could be described as non-contextual context.

5.4 Polarity, Recursion, and Control

In 'On Screen Memories', Freud divides himself, so neither 'voice' represents a complete subject, as each is reliant upon the other to 'complete' it. This is like the case of the Lacanian partial-object, that is, the entity Lacan termed the *Objét petit a*, and defined as 'a residue ... which through its simple presence, modifies, inclines, inflects the whole possible economy of

²²⁵ Keith Green, 'Deixis and the Poetic Persona', *The Language and Literature Reader*, pp. 127-136 (p. 135).

a libidinal relationship to the object, of any choice whatsoever which is qualified as objectal.’²²⁶

So too with Freud’s self-representation as a composite of two partial-subjects: it requires the constant awareness that *both* are to be read as incomplete objects. Analyst-Freud, as we have termed him, exists in the guise of the narrator, yet would be an incomplete subject and analyst without the complementing self-reflexivity of patient-Freud. This subjective relationship is also representative of the objective mechanics of the text – each ‘voice’ requires the other to function, and thereby advance the logic of the text. However, that logic is not derived solely from the reconciliation of the two positions as played-out in the text. Rather, each voice functions as a device to aid the understanding of readers, by placing them in the position of the analyst who must first come to understand the logic of the theoretical position by reading ‘with the grain’, and then apply that logic to the text by reading ‘against the grain’.

In the screen memories essay, the study by V. and C. Henri on which Freud builds his introduction of the concept of a screen memory grants Freud’s text a foundational analogy for use in coming to understand the concept he is introducing with the memories of the tree-branch and the bowl of ice. (p. 6) However, the patient character is tasked with returning to these examples later in the dialogue section of the text, and fails to comprehend their significance. (p. 18) However, as the dialogue plays out, it becomes increasingly apparent that the narrator is actually addressing readers, asking them to develop their understanding of the text beyond that which is evident in the limited, Watson-like figure of the patient.

One may regard this in a similar way to Gary Saul Morson’s work on foreshadowing and ‘backshadowing’ in fiction, in which the interpretive freedom of the ‘moment’ in the text

²²⁶ See Lacan, *Seminar XII: Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis 1964-5*, trans. Cormac Gallagher, 2011. Accessed via <http://esource.dbs.ie/handle/10788/161> on 11/08/19.

is restricted by the aspects of the text pointing towards a future event, and subsequently pointing backwards to those portents. In other words, an instance in the text is only recognised as a portent *after* the event it portends has taken place, whereupon the reader sees that instance as a shadow cast backwards by an event in the future. This is roughly what Morson means by textual ‘backshadowing’.²²⁷ Thus, Freud’s reader encounters the bowl of ice and the tree-branch memories initially as ‘blank’ details, realising only in retrospect that they are imagistic portents ‘screening’ (respectively) feelings about a death and feelings about masturbation.

In order to analyse the ‘dynamics’ of reading Freud in this way, three key concepts stand out as useful: polarity, recursion and control. The first, *polarity*, is a concept which we have touched upon in our discussion of Freud’s metaphors of energy and drive as the potential motor-forces within his texts. The function of a motor, forever oscillating between positive and negative forces, makes as powerful a metaphor for the reading of Freud’s texts as it does for the understanding of consciousness.²²⁸ In the classic detective story, the ‘positive’ aspects of the text are the deictic content, the aspects which allow us to situate the actions of the text. The binary between the clue and the solution is deictic, in that each clue ‘points’ towards a solution; the solution, conversely, allows us to locate and contextualise each clue relative to its causal position in the narrative of the solution. The ‘negatives’ are the absences, the ‘gap of indeterminacy’ between the detective and the reader. The clue points towards a solution, but that solution is not immediately accessible. Techniques such as the ‘red-herring’, and the points

²²⁷ Gary Saul Morson, *Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time*, (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1994).

²²⁸ See Section 3.6, and the discussion of the concept of an ‘oscillating consciousness’ as a diagnosis for multiple personality disorder as representative of the conceptual metaphor of mind-as-machine, but also representing the limitations of that conception.

at which the narrator deliberately withholds information for the benefit of the story, serve to create this negative space.

The motor-force of the text is thus to oscillate between the aspects where the text provides deictic information and the aspects where it has us attempt to bridge the logical gap ourselves, only to correct us at each turn with new information. Thus, the motor ‘turns’, and the text is ‘driven’. ‘On Screen Memories’ operates using a similar dynamic, which is the polarity between Freud’s self-representative characters, as echoed by the polarity between the points at which the information is apparent, versus those where we are tasked with reading the text retrospectively in order to make use of that information.

The second useful term is *recursion*. Much like the concept of energy, the idea of ‘recursion’ subtly changes its meaning in its application across different fields. Loosely defined, recursion is *the act of invoking the entire procedure as a part of the procedure*. It may be best conceptualised in the form of the Russian matryoshka dolls, in which each doll opens to reveal another doll, each part a constituent whole representative of the next. However, in the field of computer science, recursion takes on a more specific meaning. In programming, recursion is where a solution to a larger problem is found by solving smaller instances of the same problem. A computer whose code supports a (top-down) recursive function will attempt to solve a problem by starting at the beginning, with the larger problem, and searching the code for smaller and smaller instances of the problem. Having logged each solution, it will then attempt to return to the beginning to solve the larger problem.

Although we have already warned against the misapplication of the ‘mind-as-machine’ metaphor (in Chapter 4), it is nonetheless interesting to consider the act of recursion in a mechanical device as a metaphor for what Freud sets out to achieve in ‘On Screen Memories’. Recursion in systems analysis has previously been applied to Freud’s theories; itself something of a recursive attempt to update and prove Freud’s theories with the conception of mind as

processing data.²²⁹ However, a description of the logic of Freud's written work as 'recursive' would be more at home among those who would deride Freud's logic as circular.²³⁰ Whether or not this is the case, recursion may be used to different, more constructive ends, in order to analyse the point where his two psychoanalytical 'selves' interact. Thus, we shall examine how the theory of 'On Screen Memories' is explicated not only through metaphorical shifts in polarity, but also recursively. We shall thus continue to prove that further examples of Freud's self-analysis are recursive, using the *Interpretation of Dreams*. This has several examples of Freud attempting to break down the same problem multiple times by dividing it into several-smaller sub-problems. Each sub-problem represents a smaller version of the larger problem he identifies within himself. Freud thus sets about developing his method to solve the larger problem through a recursive analysis of the sub-problems he identifies.

Finally, we arrive at the concept of *control*. The self-analytical function of 'On Screen Memories' may well betray its origins in the psychology of the creator. Psychoanalysis would not be so grand a narrative if this were not the case. However, in the essay, Freud makes the paradoxical decision to bare himself to his readership in covert fashion. Instead of witnessing the birth of many of Freud's key theories in his letters to Wilhelm Fliess, here we are supposed to be party to Freud's self-analysis as the major developmental arc of his theories. Analyst-

²²⁹ See P. W. Grobbelaar, *Freud and Systems Theory: an Exploratory Statement*, (Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1989), and the development of this position in Patrick Connolly and Vasi van Deventer, 'Hierarchical Recursive Organization and the Free Energy Principle: From Biological Self-Organization to the Psychoanalytic Mind', *Frontiers in Psychology*, 26/9/17. Accessed via <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01695/full> 24/7/19.

²³⁰ For example, Karl Popper, as cited previously.

Freud certainly holds the final say in 'On Screen Memories', both literally in that it is the narrator who makes the final statements of the essay, and figuratively, in that we are subject to the control of revision. In choosing to deploy a 'screen' of his own, Freud's narrative becomes only indirectly about himself. So, the development of the theory within the text is a 'screen' for the exposition of the already-developed theory. Much like a 'Blue Peter' analogy, in which the demonstration ends with the production of 'one I made earlier', we are not witnessing the reasoned birth of an idea through self-analysis, but a recapitulation of that process for purposes of exposition.

So, as we read, we have to infer from data that would not have been available to the discoverer at that point in the discovery process. That is what is meant by the term 'the gap of indeterminacy', to reiterate the formulation borrowed from Dove. In that regard, the text is deictically uncertain; and the authority of it thus convoluted. However, it is arguable that, while Freud exercises deliberate control over the text, it is the point at which he accedes it (that is, accepts its forward-pointing implications) which lends the required agency to the reader to finish 'reading' (which is following) and to start 'analysing' (which is leading), both the text at hand and the future patient. It is ultimately for *us* to determine how we are to be influenced by the polarity between Freud's direction and misdirection within the text as we move *beyond* it.

In this way, our reading of Freud may itself be considered recursive. We attempt to apply the concepts which we have developed throughout the previous chapters of this thesis to one smaller instance of Freud's work, which best exemplifies those characteristics, in order to make a more general statement about Freud as a whole. Such a method constitutes 'bottom-up' dynamic recursion, in which the solution to the problem is found by reversing the flow detailed in the 'top-down' model above, and solving a smaller instance of the problem before applying it to larger and larger instances. If the previous positions of recursion, polarity and control hold

true for 'On Screen Memories', then we are surely reading the text as 'intended', learning to analyse as we recursively re-apply the formula we develop from the text to greater and greater instances of the same problem. At each point Freud gives us less and less information to work with, until we are faced with a final speculation, a leap in logic which we must bridge for ourselves.

Take, for instance, the part of the dialogue in which the patient suggests that the screen memory of the hillside with the dandelions and the black bread, if it is not 'real', may have never existed at all:

'I realise that by producing a fantasy like this I have, as it were, achieved the fulfilment of the two suppressed desires – to deflower the girl and secure material comfort. But now that I can fully account to myself for the motives that led to the emergence of the dandelion fantasy, I have to assume that I'm dealing here with something that never happened at all, but has been illegitimately smuggled in amidst my childhood memories.' ('On Screen Memories', *The Uncanny*, p. 17)

The character makes a reasonable assumption, given the circumstances. The narrator has unpicked the screen memory to the drives involved, which stem from sexuality and economic stability in the patient's subsequent memories. For example, the first subsequent memory, 'I was seventeen, and in the family I was staying with was a fifteen year old daughter, whom I at once fell in love with', (p. 12), is conflated with a second memory of a 'marriage plot' to the cousin, (pp. 12-13), which would ease the burden of the father's 'lost fortune', (p. 12), and the patient's early career struggles – 'when the hardships of life closed in on me' (p. 14). The narrator unpicks these down to the desires mentioned by the patient above, i.e. to 'deflower the girl'. He points towards the patient's enduring memory of the host-daughter as indicating 'how long I went on being affected by the colour of the dress'. The narrator's response is 'Don't you

suspect a connection between the yellow of the girl's dress and the excessively bright yellow of the flowers?' Of the 'secure material comfort', the black bread of the screen memory is remapped onto the second formative memory through the narrator's observation that the patient was 'struggling for [his] daily bread'. (p. 14)

It is interesting that, in the discussion of these examples, it is the patient who takes the lead, and makes the connection between the yellow flowers and 'to deflower' the girl, rather than the narrator. (p.15) The narrator has made the connection between the dandelions and the host-daughter, assuming the cousin to be a 'screen' relative to the second memory, i.e. the one representing economic security, the 'daily bread', and thus the black bread of the screen memory. It is, however, the patient who exclaims, after the narrator casts some doubt on the analysis, that 'the representation of love is the main thing about it. At last I understand. Just think: to take away a girl's flower – that means to deflower her' (p.15). The narrator encourages these assertions, answering the patient's more detailed questions on the nature of the unconscious.

The patient's query 'the fantasy that's transformed itself into these childhood memories wouldn't be a conscious one that I can remember, would it, but an unconscious one?' is responded to positively. However, it receives a significant correction. 'Unconscious ones that continue as conscious ones', the narrator replies, with an explanation as to how the conscious thought of 'If I'd married this girl or that girl' translates to the unconscious 'urge to picture what being married would be like.' (p. 15) Having been proven correct, the patient doubles his excited acquiescence: 'I can go on from there myself' he states, confident in having grasped the analysis. The latent sexuality of the screen memory, according to the patient, must therefore, hinge on 'the idea of the wedding night', the potential 'defloration'. However, each party has had to reconcile that this desire is screened in a childhood memory. Once again, the patient leads with the suspiciously Freudian explanation of repression:

‘But this idea doesn’t venture into the open; the prevailing mood of modesty and respect for girls keeps it suppressed. So it remains unconscious...’

And escapes into a childhood memory. You’re right: the coarsely sensual element in the fantasy is the reason why it doesn’t develop into a conscious fantasy, but has to be satisfied with being taken into a childhood scene, as an allusion dressed up in a *flowery* disguise. (p. 16)

The narrator’s reply continues the momentum through literally continuing the patient’s sentence. Once more, the narrator concurs, drawing out and expanding upon the patient’s understanding of the concept of repression, and its influence as a force conflicting with the drive represented in the screen memory, which forms the screen itself, as the drive ‘has to be satisfied with being taken into the childhood scene’ in which any reference to sexuality is allegorical.

However, the narrator’s immediate response to the assumption ‘that I’m dealing here with something that never happened at all’ is rejection. The narrator rebukes his patient:

Now, I have to act as counsel for the defence and vindicate its genuineness. You’re going too far. You’ve heard me say that every suppressed fantasy of this kind has a tendency to escape into a childhood scene. Now, add to this the fact that it can’t do so unless a memory trace is present, whose content offers a point of contact with the fantasy, which meets it halfway, as it were. (p. 17)

‘And escapes into childhood memory’ is an incomplete sentence, only accessible with the previous sentence given by the patient, ‘[s]o it remains conscious...’ The ‘it’ in this instance itself references the process of repression the patient introduces, ‘this idea doesn’t venture into the open.’ Each self-reference complements and continues the momentum of the last. However, the short, sharp rebuke of ‘[y]ou’re going too far’ in the ‘counsel for the defence’ example is a

much stronger ‘change in motion’, in that it arrests and subsequently redirects it. The patient is no longer allowed to continue the momentum of their previous ‘I can go on from there myself’, as to do so would be incorrect. Freud instructs the patient to appreciate the nuance of the situation, rather than draw what is a reasonable conclusion. This arrest in motion has its roots in the slight correction made by the narrator when he answers that the memory is not purely unconscious, as the patient has taken that on board when formulating the content of his conclusion – i.e. how the childhood image may still contain latent sexuality – but has not re-applied it to the larger problem of how the screen memory is actually created.

The patient thus demonstrates a failed attempt at bottom-up recursion: the narrator helps him to solve the smaller problem, but they fail to apply the same logic to the larger instance of the same problem. This logic is itself polarised, as we direct it one way (‘bottom-up’) and then the other (‘top-down’) in order to glean a greater understanding of the actual solution. An analogy may be found in both the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ recursion of certain detective stories: for example, how the solution to ‘The Purloined Letter’ rests in Dupin’s recursive analogy of the child’s game of even-or-odd, and also in how that game must be proven relevant by the subsequent solution.

The failure of the patient provides the inverse of the deictic polarity of the argument leading up to it. Deixis allows us to spatialise, and thus conceptualise, non-spatial elements, i.e. the description of a thing or place which may or may not exist. The agreement of the narrator is a powerful confirmation of deictic content, in which the speculation of the patient is granted a ‘reality’ by the authoritative voice of the text, allowing the confirmed information to continue to add to previous and subsequent ‘confirmations’ to form the conceptual basis of the patient’s worldview. Its reverse, however, acts counter-deictically. The narrator destabilises the patient’s premature world-building through a negative modification of the incorrect concept he uses to build it. The narrator’s ‘you’re going too far’ thus indicates a deictic polarity shift,

in which we leave positive space for negative space, requiring subsequent information to re-establish our connection to the information presented.

The introduction of negative space penetrates the ‘screen’ of the text – the unreal dialogue between two aspects of the same writer – in order to present the reader with the real target of ‘[y]ou’re going too far’: this real target is, of course, themselves. In order to be a psychoanalyst, the reader must succeed where the patient fails. They must navigate through the shifts in polarity – the excited ‘charge’ as the patient connects each detail, which must be repressed via a genuine understanding of the situation over premature formulation before a correct diagnosis may be ‘discharged’. These ‘shifts’ thus represent stumbling blocks for the psychoanalyst – the excitement of the ‘Ideal analyst’, or Analyst-Freud as we have termed Freud’s own self-characterisation, must meet the honest self-appreciation of the figure represented by Patient-Freud.

Having the Patient-Freud representative perform the line of dialogue in which a premature formulation is made is an interesting polarity shift in itself – Analyst-Freud still intends to screen his own imperfection, and so reverses the logic of premature formulation onto the patient. This represented part of himself still clings to his omniscience as narrator, much as Holmes does in his ability to solve crimes through his asserted ‘science of deduction’, which in fact is mostly a science of observation. The ‘motor’ has turned once more; instead of putting ourselves within the perspective of the patient, searching for the solution, we must also, and instead, take the perspective of the analyst. This is represented in the text by the narrator, where we are urged to be careful not only of our own conclusions, but also of those that we guide our patient to make.

Considering ‘On Screen Memories’ as a deictic space; it is important to understand that the deictic space is crafted as much by expectation as information. Negative space is usually an invitation or challenge expectations. As Paul Werth explains:

Unlike positive sentences, negatives always operate in contrast to an expected state of affairs: expected in that it is normal or routine, or thought to be so. So, if you say ‘John wasn’t at Mary’s party’, this is in contrast to the previous idea or hope that John might have been at the party. If you say ‘An aeroplane flew overhead’, this is simply an observation; but if you say ‘No aeroplane flew overhead’, this means you somehow expected one to. (Werth, ‘World Enough and Time’, p. 161)

Werth notes that, without the context of expectation, the statement ‘No aeroplane flew overhead’ makes no sense. It may only reference a ‘world’ in which the positive is the expected state. Werth’s argument is thus, that deictic space may still be created by deliberate absences, as long as the statement, discourse, text, etc., points towards those absences. Instead of having the reader construct a ‘world’ by inferential or referential data, the ‘world’ here is constructed by inference from absence of data. The reader is thus asked to comprehend the text world through an invitation to infer. The opening lines of the Choral introduction of *Dr Faustus* are a good example of the use of expectation and denial in negative space. Each of the opening couplets contain a ‘not’ or a ‘nor’, which sets the tone of the piece by *not* setting the scene. Thus, the audience is presented with a deictic challenge:

NOT marching now in fields of Trasimene,
Where Mars did mate the Carthaginians;
Nor sporting in the dalliance of love,

In courts of kings where state is overturned'd;

Nor in the pomp of proud audacious deeds...²³¹

Without contextual information, the audience must attempt to infer just why it is 'not', and just what the play will be as a result. Marlowe teased his audience with images of epic tragedy, but prefixed those images with 'not'. Thus, the tone is set for an uncertain, introspective play rather than an epic tragedy. The main thesis of the piece, that power is fleeting, and that Dr Faustus may only overcome the limitations of man for a brief time before being dragged down to hell, is thus exemplified by the teasing denial of the Chorus.

In a similar manner, Freud's maintenance of the 'gap of indeterminacy' leads the reader on through the development of both positive and negative space in the text. His references the Henris' survey, which detailed memories that conformed to the 'expectation' that 'certain impressions would be selected as worth remembering – namely those which produced a powerful affective impact, or were seen to be significant by virtue of their consequences.' (p. 5). Freud notes of these childhood memories that there is also an expectation of childhood pre-occupation – a child who had undergone trauma may instead only recall 'various accidents that befell her dolls'. Yet, the screen memory represents something 'grossly at odds with this expectation', and it is that disconnect that forms the basis for further exploration for the displaced psychical affect of the screened event. In order to understand the patient fully, the analyst must gain details from them that they could not, in the first instance, provide. In the essay 'On Screen Memories', the reader must figuratively perform the same process, through the act of bridging the gap and surpassing the patient's understanding of the process.

²³¹ Christopher Marlowe, 'Doctor Faustus: B Text', *Doctor Faustus and Other Plays*, reprint, (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 1998), p. 187.

That gap, formed by Freud's split-self, is surmounted by his asking the reader to surpass one of those selves. When the narrator, outside the bounds of dialogue as demarcated by direct speech, says '[y]ou're going too far', the addressee, as we have argued, is not only the patient, but the reader too. The flow of the argument, up to that point, has carried the reader along. 'You're going too far' halts their own perceived understanding of the text as much as the patient's. Any formulation as to what the concept entails, and how to diagnose and process it with the patient, is thus curtailed. The reader is made not only to look forwards, to discover a potential explanation through subsequent revelation, but also backwards, as they also reconsider each clue in light of the denial ('NOT marching...' etc). As negative space evokes the expectation of positive space, so the reader must attempt to fill that negative through a re-evaluation of the positive information presented.

Thus, Freud's narrative donates to the reader's frame knowledge, but also tests it, and forces the reader to attempt to read more deeply using the techniques that the text proposes. Case-in-point: the examples of the bowl of ice and the tree-branch. Following the analysis of the patient's own screen memory, Freud asks the patient:

Do you want to amuse yourself by trying to see whether the two examples in the Henris' report can be interpreted as screen memories for later experiences and desires? ... He reflected for a while and said, 'I can't make anything of the first one. It's very probable that a displacement is involved, but there's no way of guessing what the intermediate elements are. (p. 18)

To say that there is 'no way of guessing intermediate elements' is almost reverse psychology. There are strong elements planted within the text that very much point the reader towards an analysis. The constant references to flowers throughout the patient's narrative, but the lack of them in a funeral scene, implants a very definite suggestion of there being an intermediate

element. If anything, the discussion, suggestive content and the worked example of the Patient's narrative have been building up to and supplementing these worked examples, rather than the other way around. Instead of providing the solution without supplementing the information, as in the example of Watson's telegram in *The Sign of Four*, Freud hands the reader the clues without the solution. The reader should, in theory, begin to question the metaphorical significance of the ice as they did the flowers. Instead of the warm, vivid image which Freud links with sexuality, we have its antithesis, a cold, deathly image. In juxtaposing the two and not providing the solution for the problem, the focus is shifted.

Unlike in a Holmes story, the importance of the narrative is not centred on the worked example and Freud's masterful deductions. The emphasis is on the readers' role within the text, and their capacity to theorise and deduce, rather than a tacit assumption that the reader would naturally attempt to play the same game as the detective. They are invited to close the gap of indeterminacy, but without a definitive solution, parity is not instantly achievable by reaching the end of the work. In solving neither the problem of the bowl of ice, nor that of the tree branch, Freud has effectively set homework for us. The text is able to exemplify narrative, but also extend beyond narrative as a means not only to create a 'world', but also to create deliberate negative spaces within that world in order to have the reader play the game the text creates. In addition to this positive-negative polarity, Freud's self-fragmentation attempts to demonstrate the unconscious conditions of the neuroses in question, using a highly conscious blend of rhetorical and narrative technique in order to elicit a conscious response from the reader.

However, these conditions are *controlled*. The patient in this narrative is not entirely indicative of the role of the patient in the process of analysis, but was intended as a sacrifice to provoke a greater understanding, not only of the concept, but also of the permutations by which the concept may be misinterpreted. Where the patient's analysis is dismissed, the reader must

succeed, and continue to succeed beyond the linear limitations of the argument of a text. They must track back through the clues to discover where the patient's analysis succeeds and fails. There is the possibility that Freud's own analysis is itself a 'red-herring'. Thus, Freud ensures a subsequent re-reading and reinterpretation of his own narrative, examining the clues in a similar light to which they were formulated. One begins Freud's narrative as a learner, in the position of the patient, and should supposedly leave it a colleague, in the chair of the analyst.

Having hinted above that this logic is recursive, we must now step back from the obvious undercutting of logic to focus on how that omniscience is representative of our system-based definition of the concept. Whether top-down or bottom up, the system capable of recursive problem-solving has access to all of the information to hand, but must still solve problems in a linear manner: the solution to each problem must be based on the solution to a previous problem in the recursive chain – whether 'larger' or 'smaller'. The logical processes, as each sub-problem 'nests' into the larger problem, reflect that, as each aspect of the information must be identified so that the system may present the most optimal course of action to solve the problem. One could consider the method a vague attempt to conceptualise the optimal form of problem-solving that Richard E. Bellman worked on in the 1950s. The Bellman equation is used in dynamic programming to ascribe a 'value' to a decision-based problem at a certain point in time in terms of the payoff from some initial choices and the 'value' of the remaining decision-problems based on the results from those initial choices.

In 'On Screen Memories', as we are encountering an analysis between a figure in the role of analyst versus a figure in the position of the analysand, we could be forgiven for forgetting the predetermined nature of the text. 'On Screen Memories', deploys a value-based logic when problem solving through the dialogic section of the text – through the positive responses when the patient gets it right, to the negatives when they get it wrong. But the values are predetermined – Freud already knows the solution before building to the problem. Thus, as

with the example of fore- and back- shadowing, and the binary between clue and solution, the text is 'bound' through the relationship between these details prior to the encounter. The encounter within the text is thus logically a controlled one.

5.5 Analysis of three examples from *The Interpretation of Dreams*

In the previous section, three useful areas of focus in the discussion of 'On Screen Memories' and the detective story were identified: polarity, recursion and control. Each of those three terms, to a greater or lesser extent, characterise aspects which also appear *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The work may not be as easily related to the detective genre as 'On Screen Memories' is, but we may nonetheless develop the characteristics that we observed in that comparison. Thus, we must determine how applicable the concepts of polarity, recursion and control are to an analysis of works of Freud other than 'On Screen Memories'. In order to do this, we shall take three examples of dream analysis from *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and assess how applicable the concepts are to them. Through the course of these analyses, we shall continue to pursue the dialogic theme of the thesis, by attempting to understand how these themes allow us to characterise which 'Freud' is present in these instances. Thus, we may finally determine what the interaction is between these concepts, and how much each 'Freud', achieves.

Dream 1: The 'Clever Woman Patient'

In the previous chapter, we were easily able to determine how applicable polarity, recursion and control were through the dialogue of 'On Screen Memories'. However, dialogue is no longer as dominant a characteristic in the stylistic approach Freud takes to the case studies of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Yet, some of the more obvious dialogic polarity of the later essay remains; the work does contain *some* direct speech, and makes use of it to similar stylistic

effect. One such example is the dream of an unsuccessful attempt at holding a supper party by a ‘clever woman patient’ of Freud’s.²³² The polarisation of positive and negative in the study is introduced at the end of Freud’s preceding paragraph, when he describes how patients ‘invariably contradict [his] assertion that all dreams are fulfilments of wishes.’ His subsequent examples are thus based on overriding a contradiction, ‘[h]ere, then, are some instances from the material of dreams that have been brought up against me as evidence to the contrary.’

The next paragraph begins with the direct speech of the ‘clever woman patient’: ‘[y]ou’re always saying to me... that a dream is a fulfilment of a wish. Well, I’ll tell you a dream whose subject was the exact opposite – a dream in which one of my wishes was *not* fulfilled. How do you fit that in with your theory?’ (*TIoD* p. 171) The ‘positive’ in this polarised pairing is that which satisfies the expectation that the premise will be fulfilled, i.e. that any dream example conforms with the ‘assertion that all dreams are fulfilments of wishes’. The negative is simply that they do not, that an example that the patient may find denies that expectation and thus breaks the premise. The premise is thus proven not through positive detail, but ‘tested’ through the interaction between positive and negative. This is evident in how the patient repeats Freud’s central premise of the work before appearing to refute it with a contradictory example.

The dreamer plans a dinner party, but has ‘nothing in the house but a little smoked salmon’, and cannot gather any required materials because of a sudden realisation that the setting in the dream is a Sunday afternoon, and that the telephone ‘was out of order’, thus preventing any catering. Thus, the planned supper-party is abandoned.²³³ The dream is based

²³² *The Interpretation of Dreams*, ... pp. 171-175

²³³ The example of the supper party dream (*TIoD* pp. 171-173) is part of the larger chapter detailing ‘Distortion in Dreams’. Thus, the section hinges on Freud’s having the analysand

on negative space, as any expectations – that the supper party would take place, that the shops would be open, that the telephone would work – are denied to the dreamer. The dreamer takes these negatives to mean that the expected state, the dinner party, is a wish that has not been fulfilled in the dream, thus refuting the premise. So, the patient creates a smaller pocket of that negative space identified in our ‘On Screen Memories’ analysis. The intra-textual analyst, and extra-textual reader is thus left to ponder the example, which is presented as a conundrum. They must determine if the patient is correct, or if the method that has been established throughout the text holds true. The analysis following the patient’s refutation thus demonstrates how the patient’s denial was, in fact, a premature and incorrect formulation in light of more detailed interrogation.

The introduction of the dream, its delivery, and subsequent analysis thus oscillate between expectation and denial. Freud responds to the patient’s contradiction, as the narrator, with ‘of course, that analysis was the only way of deciding on the meaning of the dream; though [he] admitted that at first sight it seemed sensible and coherent and looked like the reverse of wish fulfilment.’ He supplements this assertion with direct speech of his own ‘[b]ut what material did the dream arise from? As you know, the instigation to a dream is always to be found in the events of the previous day’ (p. 171). Freud places the central premise of the work in check; it ‘looked like the reverse of wish fulfilment.’ However, his intra-narrative authorial voice remains confident, thus demonstrating the characteristics representing what we have termed ‘Analyst-Freud’. The uncertainty of one aspect of his text is countered with the certainty

produce her own explanation, before determining it to be unconvincing. ‘Inadequate reasons... usually conceal unconfessed motives’ he explains, thus showing how one is able to diagnose ‘distortion’, points at which the dream-work sublimates its concealed desires through a modification of the narrative it appears to present.

of others: ‘analysis was the *only* way’, ‘the instigation to a dream is *always* to be found...’. (p. 171, my italics). The potential to overturn his theory is never really under threat; the dialogue is thus an attempt at mimesis within a diegetic text. The reader, constructed as an analyst, is presented with an example not of how the premise may be wrong, but the methodology of how to prove it right when faced with contradiction of the kind that Freud deemed ‘inevitable’. In order to do this, according to the logic of the example’s stylistics, one must first occupy the perspective of the patient, the first ‘voice’ of the passage. They must ‘test’ the premise, by considering its potential fallibility. Essentially, they must understand the premise from both the perspective that it is right, and that it might be wrong, following the interplay between the two positions to the problem’s solution. The answer Freud provides to the conundrum is analysis, the ‘only way’.

Through analysis, Freud derives the dream’s formative ‘wish’ through the teasing out of additional details from the patient. The negativity of the dream is due to a repressed wish based upon jealousy. As Freud continues:

[S]he went on to tell me that the day before she had visited a woman friend of whom she confessed she felt jealous because her (my patient’s) husband was constantly singing her praises. Fortunately this friend of hers is very skinny and thin, and her husband admires a plumper figure. (*TloD*, p. 172)

Thus, the inability to cater a supper party expresses the formative wish for the friend not to put on weight, and thus become more attractive to the husband. The distortion, which gave the dream its deniability, is due to the repression of that wish. In addition to the dream’s introduction, its explanation, too, hinges on a shift in perspective. The jealousy, and denial of the other becomes the denial of the self in the dream. Thus, Freud’s analysis hinges on the establishment of a further premise, that the patient ‘had ‘identified’ herself with her friend’,

(*TlD*, p. 173) leading to a further discussion on Freud's concept of hysterical identification (p. 174). Thus, the dream is proof-of-concept not only of its status as wish-fulfilment, but also of hysterical identification. The dialogue, narrative and theoretical proofs all form different narratological layers that the reader must move between in order to establish their relationship to the overall premise. Rather than establishing each of these details in turn, the text 'oscillates' between them.

Freud is able to use each potentially disproving detail to 'turn' the text, as the details of the dream which initially seem to disprove the premise are recruited to re-prove the premise. To return to the detective-story analogy; the details which complicate the case, the clues, are woven back into the narrative of the crime by the detective. Freud must similarly wrangle the problem of a dream which complicates his case back into a causal framework in which its details prove his conclusions. Thus, we move from polarity to recursion.

The example dream of the 'clever woman patient' is recursive, in that it is a subordinate problem solved with the logic of the larger problem in order to prove the solution, in a 'top-down' schema of the term. The problem of the nature of the dreaming and its link to the unconscious is solved through the construction that 'dreams are the fulfilments of wishes'. The chapter in which the dream of the 'clever woman patient' sits is one devoted to 'Distortion in Dreams', which problematises this notion, in that the 'wish' is not immediately obvious. To solve that problem, Freud uses examples such as the 'clever woman patient' not only as a means of demonstrating how 'distortion' functions, but also as a way of showing a subordinate problem to distortion: that is, how to prove that a dream really is an example of wish-fulfilment even when confronted with one so distorted as to seem to prove the opposite to that.

One may question whether each of these levels constitutes a 'problem', given that Freud is not actively solving them as they occur, but compiling summaries of his solutions in order to demonstrate his premise. Each example is always proven to be 'the fulfilment of a wish',

which is itself a recursive solution to the problem of the balance of desire and repression and the manifestations arising from these polarised sources of mental energy which appear to upset that balance. *The Interpretation of Dreams* provides a range of sample scenarios, each representative of difficulties faced by Freud, and thus potential difficulties ahead of the analyst-reader, which seem to test the limits of, but ultimately prove the central premise.

If we consider the analysis to have a ‘direction’, as well as a ‘polarity’, then, in introducing another concept into an example, it is arguable that Freud also reverses the direction of the recursion in that example. He introduces the idea of ‘identification’ into a passage which already forms a subordinate problem to that of the ‘clever woman patient’, i.e. why in her dream denies herself, rather than her friend and unconscious competitor. The dynamic becomes more interconnected in this way, as the passage is a demonstration of multiple premises, which occur at different points during the analysis of the dream. The introduction of ‘Identification’, as it is used as a term for another of Freud’s concepts, has the reader return to a ‘problem’ level higher than the example it is being used to solve, on the same level as the ‘distortion’ that the dream is a demonstration of. Thus, ‘identification’ helps solve the problem of the ‘clever woman patient’, which in turn provides a worked example for the study of ‘identification’.

It is arguable that the redirection of the schema of recursion in this instance demonstrates a greater need to control the text, by having each premise reflect multiple solutions, and vice versa. Through its very structure, Freud’s text demonstrates a need to tightly control the exposition of its premise. After all, before beginning with the patient’s dream, he did state that patients ‘invariably contradict [his] assertion that all dreams are fulfilments of wishes.’ The example of the patient’s dream begins not with the dream itself, but by voicing this contradiction, which we are given to believe is routine dialogue. Freud never allows us to give much credence to the doubt that the dream does not, in fact, betray a ‘wish’. We are instead

left to ponder the problem, as he guides us through the solution in the ‘analysis’ section of the example. The analysis is thus there to solve *our* problems with the text as much as it does the problem that it introduces. It is thus a form of guided dialogue with the reader, as we pursue the text.

Although the ‘clever woman patient’ is allowed to ‘speak’ in the text, she is largely performing a similar narrative function to the patient of ‘On Screen Memories’, thus occupying a similar ‘Watsonian’ function. The work exhibits some measure of control over the dialogue in this example: the patient’s narrative is co-opted into the exposition of the solution. Freud demonstrates the need to gain insight from the patient by having his solutions, Sherlock Holmes-like, tested and proven by the revelation of subsequent detail from the patient. The unconscious jealousy and self-denial revealed by the patient were not, in and of themselves, detectable in the dream provided. Further information is required, and the analyst has to know how to access it, and determine its relevance to seemingly irrelevant detail which forms the distortion of the screen memory or dream-work. Thus, Freud demonstrates a measure of control over the text as a mechanism to guide the analyst to his satisfaction, navigating them through a potential pitfall to their own analysis of a dream as wish fulfilment by providing them with the logic to corroborate it upon the patient’s ‘inevitable’ questioning of it.

The ‘clever woman patient’ may well be a ‘Moriarty’, as much a projection of Freud’s self as a character in her own right, different again from the real person who Freud would have treated medically. However, *The Interpretation of Dreams* is a work in which Freud analyses dreams of his own. Unlike ‘On Screen Memories’, where Freud’s patient ‘self’ is screened, the ‘self’ in this work is explicitly so. Once more, he occupies each role in the analysis, dualising himself for the exposition of his work.

Dream 2: Freud's Father and the Magyars

Freud's analysis of his own dreams would seem to bring the divide between Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud to the fore as the two personae interact. On the one hand, he divulges candid details about himself, in order for the reader to understand the level of honesty necessary to the practice. On the other, he exerts a control over his own narrative, as the explication of the diagnosis based on his theories subsumes the symptom itself. Many of the dreams analysed in *The Interpretation of Dreams* are Freud's own, several of which are repeated throughout the work. One such example is that in which Freud dreams of his late father, standing on a pair of chairs, addressing a crowd of Magyars. By the polarised logic of Freud's self-analysis, on the one hand, Freud candidly details a subject which betrays a number of emotions which Freud seems to rescue from repression with the analysis. On the other, Freud controls the analysis, as each detail of the dream connects not only to an emotion, but to Freud's theoretical framework of the text it appears in. The second example of 'Absurd Dreams', the dream of Freud's father and the Magyars follows another in which a son dreams of his father post-mortem. Thus, Freud begins:

Here is another, almost exactly similar, example of my own. (I lost my father in 1896). After his death my father played a political part among the Magyars and brought them together politically. Here I saw a small and indistinct picture: a crowd of men as though they were in the Reichstag; someone standing on one or two chairs, with other people round him. I remembered how like Garibaldi he had looked on his death-bed, and felt glad that the promise had come true. (TloD p. 436, Freud's italics)

The import of the dream not immediately obvious until paired with Freud's own contextualisation. 'It was dreamt at a time at which the Hungarians had been driven by

parliamentary *obstruction* into a state of lawlessness and were plunged into the crisis from which they were rescued by Koloman Széll.’ (p. 436, Freud’s italics) Freud’s contextualising term, obstruction, becomes an important detail for subsequent analysis. The ‘obstruction’ becomes a metaphor representative of his father’s illness; ‘[h]is most severe suffering had been caused by a complete paralysis (*obstruction*) of the intestines during his last weeks.’ (p. 437, Freud’s italics) There are other metaphors which are important to Freud’s dream analysis, but the text is carried by this, continuing to the metaphorical relationship of the ‘*Stühle*’, the chairs of the dream. Koloman Széll, contemporary Hungarian unifying political figure, leads to the Garibaldi association, as a unifier of the Italian state, within the dream, emphasised by the pushing together of the chairs. However, the *Stühle* in Freud’s example gain a different metaphorical connotation in light of the ‘obstruction’, as they remind him of a detail of a friend’s loss of their father. The ‘*Stuhl*’ in that sense is not a chair, but the stool that he had passed at the moment of his death. These two details become the focus of subsequent analysis by their ability to carry the text towards its conclusions.

The text appears thus methodologically akin to free-association, but one must also bear in mind the level of control present in the revelation of those associations. It must be remembered that the dream analysis is not necessarily Freud working through his symptom as he would in one of his letters to Fliess – although, we will examine it from the perspective of Patient-Freud further on in this chapter. For now, let us consider the ‘small and indistinct picture’ of Freud’s dream. Treating it as recursive, the analysis itself is a ‘small and indistinct picture’ relative to the whole, a problem to solve, to render distinct, and thus return to the broader picture. Freud’s dream in miniature, as though it were a woodcut, is a metaphor too for Freud’s process within the work:

The trivial detail of the scene in the dream appearing in pictures of such a small size was not without relevance to its interpretation. Our dream-thoughts are usually represented in visual pictures which appear to be more or less life-size. The picture which I saw in my dream, however, was a reproduction of a woodcut inserted in an illustrated history of Austria... Like Maria Theresa in the picture, so my father in the dream stood... (p. 436)

The feature of the dream, that it appeared almost as a miniature image, itself potentially trivialises the dream. Yet Freud has us pay attention to seemingly trivial detail, and so must we consider not only the miniaturised dream, but why the dream was miniaturised, rather than rendered as lifelike, 'more or less life-size'. The dream arriving in the form of 'a reproduction of a woodcut inserted into a history of Austria carries the connotations of studenthood, potentially even childhood. Freud's dream is thus given the association of an image for study, which is how it appears in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, a metaphorical image for analysis. For the purposes of our fractal-like recursive model, a whole image within an image makes for a striking visual metaphor, especially given that the problem of this dream is solved in a similar manner to that of the 'clever woman patient'.

However, Freud's dream of his father and the Magyars does not stand alone. His 'indistinct picture' becomes clearer only with a second example. The control element that the Analyst-Freud persona seems to exert on the text seems to appear in the transition between an area where Freud talks about himself, and where he switches the analysis to talk about someone else. His reaction to thoughts of his father suffering from his intestinal 'obstruction' is to state that '[d]isrespectful thoughts of all kinds followed from this.' (p. 437) However, those disrespectful thoughts are those of another person, and are thus displaced onto another's narrative. The disrespectful thought is that of a friend, whose own father died in the street, and

who had ‘passed a stool’ in death. However, that ‘disrespectful thought’, having the honesty that we associate with Patient-Freud, nonetheless also betrays the hallmark of Analyst-Freud, as it redirects the analysis. Instead of examining his own ‘disrespectful thought’, the thought is a springboard for the pursuit of a loftier goal, as Freud once again redirects analysis towards drawing every dream of the departed into an explicable framework.

Thus far, in this example, the ‘polarity’ between voices is not as obvious as in ‘On Screen Memories’ or in the example of the ‘clever woman patient’. Any negative space is harder to determine than in the previous examples, ostensibly due to the lack of disagreement of the text with itself. However, this passage transitions between the two perspectives: one where Freud confronts the dream of the loss of *his* father, and one in which loss is demonstrated objectively. Thus, the subsequent perspective becomes analogous to the first, and may be seen as a subordinate example that thus informs the first, as a solution is found for the second which satisfies the first. Thus, the factor of ‘control’ is demonstrated through both ‘polarity’ and ‘recursion’, in the manner in which the ‘clues’ are handled relative to the ‘solution’.

Additionally, the whole passage itself hinges on control. Each analysis revolves around controlling grief, or the guilt of the self for thoughts and actions in the context of grief, which are not controlled. The first dream analysis of the passage encounters this idea after the fact, with the ‘[d]isrespectful thoughts of all kinds’ arising during the analysis. This is evident in the fact that there is a further transition within the passage, where Freud continues from using a memory of a friend’s grief to inform his analysis, to providing the basis for understanding of his own dream, through the use of a patient’s. The second dream analysis clarifies Freud’s thinking on the first; how ‘absurd’ content in a dream of this nature reflects the disrespectful thought manifested and repressed in dream content. Freud describes this second dream thus:

For instance, a man who had nursed his father following his last illness and had been deeply grieved by his death, had the following senseless dream some time afterwards. *His father was alive once more and was talking to him in his usual way, but* (the remarkable thing was that) *he had really died, only he did not know it.* This dream only becomes intelligible if, after the words ‘but he had really died’ we insert ‘in consequence of the dreamer’s wish,’ and if we explain that ‘he did not know’ was that the dreamer had had his wish. (pp 438-9, Freud’s italics)

The polarity within Freud’s own dream is unclear; he uses a second example to highlight it. In this example, the patient summons and dismisses the ‘ghost’ of his father. The father becomes a form of Schrödinger’s cat, both alive and dead within the dream-work. He thus occupies a polarised existence within the patient’s mind. A simplistic interpretation of the ‘wish’, would be that the patient wished that his father was alive. However, according to Freud, that would not account for his dismissal. Freud interprets the reassertion of the reality that the father is dead onto the dream as a fulfilment of the wish that the father could be returned to the dreamer, but that wish is asserted as a form of control. The dream is thus more self-conscious than a simple wish for the return of a loved one.

Within that return lies its antithesis, which is the ability to *un*summon the ‘ghost’. Freud explains that the dream content, manifested in this way, was made available to the dreamer through a ‘stirring up of infantile thoughts against his father.’ However, ‘the fact that the instigator of the dream and the daytime thoughts were such worlds apart was precisely what necessitated the dream’s absurdity.’ Freud pursues the potentially ‘disrespectful’ thought thus further, to formulate and attempt to answer the new question posed, which is, why, instead of simply wishing his father back, does the supposedly wishful content of the dream effectively kill the patient’s father for a second time?

The 'wish' in this instance, is itself polarised. The reader must objectively reconcile how the patient cares for his father, but at the same time seems to wish him dead. Freud explains that, while the patient had cared for his terminally ill father, 'he had had what was actually a merciful thought that death might put an end to his sufferings.' However, the paradoxical nature of this thought left its mark upon the emotional health of the patient. He had to reconcile a desire to end his father's life, with wanting to keep the father well and in the patient's own life. As Freud elaborates, the source of this tension is the 'sympathetic wish [that] had become the subject of unconscious self-reproach, as though by means of it he had really helped to shorten the sick man's life.' (p. 439) Freud addresses the paradox as a 'strongly marked emotional ambivalence which dominates the dreamer's relation to the dead person.' The ambivalence thus represents a desire to occupy both polarised states at the same time. This itself an ambivalent sentence: the reader has to unpack a paradox. How can an 'ambivalence' be 'strongly marked'? Freud elaborates:

It eventually occurred to me that this alternation between life and death is intended to represent indifference on the part of the dreamer... This indifference is, of course, not real but merely desired; it is intended to help the dreamer repudiate his very intense and often contradictory emotional attitudes and thus it becomes a dream-representation of his ambivalence. (p. 439, Freud's italics)

Once again, we find an argument on how the 'wish' is formed between binaries: life and death, and desire and repression. The difference in this instance is that the desire is repressed, as it is a desire for the negative, for death rather than life. For the dreamer to return to the positive side of the equation, they must thus confront a negative thought which drives them. Where the 'motor' force in this instance is driven by this polarity, Freud explains that ultimately, the goal is a state of rest, represented by 'indifference'. Indifference, as the term is used here, is thus

the desired state: objective, neutral, and no longer emotionally charged. As this indifference is an ambivalent state, it thus also intersects the themes of polarity, recursion and control.

Freud is sympathetic towards the contradictory emotions involved in grief, and his diagnosis thus attempts to balance each side of the paradoxes involved. The ‘ambivalence’ of the emotional attitudes is presented, in this instance, as a binary, or a series of layered binaries. The paradox of the ‘strongly marked ambivalence’ is thus representative of an attempt to grapple with the paradoxes present in the contradictions of grief. Polarity presents the oppositional forces Freud separates out as he forms the equation. Control is represented by the need to provide a solution, to return the dreamer to the self-control of a ‘real’ state of rest rather than the ‘desired’ indifference which cannot actually reconcile the imbalanced emotional forces. Recursion is the means by which Freud attempts to solve it, as each layer of the passage corresponds to, and is solved through the logic of analysis. The second analysis is thus a recursion of the first, in that the solution to the second problem is derived from the first, but in forming that second solution, Freud sheds light on the first problem that would not have been possible without analysing the second.

However, in our own recursive logic, we are also obliged to read backwards as well as forwards. As each subsequent point of Freud’s seems less a discrete example, and more of a constant recursive chain, then we must examine what came before. Directly before these dreams of the loss and return of paternal figures, at the end of the preceding chapter, Freud details a dream analysis from which the loss-and-return aspect is a reiteration. Analysis of this, the ‘*non vixit*’ dream, further demonstrates the key concepts of polarity, recursion and control. However, much as Freud’s concept of ‘ambivalence’ renders two distinctly opposing drives non-discrete, we have to, in turn, use these concepts more dynamically. In examining how the dreams interact, and speak to each other in the text, we can also formulate how those concepts

intertwine, and how they speak to the driving tension between Freud's 'analyst' and 'patient' modes.

Dream 3: *Non Vixit*

Freud's '*non vixit*' dream is one in which he summons 'ghosts' of old friends and mentors. His analysis actually makes use of two dreams. The first dream that he notes on this theme is one in which he had gone to Ernst Brücke's laboratory at night, and been confronted by Ernst von Fleischl-Marxow, setting down with a number of strangers. Freud links this thematically to a second dream, the '*non vixit*' dream. The subsequent dream has Freud once more confront the 'ghosts' of Fleischl, and his former friend and colleague Josef Paneth, along with his still-living friend, Wilhelm Fliess. However, in realising within the dream that Paneth and Fleischl are no longer alive in reality, he returns them to death. The dream hinges on Freud's 'wish' betraying a professional jealousy. The betrayal occurs in a classic Freudian slip; in the dream he uses the term '*non vixit*' (he never lived) to unsummon these apparitions, rather than 'non-vivit' (he does not live). Freud summarises in this extract:

[O]vercome by strange emotions, I tried to explain to Fl. [Fliess] that P. [Josef Paneth]²³⁴... was not alive. But what I actually said – and I myself noticed the mistake – was 'Non vixit.' I then gave P. a piercing look. Under my gaze, he turned pale; his form grew indistinct and his eyes a sickly blue – and finally he melted away. I was highly delighted at this and I now realised that Ernst Fleischl, too had been no more than an apparition, a 'revenant' ['ghost' – literally, 'one who

²³⁴ Josef Paneth (1857-90) Freud's 'friend and opponent P.', who 'succeeded to Freud's position at the [Vienna Physiological] Institute.' See Strachey's footnote, *TlD*, p. 487.

returns’]; and it seemed to me quite possible that people of that kind only existed as long as one liked and could be got rid of if someone else wished it. (TloD, p. 430, Freud’s italics)

Within his dream, once more, Freud exercises control. In thematically tying the first dream to the second, Freud establishes that there is another ghost that he dismisses within his dreams: Ernst Brücke. In reality, Freud’s former mentor, Brücke had reproached Freud for the lateness in which he attended laboratory demonstrations that he was meant to be leading by sitting in the class and reprimanding the young Freud in front of his students. Brücke’s laboratory thus held the memory-images required for the construction of both the dream of the laboratory and the ‘*non vixit*’ dream; Freud equates Brücke’s piercing blue stare to P.’s ‘eyes a sickly blue’, noting that he is able to turn the tables on his old professor through his power to dismiss the dead. Thus, the logic of the dream is recursive within Freud’s analysis: he does, in fact, exercise the power he believes he has in the dream work, to dismiss the dead. He believes himself to have, in dismissing P. and Fleischl, to have thus also dismissed Brücke.

The ‘*non vixit*’ dream is at the centre of a number of associative paths that we may follow, both forwards and backwards. Freud’s analysis hinges on the ‘mistake’ that he is able to pick up on within the dream-world, that he said ‘*non vixit*’ (he did not live) instead of ‘*non vivit*’ (he is not alive). Like the previous dreamer and his late father, Freud dismisses the dead by re-establishing the reality of their deaths in the unreal world of the dream. However, ‘*non vixit*’ serves as a stronger dismissal, eradicating the reality of the ‘revenant’ versus simply returning them to death. The ‘mistake’ thus renders Freud more potent in his conquest of former mentors and rivals, thus establishing an associative reading of professional jealousy, or that of feeling as though he had surpassed those figures in his career. Freud’s description of the piercing stare of Brücke corroborates this: ‘no-one who can remember the great man’s eyes,

which retained their striking beauty in his old age, and who has seen him in anger, will find it difficult to predict the young sinner's emotions.' (p. 431) Brücke's admonishing stare is clearly a memory conflicting with Freud's self-status as Analyst-Freud, to surreptitiously gain control over his own legacy through the 'wish' to purge this memory is understandable.

The '*non vixit*' example is thus another intersection. On the one hand, from the perspective of Analyst-Freud, the dream is an example of a top-down recursion: a greater, and more open-ended example is solved through smaller instances of the same problem, using the same logic for the solution. The logic of the '*non vixit*' analysis is derived from the logic that latent drives may manifest themselves in dreams through absurdity due to the repression of an unacceptable 'wish' towards Freud's colleagues. This in turn ultimately supports the claim that a dream is a fulfilment of a wish. This is exactly the same logic as the dream of Freud's father and the Magyars, an example which thus supports the logic of the solution to the earlier puzzle by being able to be solved in the same way. This dream does not necessarily betray the same 'disrespectful thoughts' of the second dream he introduces in that example, however. Thus, the second dream, in which the dreamer experiences a similar effect of dismissal of a 'revenant' to Freud's in-dream realisation that '*people of that kind only existed as long as one liked and could be got rid of*'.

One may argue, too, that this is thus a subordinate problem to a greater Oedipal conundrum, as Freud too demonstrates the 'stirring up of infantile thoughts against his father' through his dismissal of the 'revenant'. Freud's analysis thus not only supports his conclusions in a linear model of recursion, but in a more interlinked way, much as the 'clever woman patient's' problem also supported Freud's theory of hysterical identification. However, one may also consider the dream, and its analysis, along a different locus: that of Patient-Freud. In this direction, each 'problem' is considered as a 'problem', and not merely an example in which the premise is seen to work, as demonstrated through analysis. Instead of an explicative

situation, from this perspective, we are placed back into an analytical one. From this analytical point of view, we may read Freud's slips, his omissions, and his clear preoccupations as repetitive rather than recursive. Recursion implies a control over the problem, repetition implies a symptom, by Freud's own logic. Thus, to do so, we are still to perform a recursive function, only in its inverse form.

The logic that we are provided with to solve the problem is Freud's own. We must decide which problem is the initial, formative problem, just as Freud, in his analysis, has to determine what is the causative event to a psychical manifestation – i.e. the content of a dream versus the causal 'wish' versus the mechanism of repression. To question whether Freud is truly aware of the problem that he is trying to solve is, on some level, a reiteration of his own methodology. We find ourselves at another, extra-textual level of recursion, seeking to apply the same logic to a linked problem. We thus occupy the analyst's position of attempting to apply control to a situation which we have evaluated as betraying a lack of control, where 'reality' is subsumed by 'desire', as in the problem of ambiguity and indifference in the dream of the ill father. The fact that this problem is fundamentally unsolvable places us in a similar bind of polarity to the paradoxical situation that the dreamer found himself in: we want to solve it, we are given the tools to solve it, but the problem remains elusive, forever turning around the two possible solutions: repetition and recursion.

Thus, instead of an 'analyst-mode', in which Analyst-Freud demonstrates the concepts from the point of view of a character who has already solved the text's problems, the 'Holmes', in following this logic we are treating his Patient-Freud self-representation like the unreliable 'Watson'. We are thus engaging an 'analyst-mode' of our own, in re-interrogating the text, attempting to determine which 'Freud' truly holds sway. Freud solves the problems that his authorial persona is 'pre-ordained' to solve, through the explication of his analysis. However, through his self-revelation, we are party to problems that Freud appears to solve, but also seem

to weigh more upon him than he suggests, playing as much a part in the solution as the problems he presents. Freud the man could not have the control over the emotional triggers that Freud the persona could: Freud's control arises through analysis.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

In this thesis, one of the key concerns has been the relevance to Freud's work of a range of conceptualisations of the notion of energy. In its various forms, it has been argued, the concept of energy underpins the essence of Freud's thought on how the human mind functions. His notion of energy was modified and progressively refined in the light of contemporary thinking from other disciplines, and it has provided a tool for examining several key Freudian works and concerns in the body of the thesis. The term 'energy', much like other important concepts in Freud's thought, such as the 'psyche' or the 'self', is superficially accessible, but it quickly unravels into complexity the more closely it is examined. The self is the most fundamental concept to our understanding of our world, it is our place within it; we explore it with our own senses, and we understand it with our thoughts. Energy, too, is fundamental to that understanding; it is a constant, indestructible force which forms the backbone of our universe. Without it, there could be no concept of action, development, discovery, or recovery.

Ironically, the basis for Freud's deconstruction of the notion of the oneness of the self, and its replacement with one of dualistic narcissism, is propagated through an understanding of the 'otherness' within the self which depends upon notions of the properties of energy. Energy may be transferred, may flow as a current, may exist between potential and kinetic states, and may never be created or destroyed – all of these are integral to Freud's various models of the mind's functionality. His challenge arises as he finds discrepancies between what should be registered as important and what is repeated by the patient, a dichotomy encapsulated in the interaction between the manifest and the latent content of dreams. Freud sets about developing structures through which we may rebalance, the equation. Thus, as the self holds the dynamic between the biological imperative and abstract thought, so too does energy operate on both physical and metaphorical levels.

Originally, as argued in Chapter 3, energy was a term used to describe metaphor, and it then became a term for a concept that we may only access through metaphor itself. The same may be said of psychoanalysis, because it can be viewed as a metaphorical concept for examining the conceptual domain. This study has thus approached Freud's work from the point of view that the mode of operation of metaphor is an important means of understanding the process of psychoanalysis, at least, in its written form.

Freud's own application of the metaphor spawned the school of psychodynamics, in which the psychology of the self is determined through the interrelation of forces between the unconscious, the conscious, and the perception of the external world. Our own concept of 'dynamism', as put forward in the thesis, has developed from a consideration of the literally polarised action of the dynamo, which is energy produced by a constant fluctuation between positive and negative states in order to generate motor force. However, instead of polarised points to drive a motor, or the 'drive' of Freud's work, we have thus examined a different form of drive, a dualised force which motivates the exchange between text and reader, analyst and patient, as well as that between dualistic entities within the analyst.

So, this thesis has examined Freud's work by using a 'dynamist' notion of the creation of a textual space, defined as a site of co-operative engagement between several operative dualisms. It has employed ideas from the cognitivist school of thought and language to demonstrate the creation of 'non-spatial space'. A cognitivist study might well be able to rival the subtlety of Freud's 'depth' psychology, yet, as we have argued, Freud's own work is, in many ways, largely an attempt at a similar endeavour. Even the very concept of a '*depth*' psychology spatialises the abstract concept of 'mind' – as set apart from the physical, organic 'brain' – in order to understand it.

This has been demonstrated in our selection of materials and examples in which Freud examines a space that is also not a space. Thus, we have demonstrated the appearance of displaced and distorted reality in a ‘memory’ which is proven not to be a memory at all, but what Freud calls a ‘screen memory’. We have discussed Freud, standing in suspended metaphysical disbelief at the Acropolis in Athens, the ruins before him being perceived as real, but also somehow unreal, or less ‘real’ than the cultural memory recalled from schooldays. In Freud’s analysis of the dream work, we have engaged with dreams which point towards one reality, but suggest another. In each of these situations, it is for the analyst to determine what is ‘real’, i.e. what is the actual motivating circumstance behind the patient’s psychological reaction, which caused the perceived and felt break with reality.

In each of these cases, as we saw, Freud necessarily *analyses himself*, playing the part of both patient and analyst. Thus, it was argued that even Freud’s self is dualised, into the constructed role of an idealised analyst, expressed in the paternalistic voice of the text, but also merging into that of the patient. The implied composite reality, Freud as ‘ideal author’, in which the self is effaced, is often challenged and sometimes subsumed by the reality of himself as the patient of a self-analysis. This situation explicitly utilises the first description of this polarisation which we put forward, which had Freud’s dividing his constructed writing persona into two composite figures, Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud. The polarising factor here is that the text is driven through metaphorical dialogue; the psychodynamic is portrayed through the textual dynamic of the interaction between the two states.

In the motor, or dynamo paradigm, both opposing states – positive and negative – must reverse to become the other in order to generate ‘drive’. Freud’s narrative ‘voice’, too, alternates between these states (analyst and analysand) in order to drive the text. With regards to the specific example of ‘On Screen Memories’, misdirecting faux memories, this is reinforced through the reading of a dialogue which isn’t a dialogue between two people, but

between two representations of states within Freud himself. Such dialogue is striking in that the two positions inhabited by Freud become explicit; the deployment of each of Freud's characterised positions 'turns' the text as a motor turns a shaft. The patient-position seeks to inhabit that of the analyst, and momentarily does so as the analyst-position assumes a more passive role, that of being explained to, but regains its authority in order to correct the patient's course.

In Chapter 5, we expanded upon this by more closely examining how Freud entices that interrogation, and creates an implicit narrative beyond that of the initial problem-and-solution account. The patient persona, in that case, gained a measure of understanding, but never seemed to achieve a permanent self-transformation, so the 'solution' to the mystery of the symptom was found, but the underlying cause of the condition remained contingent and open-ended. This is because the analyst figure set the patient a further problem, which the patient was unable to solve, using the same logic that he was supposed to have assimilated through the psychoanalytic process.

The dialogue within the text, as has been argued throughout, is not the only polarity at work. The reader must be aware of, and sceptical about, their own active role in shaping the text. It is for this reason that concepts such as cognitivism and narratology are important to any study of Freud. However, instead of regarding narrative as the end in and of itself, we have regarded it as part of another polarised schema. There are constructive elements which provoke narrative engagement, but also counter-narrative elements which cause a deliberate rethinking of our engagement with the text. For example, Chapter 2 employed a reading of 'On Screen Memories' by interrogating the dynamics of a 'fact' as both represented and created through narrative, and subsequently distorted by conflicting narratives. The implicit dialogue in that scenario is with the reader, the voice of authority in the text ultimately turning to the reader –

implied to be seeking to 'become' the analyst in the same way as the patient – to arbitrate on the nature of a remembered 'fact' by interrogating the text.

Thus, we have argued that it is up to the reader, armed with ever-changing and oscillating 'frame-knowledge' relative to the text in front of them, to complete that space through inference. Freud's narrative practice invites such theorisation utilising deictic elements in order to construct working theories and definitions, yet controls it through the use of counter-deictic elements. These include the way that Freudian texts present the patient as well as the analyst as having drawn premature conclusions, which amounts to a tacit provisionalisation of all the material at issue. Hence, we have seen readers, as always needing, in the end, to find their own way out of the maze. Readers read by re-adjusting their own potential conclusions accordingly, and thus co-building the maze they seek to find the way out of.

These various paradoxical relationships within the text, we have argued, reflect relationships outside of it. For instance, the paradox of Freud as both artist and scientist, as a narcissist disavowing narcissism, and as a conqueror of the unknown who warns us against the lust for conquest. He particularly warns us to beware of the heady glamour which attaches to the role of the archaeologist while simultaneously pursuing his own practice of textual archaeology. These self-images were highlighted by our building upon Malcolm Bowie's identification of Freud's notion of himself 'as archaeologist and as *conquistador*' (in *Freud, Proust and Lacan*). Freud's self is very much in focus as he destabilises the ideal of the self in others. Writing himself as a 'refuse archaeologist' (that is, as an archaeologist of what has been jettisoned or discarded as useless), Freud occupies the seemingly-paradoxical position of analysing material, which may be just 'refuse', but gains its value from having 'lain beside gold' (like the screen memory). This foregrounds the thrill of the moment of discovering the gold, rather than the gold itself, for the gold is made discoverable by having its gleam set off

by the refuse lying beside it, against which it gleams by contrast. This, of course, was another of the crucial dualisms identified within Freudian thinking.

It is fair to criticise Freud's failures of empathy as the analyst is supposed to have a greater working knowledge of the analytical situation than the patient. Conversely, one thing that is not always so evident in the study of Freud is the amount of care that he takes to portray his subject thoroughly, specifically, and without prejudice. When he lapses from those ideals, we are being as hard on him as he is hard on himself, as we are therefore supporting those ideals of objectivity. Dividing his written persona into Analyst-Freud and Patient-Freud, we have thus considered the many paradoxical forces competing for control of the text as they simultaneously build and drive that conceptual space. This made for a more 'anxious' reading of Freud in this thesis than has been traditional. Freud was ahead of the majority of his peers in this regard, given the increasingly restrictive direction and effects of their experiments in psychobiology, as discussed, compared to those of Freud's development of the 'talking cure'. Arguably, they pursued a metaphor too far; in this case, the metaphor of the mind as machine.

After examining the relationships between the two metaphorical 'Freuds' and the internal dualism within metaphor itself, the thesis moved on to a reciprocal reading of Freud and Arthur Conan Doyle. It has been argued here (as in many other places) that a major Doyleian aspect of Freudianism is Freud's identification with Doyle's most famous creation, Sherlock Holmes. However, much of this earlier work has shown how the psychoanalytic case-study, like the Holmesian case, foregrounds the process of deduction and discovery against the backdrop of the discovery itself. The present thesis has gone further than this familiar axis by analysing parallel Freudian-Holmesian structural features, such as the polarised function of composite dialogue, and the creation of textual spaces, termed 'worlds', through both constructive and counter-constructive elements – i.e. deixis and counterdeixis. The Doyle-Freud parallelism is also extended beyond the notion of Holmes as a Freudian prototype by

providing co-analyses of Doyle's Spiritualist and Science Fiction writing and demonstrating major Freudian affinities in Doyle's work in those genres.

In these paralleled readings of Freud and Doyle, use was made of key narratological functions named as polarity, recursion and control, and these were combined, on the metaphorical level, with the Freudian tripartite model of 'ego', 'superego' and 'id' to demonstrate a method of proactive readerly interpretation, in both the case studies and the fiction. Polarity, recursion and control interlock, and help to demonstrate the principles of dualistic and tripartite reciprocity, which form the backbone of the thesis. This reflects the constant progressive evolution, throughout the *longue durée* of his career, of Freud's terminology and, in turn, his patient and nuanced approach to the explication of mental functioning. In particular, returning to the 'mind as machine' analogy, we noted that 'recursion' is a term derived from computer programming. It treats the text as an interface, and subsequently sees the act of reading as a 'system'. But like Freud, we do not take the next 'logical' step and conclude that the mind is a computer. Rather, we make use of the concept as an analogy, a way of conceptualising the mind, and not as an indication that we should concede the world to the makers of algorithms. The term thus remains a figure of speech, poised between two realms, like the 'science' in 'fiction' and like the 'fiction' in 'science'.

This has brought us, then, to our own time, and our increasingly dependent relationship on technology which is, once again, at a stage of unprecedented and hyper-accelerated development. Cognitivist studies, we have argued, may have distanced themselves from the arguments of the 1980s and 90s, as exemplified by 'Strong AI' and the 'Chinese room' figure of John Searle. However, recent advances in machine learning, from deep learning to more advanced models which approach cognition and imaginative interpretation, have once more opened up conversations from earlier periods discussed in the thesis. The closer we are to achieving a 'true' artificial intelligence, the more a new wave of critiques of the interaction

between mind and machine becomes necessary, and is already becoming an important part of the conversation. The potential issue with a cognitivist reading is to regard everything as data. The lure of physical interventions in the study of the mind has again become attractive to many. If mind were literally a machine, then high-tech versions of Freud's early mechanistic approaches, such as the use of hypnosis and cocaine, would seem to offer a way of short-circuiting inquiry in a futile attempt to remedy limitations or defects of the mind by tinkering with the brain itself. That is the path which Freud, to his great credit, swerved away from.

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Abbreviations used for Freud's works

S.E. – Standard Edition

NIL – New Introductory Lectures

BtPP – Beyond the Pleasure Principle

TloD – The Interpretation of Dreams

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Works by Sigmund Freud:

In order to give some semblance of order to Freud's text, the attempt made here is to present them in chronological order, starting with the year in which the texts were first published. This is difficult, as most of the primary texts used in this thesis were taken from collected editions, published by Penguin. However, the hope is that this demonstrates how certain works benefit from being described as 'earlier' or 'later' Freud.

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